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ABSTRACT 
Can imaginative literature make a substantive contribution to ethical 
reflection? If so, what is the nature of this contribution and what is its 
value? What role can literature play in moral enquiry? Can literature 
help moral philosophy to shed light on moral questions? Can 
literature furnish moral knowledge that is unaccounted for, or 
unaccountable, in the traditional methods of philosophical reflection? 
In addressing these questions, my aim in this thesis is to construct a 
comprehensive and critical account of the contribution to ethics that 
imaginative literature (particularly in the form of the novel) can make 
within and alongside traditional moral philosophy. 
First, I consider the character of moral philosophy, conceived as 
a normative enterprise, and review some systemic limitations of 
normative ethics. I then examine the arguments of some prominent 
philosophers concerning literature's role in helping to identify and 
address these issues. 
Second, in examining the aspects of literature which render it 
valuable to ethical reflection, I consider the formal distinctions 
between literature and traditional moral philosophy, and investigate 
the unique role of literary devices. The arguments here provide the 
foundation for my proposition that the value of the connection 
between philosophy and literature depends crucially on the 
distinction between them. 
The third chapter deals with literature's ability to illustrate, 
challenge and test a moral perspective, and so help to reveal and 
illuminate features of the ethical life that cannot be apprehended via 
traditional philosophical reflection alone. To illustrate this expansion 
of the philosophical method, I consider aspects of Kantian ethics and 
utilitarianism in light of a select number of literary works. I argue that 
sympathy is crucial to the realisation of genuine ethical ends. The 
argument is that seeing the world through the eyes of others enables 
one not only to understand their motives and actions, and to consider 
one's own responses to similar circumstances, but that, in doing so, 
one can uncover the extent to which a moral stance comports with 
one's own ethical convictions, how that stance can accommodate these 
convictions, or how these convictions need modifying in light of that 
stance. Because fiction both exercises and confers a number of 
important freedoms, fictional literature is an ideal tool for the 
exploration of ethical concepts. Moreover, as the apotheosis of 
extended, connected fictional narratives, it is further argued that the 
novel is the ideal literary mode for this exploration. However, if 
literature is such a valuable supplement to philosophical reflection, 
why can we not treat literature itself as a form of moral philosophy? 
As an adjunct to philosophical reflection, literature can enhance 
our moral understanding in a manner that does justice to us as 
complex beings in complex conditions, and in a way that traditional 
philosophical reflection alone cannot. Literature has the power not 
only to move us, but to help us shape our lives and make reality out of 
ethical reflections. However, as literature's ability to make this 
contribution is a consequential feature of its form, there is sufficient 
reason not to treat literature as moral philosophy, which requires its 
own very different approach. I conclude by arguing that cooperation 
between literature and moral philosophy can enhance moral 
understanding to an extent unachievable via either form of discourse 
alone, and that this enhancement flows directly from the distinction 
between the two. 
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ETHICS AND THE ROLE FOR LITERATURE 
Morality is a subject which interests us above all others: We 
fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision 
concerning it; and 'tis evident, that this concern must make 
our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the 
subject is, in a great measure, indifferent to us. 
David Humel 
Can imaginative literature make a substantive contribution to ethical 
reflection? If so, what is the nature of this contribution and what is its 
value? What role can literature play in moral enquiry? Can literature help 
moral philosophy to shed light on moral questions? Can literature furnish 
moral knowledge that is unaccounted for, or unaccountable, in the 
traditional methods of philosophical reflection? 2 In addressing these 
questions, my aim is to construct a comprehensive and critical account of 
the contribution to morality that imaginative literature (particularly in the 
form of the novel) can make within and alongside moral philosophy. 
In this thesis I argue not only that literature can furnish a valuable 
supplement to ethical thought, but that it can also contribute autonomously 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), (Oxford: 1965), p. 456 
2 
to our individual understanding of the ethical life. I further argue that 
attention to the connections between the two enterprises promises fruitful 
outcomes, namely, a deeper understanding and richer conception of 
morality than can be achieved by philosophical reflection alone. At the crux 
of my case I argue that the value of this relation depends on the distinction 
between the two enterprises, and that the contribution that literature, 
particularly the novel, offers to moral philosophy is a consequential feature 
of its form. 
An Apparent Dichotomy 
In an essay on morality and the novel, D. H. Lawrence wrote, 'The business 
of art is to reveal the relation between man and his circumambient 
universe, at the living moment.' 3 Compare Lawrence's evaluation of the 
descriptive role of literature with the essentially prescriptive function that 
Socrates assigns to moral philosophy in Plato's Republic: 'We are discussing 
no small matter, but how we ought to live.' 4 
The respective roles assigned to literature and moral philosophy by 
Lawrence and Socrates imply a dichotomy between two divergent 
enterprises. At one end of the cognitive spectrum, there is imaginative 
literature, with its descriptive, contextual role of indirectly mirroring the 
personal, social and historical milieu from which a narrative emerges and 
in which its characters and their actions and attitudes exist - albeit in a 
fictional sense. At the other end, there is moral philosophy, including 
normative ethics, with its traditional aim of seeking rational justification for 
general and abstract moral principles to guide the conduct of human beings 
in relation to one another and to all else that shares their life world. While 
the descriptive process of literature reveals how an agent does, or might, 
relate to his or her life world, the normative function of moral philosophy 
prescribes how he or she ought to relate to it. 
2 My attention to these questions was first drawn by John Norris in his "Philosophy and Literature" 
in Cogito (vol. 11, no 1, April 1997), p. 16 
3 D. H. Lawrence, 'Morality and the Novel' in Phoenix, (London: 1936), p. 527 
4 Plato, The Republic, various editions and translations, sec 352d 
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The distinction is further illuminated by noting that in normative 
ethics, prescriptive and evaluative judgements are typically central, and 
overtly expressed with a focus on generality, on universally applicable 
rules or formulae. On the other hand, in most imaginative literature 
evaluative judgements are typically only implied in the text, embedded in 
aesthetically shaped language and literary devices, rather than overtly 
expressed. And while philosophy deals with the abstract, imaginative 
literature is concerned with the concrete individual, and the path that he or 
she has chosen to navigate through the messy particularities of life. 5 In a 
discussion with Bryan Magee concerning the relation between literature 
and philosophy, Iris Murdoch enumerates further substantive differences 
between them: 
In her discussion of the differences, Murdoch draws the 
following distinctions: literature does many things, philosophy 
does one thing (has one aim); literature is natural, philosophy is 
counter-natural; literature arouses emotion, philosophy tries to 
eliminate emotion appeal; literature is indirect, philosophy is 
direct; literature has no problem to solve, philosophy seeks to 
solve a few technical and abstract problems; literature is 
concerned with aesthetic form, philosophy does not aim at 
formal perfection.6 
How these differences bear on literature's possible contribution to ethical 
reflection will emerge in the course of this thesis. However, the existence of 
even substantial differences does not imply that there is no connection 
between literature and philosophy, or that the connection between them 
cannot be valuable. At the very least, they share an interest in the same 
subject matter. To a greater or lesser degree, each has an interest in, and 
seeks to understand and articulate its understanding of, human existence. 
But this is a truism; at best a trivial observation that if a thing is about life, 
5 I hold to one side the debate over this point sparked by Hare's remark that ' ...no work of fiction 
can be about a concrete individual.' (See his 'Universalisability,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
55, 1954/5, p. 310) In chapter 41 defend against Hare my position that rather than obfuscate 
philosophical features of moral significance, literature can alert us to their existence. I take the term 
'messy particularities' from C.A.J. Coady in his "Literature, power and the recovery of philosophical 
ethics" in Adamson, Freadman and Parker (eds.), Renegotiating Ethics in Literature, Philosophy and 
Theory, (Cambridge: 1998), p. 13 
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be it prescriptive or descriptive, performative or evaluative, then it shares 
at least something with anything else that is about life. 
However, assuming that there is a substantive connection that 
transcends merely a shared interest in a general topic, where does it lie, and 
what is its value to ethical reflection? Moreover, if we take seriously the 
proposition that art is pointless unless it can furnish something not 
attainable by other means, then what can literature provide that cannot be 
obtained through philosophical reflection alone. 7 
Four Possible Connections 
Consider D. D. Raphael's conception of the possible relations between 
literature and philosophy. In 'Can Literature be Moral Philosophy?'s he 
examines four possible meanings of the thesis that there is a positive 
connection between literature and moral philosophy. He expresses these 
meanings in the form of four propositions: first, a work of moral 
philosophy can also be a work of literature; second, a work of literature can 
also be a work of moral philosophy; third, moral philosophy can feed 
literature; and, fourth, literature can feed moral philosophy. 9 
On the first proposition, that a work of moral philosophy can also be 
a work of literature, it is generally accepted that a number of works of 
philosophy possess literary merit without compromising their status as 
works of 'serious' philosophy. Many of Plato's dialogues qualify in this 
regard, as does, for example, Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous and Hobbes' Leviathan. These are excellent examples of how 
6 Bryan Magee, Men of Ideas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 242 
7 'Unless art delivers values that life without art cannot, it is pointless.' 
Edgar Sleinis, Art and Freedom, (Urbana: 2003), p. 1. In this thesis I leave to one side questions 
concerning definitions of art and what counts as art. For the purposes of my argument, I assume 
that, insofar as it is a work of imaginative literature, the novel counts as a mode of literary art. I am 
concerned with what makes the novel, as a form of literary art, valuable to ethical reflection. I defend 
the normative nature of my enquiry later in this chapter. 
8 D. D. Raphael, 'Can Literature be Moral Philosophy?' in New Literary History vol. XV, 1983-1984, pp. 
1-12 
9j will examine in greater detail each of these propositions in chapter five. The brief account which 
follows is intended merely to establish the overall context of this project. 
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philosophical arguments can be communicated in a literary mode. 10 These 
are Raphael's examples of works of moral philosophy that qualify as works 
of literature or possess literary merit. While the Berkeley text is not strictly 
a work of moral philosophy, I take Raphael's point. But a text with more 
overtly moral themes, such as Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra may 
perhaps serve as a more apt example. 
Two important questions need to be addressed to the first 
proposition. One, by reference to what criteria may we ascribe literary 
merit? Two, does the mere fact that a work of philosophy possesses literary 
merit qualify it as a work of literature? A response to the second question, 
informed by the answer to the first (both of which I address chapter 5), 
needs a viable definition of literature, one that covers all forms of discourse, 
including philosophical prose. If it is true, as I will argue, that the 
significance to ethical reflection of the connection between literature and 
philosophy lies in the distinction between the two enterprises, then answers 
to these questions have a crucial bearing on how to account for the value of 
this connection. 
These answers also have a crucial bearing on Raphael's second 
proposition, that a work of literature can also be a work of moral 
philosophy. To value literature for the distinctive contribution that it offers 
to philosophical reflection is to acknowledge a distinction between 
literature and philosophy, and to accord importance' to the distinction itself. 
But, as I propose in the chapters that follow, to accept the second 
proposition is to reduce one form of discourse to another form of discourse, 
and there are good arguments that the power of the connection between 
philosophy and literature would be severely attenuated thereby. 11 
On Raphael's third proposition, that moral philosophy can feed 
literature, it is clear that material in numerous distinctly philosophical 
perspectives can, and often do, provide rich thematic material for works of 
I0 Raphael, op. cit. p. 2. I will examine Raphael's arguments concerning what features endow works 
such as these with specifically literary merit in chapter five. 
II To a certain extent this argument constitutes the crux of my thesis. The final section of chapter five 
is devoted to a discussion of this proposition. 
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fiction. The thematic preoccupations of Charles Dickens' Hard Times,12 for 
example, are clearly responsive to the utilitarian thought that characterised 
moral debate in nineteenth-century Britain. As a literary exploration into 
the concept of ends justifying means, William Faulkner's Intruder in the 
Dust13 offers a convincing and somewhat damning portrayal of 
utilitarianism's inability to accommodate the welfare of the individual in 
conflict with the greatest good for the greatest number. Existentialist 
themes abound in the literary works of French writer-philosophers Jean-
Paul Sartre and Albert Camus; the latter's The Outsiderl4constitutes a classic 
literary articulation of the existential notion of absurdity and remains one 
of the most significant illustrations of amorality. Jane Austen's novels are 
evidently informed by philosophical questions of virtue and character. 15 
More recently, we find issues concerning moral duty represented in the 
actions and attitudes of characters in Kazuo Ishiguro's Remains the Day,16 in 
which Kantian notions of detachment and rationality are contrasted with 
sentimentality and passion. 
What is unclear in the third proposition, however, is how strong the 
connection needs to be, and how confidently we can determine that the 
connection holds. While it may be reasonable to assume that the literary 
works of philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Iris Murdoch, insofar as 
they exemplify their authors' own philosophical views, are in some 
measure fed by such views, it is clearly not the case that only novels that 
have been written by bona fide moral philosophers merit serious moral 
attention. Nor does their status as bona fide moral philosophers alone confer 
moral authority on their novels. As Raphael himself suggests, 'the 
possession of moral insight is not a prerogative of moral philosophers and 
indeed is sadly lacking in some of them.' 17 For authors in general, the 
relation 'to feed' is harder to construe. If a particular novel, say Dickens' 
12 Hard Times, (Oxford: 1989) 
13 Intruder in the Dust, (New York: 1964) 
14 me  Outsider, trans. Joseph Laredo, (Harmondsworth: 1983) 
15 Her Emma (Harmondsworth: 1996) is an excellent example. 
16 Remains the Day, (New York: 1993) 
17 Raphael, op. cit., p. 2 
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Hard Times, shares its thematic preoccupations with a body of moral theory 
such as utilitarianism, or deontology, or contract ethics or virtue theory, 
how confidently can we infer that the doctrine fed the novel and that this 
shared interest (whether or not they draw the same conclusions) is not just 
a coincidence; or a reflection of the moral preoccupations of the day that 
have, in turn, informed philosophical and literary endeavours to 
understand lived experience in the society from which both have 
contemporaneously emerged?18 
Uncritically accepting the third proposition risks reducing all literary 
works with moral issues as their subject matter to works with moral 
philosophy as their subject matter, and thus to mere articulations of 
philosophical perspectives that subordinate literature to philosophy. Thus 
we could blur the line that separates the two enterprises. For all its 
dependence on a distinction between the two enterprises (for the relation 
'to feed' to hold there must be a feeder and a fed), proposition three risks 
collapsing into either proposition one or proposition two. This is clearly not 
Raphael's intention, despite his acknowledgement of the thinness of this 
proposition. 19 The other danger is that, at its limit, the proposition that 
philosophy feeds literature implies that only literary works that are 
informed by prior formal philosophical reflection can be of genuine moral 
value, that such downstream 'feeding' is a necessary condition of moral 
seriousness. This, however, as will be shown in later chapters, is an 
unsound conclusion to draw from the outer reaches of one possible 
interpretation of this proposition. 
None of this entails that philosophical doctrines cannot furnish 
excellent material for works of imaginative literature. On the contrary, 
distinctly philosophical reflections have, directly or indirectly, provided 
material for some very fine novels, including Dickens' Hard Times. The 
claim is not that moral philosophy cannot valuably feed literature, but that 
the upshot of the proposition that it does so depends on how the term 
18 I examine these questions in chapter five. 
19 'Proposition three,' he writes, 'Is thinner than proposition four.' op. cit., p. 1 
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'feed' can reasonably be construed. Moreover, the claim that the 
proposition is plainly true has implications that require deeper 
examination.20 
Investigation of the role that imaginative literature can play both 
alongside and within a distinctly philosophical mode of reflection, 
however, can usefully focus on Raphael's fourth proposition, that literature 
can feed moral philosophy. He offers two meanings for the term 'feed' in 
this context, each of which constitutes a subtly different account (both of 
which I deal with in this thesis). The first meaning generates what can be 
called the 'propositional' account of the relation between literature and 
ethical reflection: 'If someone says that literature feeds moral philosophy,' 
writes Raphael, 'he may mean that the characters or situations in a work of 
literature can be used as evidence for some issues in moral philosophy.' 21 
On this account, literature can reveal or elucidate facts concerning ethical 
life that have the potential for substantive impact on the truth value, 
plausibility or practicability of moral propositions. This account of the 
value of the connection between philosophy and literature is endorsed by 
R. W. Beardsmore. He argues that literary representations of moral 
problems, situations and possibilities can furnish examples and counter-
examples to 'illustrate and test our philosophical theories.' 22 The value of 
literature here is largely cognitive. In the context of its relation to moral 
philosophy, literature's value is derived from its being a source of ethical 
understanding, and it is accorded significance by reference to what it can 
reveal about ethical issues and ethical theories. This notion resonates with 
the first of two claims that Martha Nussbaum makes for a moral agent's 
reading experience in her Poetic Justice? 3 She holds that novel in particular, 
and novel-reading, can provide '...insights that should play a role (though 
not as uncriticized foundations) in the construction of an adequate moral 
20 1 examine more deeply these implications in chapter five. 
21 Raphael, op. cit., p. 1 
22 R. W. Beardsmore, "Literary Examples and Philosophical Confusion" in Philosophy and Literature, 
(Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series: 16, Supplement to Philosophy, 1983), 
p. 60. The italics are mine. I will examine these functions of literature in the next chapter. 
23 Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995) 
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and political theory.' 24 For Nussbaum, like Beardsmore and Raphael, 
novels are a particularly important source of material that can be of real 
service in the specifically philosophical endeavour of providing defensible 
principles of morality. Indeed, Raphael claims that this proposition 
constitutes by far the 'most obvious, the richest, and the most satisfying' 
relation between moral philosophy and literature. 25 
The second meaning considered by Raphael of the notion that 
literature can feed philosophy appears to entail that some effect is 
produced in the reader's moral outlook: 'But to say that literature feeds 
moral philosophy can also mean that literature may stimulate a 
philosophical perception which otherwise might have been missed.' 26 If by 
'philosophical perception' Raphael means some ethical consideration that 
may have been overlooked in direct philosophising, and a literary work 
reminded us of or alerted us to its existence or bearing, then it is difficult to 
see how this second meaning can significantly differ from the propositional 
account. If, however, he means that there is a moral dimension that is 
inaccessible via traditional philosophical reflection yet accessible through 
literature, or through an amalgam of the two endeavours, and that this 
access adds something valuable to ethical reflection, then the distinction 
between the two accounts, as well as the importance of the second account, 
becomes apparent. Rather than merely being an adjunct to moral 
philosophy, as would be the case if literature's only value to ethical 
reflection lay in its capacity to help philosophy to develop and access 
proposals about ethical issues, this 'attitudinal' account implies that 
something about literature enables it to contribute in its own right 
something that cannot be attained by moral philosophy alone. This 
construal accords with Nussbaum's second claim for the contribution to 
morality that novel-reading can make: 'it develops moral capacities,' she 
argues, 'without which citizens will not succeed in making reality out of the 
normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however 
24 ibid., p. 12 
25 Raphael, op. cit. 
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excellent.' 27 For Nussbaum, these 'moral capacities' are necessary for an 
agent's successful grasp and application of moral rules, principles, ideals or 
arguments. This is important: for without genuine motivating force, 'the 
power,' as Anthony Cunningham says, 'to move us/ 28 a moral theory 
consists in mere stipulation, and is thus inadequate. Novel-reading can 
cultivate internal states that facilitate the capacity to recognise ethical 
significance and act on, and thereby to make reality out of, relevant and 
worthwhile ethical prescriptions. Because it is a function of normative 
ethics to furnish injunctions that require being committed to or consistently 
acted on, this second claim implies that imaginative literature must be 
given an especially important place in ethical reflection. Thus, the 
distinction between the two accounts turns on the distinction between 
cognition and motivation: the first account points to a possibility of ethical 
seriousness or a proposition concerning an ethical perspective, the second 
furnishes reasons to act in relation to such a possibility or proposition. 
A growing number of moral philosophers are convinced that both 
interpretations of the proposition that literature can feed moral philosophy 
offer something valuable, and that insights derived from literature can 
augment ethical arguments in meaningful and substantive ways. They 
argue that a marriage between imaginative literature and philosophical 
reflection can, as Cunningham puts it, '...open the door to a richer 
conception of moral philosophy that can speak to the heart of what matters 
in a human life and character.' 29 
The Argument 
In the rest of this chapter, I consider the character of moral philosophy, 
conceived as a normative enterprise, and examine in outline the major 
approaches to ethics. I also consider some systemic limitations of normative 
ethics, and examine the arguments of some prominent philosophers 
26 ibid. 
27 Nussbaum, op. cit. 
28 Anthony Cunningham, The Heart of What Matters, (Berkeley: 2001), p. 10 
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concerning literature's role in helping to identify and address these issues. 
In the following three chapters, I critically examine those features of 
literature that render it valuable as a supplement to philosophical 
reflection. 
Chapter two, The Form and Content Connection, deals with the formal 
distinctions between literature and traditional moral philosophy, and 
investigates the role of such literary devices as point of view, language and 
plot. The arguments in this chapter provide the foundation for the 
proposition that the value of the connection between philosophy and 
literature depends crucially on the distinction between them. 
Chapter three, The Expansion of Methods, deals with literature's ability 
to illustrate, challenge and test a moral perspective, and so help to reveal 
and illuminate features of the ethical life that cannot be apprehended via 
traditional philosophical reflection alone. To illustrate this expansion of the 
philosophical method, I consider aspects of Kantian ethics and 
utilitarianism in light of a select number of literary works. I also review the 
claim that, because of its emphasis on character, the incorporation of 
literature into ethical reflection is most congenial to virtue ethics. Moreover, 
as J. R. Lucas observes, 'We are able, on occasion, by the exercise of a 
certain sympathy.. .to penetrate behind observable behaviour and to put 
ourselves in another's shoes and to see, to feel, to understand, what we 
ourselves would do if situated in his circumstances.' 3° A 'certain sympathy' 
is thus crucial to the realisation of genuine ethical ends. The argument is 
that seeing the world through the eyes of others enables one not only to 
understand their motives and actions, and to consider one's own responses 
to similar circumstances, but that, in doing so, one can uncover the extent to 
which a moral stance comports with one's own ethical convictions, how 
29 ibid., p. 3. I shall investigate the substance of these arguments in the following chapter. 
30 J. R. Lucas, 'The Soul,' in Basil Mitchell, ed., Faith and Logic, (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1957), p. 142 
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that stance can accommodate these convictions, or how these convictions 
need modifying in light of that stance. But one must possess an extensive 
freedom to do this. 
Chapter four, The Scope of Fiction and the Ascendancy of the Novel, 
advances the argument that, because fiction both exercises and confers a 
number of important freedoms, including those which flow from the 
provision of an indefinite number of new perspectives unavailable via 
other means, fictional literature is an ideal tool for the exploration of ethical 
concepts. Given these arguments, I then ask: is all fiction valuable? This 
chapter concludes with the argument that, because the novel can depict the 
complexities of moral life more effectively than other narrative forms, it is 
the apotheosis of literary supplements to ethical reflection. However, it has 
been argued that, if literature is such a valuable supplement to 
philosophical reflection, why can we not treat literature itself as a form of 
moral philosophy? 
Chapter five, Can Literature be Moral Philosophy?, deals in greater 
detail with the four propositions that Raphael advances for the connection 
between the two enterprises and his argument that the implications of each 
confirm that that some literature can properly be regarded as moral 
philosophy in its own right. I argue that, while literature can make a 
genuinely valuable contribution to ethical reflection and the development 
of moral insight, it cannot be an effective substitute for systematic 
philosophical reflection and analysis. As an adjunct to philosophical 
reflection, however, literature can enhance our moral understanding in a 
manner that does justice to us as complex beings in complex conditions, 
and in a way that traditional philosophical reflection alone cannot. 
Literature has the power not only to move us, but to help us shape our lives 
13 
and make reality out of ethical reflections. 31 It follows that, as literature's 
ability to make this contribution is a consequential feature of its own form, 
there is sufficient reason not to treat literature as moral philosophy, which 
requires its own very different approach. I conclude the chapter, and the 
thesis, by arguing that cooperation between literature and moral 
philosophy can enhance moral understanding to an extent unachievable via 
either form of discourse alone, and that this enhancement flows directly 
from the distinction between the two. 
In the course of argument, normative conclusions are unavoidable about 
the role of narrative art in moral philosophy, the extent to which it can be 
effective there, and which forms of narrative are most valuable. Therefore, 
this project is itself to an extent normative. In identifying and clarifying 
those features of literature that render it valuable to ethics, implications 
follow for the value of the literature with these features. This is consistent 
with received notions of normative enquiry, even in the philosophy of art. 
As Gordon Graham writes: 
Normative theory of art is not concerned with the essential 
nature of 'art' but with explaining the different ways in which it 
can be of value and the relative importance that we should 
attach to each.32 
This thesis, however, does not constitute a comprehensive philosophy of 
literature. Aesthetic considerations are limited to their contribution to the 
value of narrative art in the specific area of ethical reflection. My principal 
concern is moral philosophy, the extent to which it captures the things that 
matter in our lives, and how literature may be of value in realising its aims 
in this regard. To this end, my thesis aims at clarifying and evaluating the 
role that literature can play within that discipline, as well as the role it can 
play in our quotidian moral concerns. To be sure, there is more to say about 
31 cf Colin Radford, 'How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?' in Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 49 (1975); also Barrie Perkins, 'On Being Moved by Anna 
Karenina and Anna Karenina,' in Philosophy 52. 
32 Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, (London: 1997), p. 127 
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literature beyond what I say about its service to normative ethics; just as 
there are other significant features of literature worth more attention than I 
give them. Moreover, there could be objections to my treatment of 
literature, and of my arguments for its role within moral philosophy; not 
the least of which could be the charge of philistinism occasioned by my 
implicitly cognitivist position on literary art and its instrumental value. 
However, my specific focus on literature and its role as a supplement to 
moral philosophy does not devalue the purely aesthetic aspects of 
literature. The focus is narrow, but I do not dismiss any other values that 
may attach to or derive from a work of art. The various ways in which 
literary art is valuable do not inhabit mutually exclusive spheres. Given 
that we can derive knowledge from a work of art, and given that this 
knowledge is valuable in another sphere, it does not follow that that work 
of art cannot also be valuable for the sheer pleasure that it brings, or for 
some other positive effect or feature. 
Similarly, there is more to say about normative ethics, and morality 
as a whole, than will be said in this thesis. The concern here is with the 
intersection of the two enterprises and how this intersection can be valuable 
to ethical reflection. In investigating the mechanics of this relation, 
inevitably many aspects of philosophical analysis and literary criticism, 
while important in other contexts, fall outside this project's scope 
altogether. 
The claim that literature - particularly in the form of the novel - can 
feed or otherwise supplement moral philosophy implies that literature can 
furnish something of significance that cannot be derived from philosophical 
reflection alone. With this in mind, we need to consider the fundamental 
aims and methods of moral philosophy. 
15 
The Moral Philosophy Enterprise 
The ethical concerns of philosophers embrace two species of question, each 
of which characterises a distinct field of ethical enquiry.33 
In the enquiry known variously as ethics or philosophical ethics, or 
more generally as moral philosophy, philosophers discuss what have been 
referred to as 'first-order' questions about the ethical life. First-order 
questions are characterised by the action-guiding nature of the answers that 
they seek or the substantive evaluative judgements that they elicit. 
Questions that fall into this category include: What sort of life ought I to 
lead? What sorts of actions ought we to perform? Is truth telling always 
right? What sorts of actions ought we to refrain from performing? Is lying 
always wrong? What should I do in this situation? Why perform this action 
rather than another? Is it ever right to hurt another person? Is it right to 
treat others as mere means to further my own ends? What character traits 
or dispositions are virtues, and which count as vices? 34 First-order 
evaluative questions also include: Is pleasure good? Is friendship good? Is 
knowledge a moral good? Is hate always bad, or is it sometimes good? Is 
anger always bad? Is freedom good? Is slavery always bad? As Colin 
McGinn observes, insofar as these questions are concerned with, '... what it 
is right to do in specific concrete circumstances,' 35 first-order enquiries are 
intended to be of practical value when making ethical decisions and 
addressing real-life moral dilemmas, such as we find concerning 
censorship, euthanasia, the justifiability of war, abortion, animal rights, and 
so on. 
Systematic philosophical attempts to answer first-order questions 
constitute normative or prescriptive ethics. These 'systems' are normative or 
prescriptive because they seek to construct moral theories that inform, and 
are intended to have sufficient motivational force to guide, the actions, 
33 For a detailed exposition of this distinction see Jonathan Harrison's Our Knowledge of Right and 
Wrong, (London: 1971) pp. 13-19. For an overview of contemporary positions regarding this 
distinction see Louis Pojman, op. cit., especially parts I and VIII. For an excellent pictorial 
representation of the distinction, see Ted Honderich (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
(Oxford: 1995), pp. 940-941. 
34 Jonathan Harrison, op. cit., p. 13 
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attitudes, practices and judgements of moral agents and agencies. First-
order moral enquiries of this type are considered specifically philosophical 
because, as Bernard Williams notes, they are characterised by a 'reflective 
generality and a style of argument that claims to be rationally persuasive.' 36 
Which is to say that, first, they concern moral questions that are abstracted 
from the particular so as to apply to all persons in all situations and, hence, 
have universal or general applicability; and, second, they aim to furnish 
good reasons to act in one way rather than another, to live one form of life 
rather than another, or to cultivate certain character traits rather than 
others. It is the impartiality and the 'reasonableness' of these arguments 
that lend them rational persuasiveness and thus endow them with 
normative force. If we do not act in accordance with the prescriptions of a 
reasonable moral argument, then we are not doing what there are good 
reasons for doing, and hence, we are not doing what rationally we ought to 
do.37 
Philosophers engaged in the second field of enquiry, on the other 
hand, ask what are have been called 'second-order' questions about ethics 
and ethical concepts. Second-order questions are questions about first-order 
questions and the theoretical issues to which they give rise. Addressing 
these issues constitutes the philosophical activity generally referred to as 
meta-ethics. Meta-ethics deals with such issues as the meaning of ethical 
terms and the nature of the sentences in which they occur; with the logical 
relations between ethical terms and concepts; and particularly with the 
notions of description, prescription and evaluation. Meta-ethics also deals 
with the epistemology, ontology, logic and semantics of moral claims and 
terms, and includes such questions as whether moral judgements are 
subjective or objective, the reality of moral properties, the justification of 
normative claims, and so on. 
35 Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil and Fiction, (Oxford: 1997), p.1 
36 Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (Cambridge, Mass: 1985), P.2 
37 There are of course difficulties with this view of reason's power to move us, not the least of which 
is discussed by David Hume in books II and HI of his Treatise, (op. cit). I make mention of the 
'rational' aspect of normative conclusions at this early stage merely to demonstrate the general 
character of first-order questions in philosophical ethics. 
17 
The distinction between first and second order questions is 
elucidated in Ross Harrison's entry on meta-ethics in The Oxford Companion 
to Philosophy: I.. .instead of being concerned with questions of what actually 
is right or wrong (or good and bad), it is concerned with the meaning or 
significance of calling something right or wrong.' 38 But this does not mean 
that first- and second-order questions always occupy mutually exclusive 
spheres of reflection, and several landmark philosophical works deal with 
both strands together. Kant's The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 
and his Critique of Practical Reason are, alongside John Stuart Mill's 
Utilitarianism, classical examples of works that integrate treatments of first-
and second-order ethical questions. 
However, an overemphasis on second-order concerns can blinker 
moral philosophy to much that matters in a human life and character, and 
which is the proper and pressing subject of philosophical reflection. 39 As 
McGinn suggests, 'there is a range of ethical topics that is both 
philosophical and not comprehended by meta-ethics.' 40 Moreover, 
enquiries that confine their attention to the language and logic of morals 
are open to the charge of philosophical negligence. While, with Williams /41 
it is difficult to deny that reflection on the nature of ethics, what we say 
about ethics, and how we say it, are proper concerns for moral 
philosophers, meta-ethics draws criticism concerning its apparent 'failure 
to engage with what is really morally interesting.' 42 McGinn agrees and 
argues, 'there is more to moral life than what moral words mean.' 43 And 
while it must be acknowledged (as he does) that there is more to meta-
ethics than formal reflection on the linguistic constitution of ethical words 
and judgements, a number of prominent moral philosophers reject the 
claim that our philosophical reflections ought to be confined to meta-ethical 
38 Ross Harrison, 'meta-ethics' in Honderich, op. cit., p. 555. 
39 For a summary of these arguments, see Adamson, Freadman and Parker, op. cit., especially Simon 
Haines "Deepening the Self," pp. 21-38 
4o Colin McGinn, op. cit., p. 2 




questions of this nature.44 The position that they reject is expressed by G. E. 
Moore who, in his rejection of the notion that moral philosophy can 
properly be concerned with the particular ethical judgements, makes the 
tendentious claim that '...it is not the business of the ethical philosopher to 
give personal advice or exhortation.'45 As Simon Haines observes, however, 
moral philosophers who argue against Moore's injunction are frustrated at 
having been told 'for nearly a century' that: 
...in ethics the important things are the ones we cannot speak 
about; or that to speak about them is simply to say 'boo' or 
'hurrah' with rhetorical embellishments; or that the moral 
questions which really matter are not 'How should one live?' or 
even 'What should I do?', but 'What kind of thing is a moral 
judgement?', and 'What kind of concept is "good"?' 46 
Haines argues that this way of doing moral philosophy misses a major 
point of philosophical ethics. And even if it has not entirely missed the 
point, in systematically neglecting first-order issues that embrace what 
McGinn regards as 'questions of greatest ethical importance,' 47 a moral 
philosophy that deals only with second-order questions fails to speak to the 
heart of what matters in a human life and character. However, to whatever 
extent meta-ethical concerns inform their projects, the philosophers whose 
works are considered in this thesis are primarily concerned with 
addressing first-order questions about the ethical life. 
The Entry Point for Ethical Reflection 
According to Anthony Cunningham, 'Good moral philosophy should be 
about life - life as we best know it and as we might know it at our best.' 48 
For the moral philosopher in the western tradition, however, a mere 
articulation of opinion concerning the best form of life is not enough. Moral 
44 See Simon Haines, op. cit., p. 22. In his article he constructs a list of 'only the most eminent' which 
includes Bernard Williams, Alisdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, 
Annette Baier, Martha Nussbaum, and Raimond Gaita. To his list! would add Gordon Graham, 
John Norris, Richard Kearney, Anthony Cunningham, Colin McGinn and others whose work I cite in 
this thesis. 
45 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: 1903), p. 3 
46 Simon Haines, op. cit., p. 22 
47 McGinn, /oc. cit. 
48 Anthony Cunningham, op. cit., p.1 
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philosophers seek compelling arguments for the best ways to act, the best 
ways to live and the best forms of character 'for creatures like us.' 49 In so 
doing, they often employ a dialectical method to develop an adequate 
account of morality. This is a form of argument, according to Gordon 
Graham: 
...that proceeds from claim to counterclaim, from thesis to 
counterthesis, testing every point critically as it goes. The test 
consists in drawing out the implications of each claim that is 
made and examining these implications for consistency with all 
the other elements in the argument. 50 
The philosopher is not engaged merely in asserting and counter-asserting 
opinions, but in a process, as Graham points out, 'in which thought is 
clarified, made more precise, and given rational grounding: 51 Our feelings 
are important in questions of morality, but feelings are prone to conflict 
and, as James Rachels observes, these are often the products of 'prejudice, 
selfishness, or cultural conditioning.' 52 He argues that: 
If we want to discover the truth, we must try to let our feelings 
be guided as much as possible by the reasons, or arguments, 
that can be given for the opposing views. Morality is, first and 
foremost, a matter of consulting reason: the morally right thing 
to do, in any circumstance, is determined by what there are the 
best reasons for doing. 53 
The normative aspect of philosophical reflection aims to furnish a 
conceptual framework in which good reasons for everyone to do or to 
believe certain things in the moral sphere are identified or prescribed - a 
framework of universally applicable tests for right and wrong. This 
requirement removes ethical judgements from the realm of the subjective 
particular, where they are prone to the influences of personal taste, 
prejudices, or other preconceptions. This is not to suggest that feelings and 
opinions play no role at all in philosophical reflection: 'Rather,' says 
49 ibid., p. 69 
50 Gordon Graham, Living the Good Life: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, (St. Paul: 1990), 
p. xiv. 
51 ibid. pp. xiii-xiv. 
52 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: 1995), p. 10 
53 James Rachels, /oc. cit. 
20 
Graham, 'dialectical philosophy consists in putting our own opinions and 
those of others to the most critical test we can.'54 And if, as Cunningham 
suggests, good moral philosophy is about life, then good moral philosophy 
must start from lived experience - the very source of our opinions and ideas 
concerning morality and what it calls for. It is from lived experience that 
questions emerge concerning the actions we ought to perform, the lives we 
ought to lead and the character traits we ought to cultivate. The tests that 
we apply to ethical arguments must reflect this basis. As John Kekes writes: 
In civilized society, freedom, security, and wealth often coexist 
with deep and serious disquiet about good lives. People reflect 
on the conduct of their affairs, because they are naturally 
thoughtful, or because they face grief, injustice, 
disappointment, illness, or boredom, and whether they wonder 
about the point of it all, about how their lives could be 
improved, and about why and how they should face adversity. 
Moral philosophers ought to be able to give reasonable answers 
to these questions. 55 
William Frankena observes, 'The ultimate concern of a normative theory of 
obligation is to guide us in the making of decisions and judgements about 
actions in particular situations.' 56 In order to have the power to move us, 
philosophical arguments, in addition to heeding the exigencies of reason, 
must be responsive to the first-order concerns identified by Kekes from 
which our strongly held moral opinions often derive. Moreover, if moral 
philosophy is properly construed as a 'systematic endeavour to understand 
moral concepts and justify moral principles and theories,' 57 and if it is true 
that for it to be good, moral philosophy should be about life, then its most 
basic aim must be to give a reasonable answer to the most basic ethical 
question, first framed by Socrates and regarded by many western moral 
philosophers as the proper entry point for ethical reflection: 'How ought we 
to live?' 58 
54 Gordon Graham, /oc. cit. 
55 John Kekes, The Examined Life, (Lewisburg: 1988), p. 9 
56 William Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliff: 1973), p. 12 
57 Louis Pojman, 'What is Ethics?' in Louis Pojman (Ed.), Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, 2nd edn., (Belmont:1995), p. 1 
58 Plato, /oc. cit. 
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However, as Frankena contends, Socrates' question entails more 
than just a simple request for guidance in how best to live, what to do, or 
how to act in particular situations: 
We also wish to make judgements about what others should do, 
especially if they ask us what we or they should have done, 
about whether what we or someone else did was right or 
wrong, and so on. We are not just agents in morality; we are 
also spectators, advisors, instructors, judges and critics. 59 
A survey of the philosophical literature that deals with traditional western 
normative ethics reveals that, in seeking 'reasonable answers' to these 
questions and provide guidance that genuinely improves our lives, modern 
philosophers' arguments for general principles that ground particular 
ethical judgements belong to three major approaches to Socrates' question, 
each of which construes its requirements in a different sense. The first 
involves the interests and desires of the moral agent; the second involves 
his or her actions; and the third involves ways of life and forms of 
character.60 
In the first sense, Socrates' question prompts an enquiry into the most 
desirable life for agents as stake-holding individuals. The most prominent 
ethical paradigm taking this response is 'Ethical Egoism.' Each of us ought 
to act, says the ethical egoist, such that our actions best promote our own 
interests.61 This normative doctrine finds its earliest expression in Plato's 
Gorgias,62 in which the Sophist Callicles argues (against Socrates) that things 
are valuable by reference to our desiring them, and that the fulfilment of 
these desires is constitutive of the good life. The good life for the Calliclean 
egoist consists in getting what we want, with no regard for the interests of 
others except insofar as they further our own. An apparently more socially 
59 Frankena, /oc. cit. 
60 Another view, ethical relativism, entails the response to Socrates' question such that we ought to 
act in accordance with the moral code imposed by the society in which we live (or the culture in 
which we participate). 
61- Ethical egoism must be distinguished from psychological egoism, the essentially descriptive position 
according to which it is held that, as a result of our 'natural condition' we cannot help acting out of 
our own interests. 
62 Plato, The Gorgias, Walter Hamilton, trans., (Harmondsworth: 1971), pp. 74ff 
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sensitive formulation of ethical egoism, advanced by modem philosophers 
sympathetic to the doctrine such as Robert Olsen, 63 holds that, in pursuing 
their own interests, individual agents contribute to the collective betterment 
of society. In one sense this is trivially true - if every individual in a society 
is happy, then the total sum of happiness in that society is greater than if 
this were not the case. The total happiness of a society must be 
proportionate to the sum of happiness enjoyed by individual members. But 
if the obligation to act in our own interests is ultimately grounded in an 
obligation to act for the betterment of society, then the doctrine ceases to be 
essentially egoistic, and our moral obligations will require an altogether 
different account from that found in egoism. If our obligations are 
grounded solely in self-interest, then it is difficult to imagine how social 
goods can genuinely be accounted for in those social dimensions that 
transcend practical necessity, private indulgence and private prudence. 
Indeed, there seems to be something counter-intuitive in the view that the 
content of morality is confined to self-interest. As Cunningham observes: 
As daughters, sons, siblings, friends, lovers, spouses, parents, 
neighbors, colleagues, comrades, and fellow citizens, we share 
intrinsic interests in how others live their life and the shape of 
their character. So long as we care about others, we cannot be 
indifferent to how they answer these [moral] questions. When 
life is a shared voyage, as it is by design and aspiration for most 
of us, the life and character of our company is at the heart of 
what matters.64 
Taken to its limits, ethical egoism distorts or deforms many things that 
matter; not the least of which is the interest we have in, and share with, 
other people, and how to deal with situations in which one's own interests 
conflict with the interests of others. But the challenge of Ethical Egoism 
should be taken seriously: one question that it prompts is perhaps even 
more basic than Socrates' and asks: Why should I live one way rather than 
another? Why shouldn't I live strictly according to my own interests and 
63 1n his The Morality of Self Interest, (New York: 1965). 
64 Cunningham, op. cit., p.9 
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desires? These issues feature in the other senses in which Socrates' question 
can be interpreted. 
In the second sense, the question asks how ought I to conduct myself 
as a rational moral agent among other rational moral agents such that my 
actions and attitudes give appropriate weight to the interests of all agents 
who stand to be affected by my actions, and reflect the notion of a shared 
voyage. Normative philosophical responses to this sense of the question 
typically take one of two forms: deontological, or law-based, ethics; and 
consequential, or outcome-based, ethics. The former generally holds that 
we ought to act in accordance with our duties to obey the moral law, 
whatever its provenance, while the latter grounds the moral value of 
actions in the states of affairs that they produce. 
Deontological theories include the divine-command view, in which 
moral actions are right or wrong by reference to God's commands. They 
also include intuitionism, the theory that there is an autonomous realm of 
moral facts discoverable only by intuition. Knowledge of basic moral 
principles is derived from an agent's basic intuitions of the moral law, or of 
goodness as a moral property, and agents ought to act in accordance with 
obligations derived from such intuitions. Prichard and Ross (among others) 
differ on the source of intuitions and the normative strength of obligations 
so intuited, but all agree that intuition is the basis of substantive moral 
judgement. 65 Another species of deontological theory, rationalism, holds 
that reason can reveal our moral obligations. The rational approach to 
ethics includes the contract theory, in which right action is determined by 
reference to a set of rules or laws that rational agents agree (or, as found in 
hypothetical contract theory, would rationally agree) to establish for their 
mutual benefit. Classic articulations of the contractarian view are found in 
the writings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 66 
65 For a useful discussion of these approaches to intuitionism see Philippa Foot, Theories of Ethics, 
(Oxford: 1967), pp. 2-3. See also Frankena, op. cit., pp. 102-104. 
66 See Hobbes, op. cit.; John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, reprinted in D. Wootton (Ed.), The 
Political Writings of John Locke, (Harmondsworth: 1993), and Rousseau, J., The Social Contract, 
reprinted in Social Contract, (Oxford:1960). 
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and contemporary exponents of this approach include John Rawls and 
David Gauthier.67 
However, by far the most influential view that reason can reveal the 
moral law is Kantianism. Kant argues that reason can reveal absolute moral 
rules and that moral obligation derives from universal duties to act in 
accordance with these rules. His guidance for what is morally right comes 
in the form of the 'categorical imperative' which he believes expresses the 
'universal imperative of duty' from which all moral duties can be derived. 
In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant formulates three versions of 
the categorical imperative, the first two of which are intended to offer clear 
guidance in deciding what is right. The first formulation stipulates that 
moral acts be performed in accordance with rules that reason dictates 
everybody ought to follow: 
Act only in accordance to that maxim through which you can at 
the same time will that it become a universal law (AK 4:421). 68 
Kant's view of human dignity as an intrinsic and inalienable good is 
encompassed in the second formulation of the categorical imperative, 
which requires that our actions be consistent with a universal respect for 
the dignity shared by all persons: 
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, 
never merely as a means (AK 4: 429). 
For Kant, however, moral value does not reside simply in the performance 
of duties consistent with the categorical imperative or in the practical 
fulfilment of obligations so derived. Because there are practical limitations 
on our capacity to perform moral actions which, in turn, limit our control 
over the consequences of our actions, and because, for Kant, we cannot be 
held morally responsible for those things over which we have no control, 
moral value cannot reside either in our actions themselves or their 
67 see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: 1971); and David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, 
(Oxford: 1986). 
68 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785, trans. Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). Consistent with the standard method for citing passages from 
Kant, all further in-text references are to the German Academy edition of Kant's works (1900-). 
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consequences. What we can control, however, are our intentions to act one 
way or another and, because of this, Kantian ethics locates moral value in 
our will that moral duties be performed. This idea is expressed in Kant's 
third formulation of the categorical imperative: 
...the third practical principle of the will, as supreme condition 
of its harmony with the universal practical reason, the idea of 
the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law 
(AK 4: 431). 
Other philosophers deny that there are such absolute moral rules as 
envisioned in Kant's categorical imperative, and reject the notion that the 
locus of moral value resides in solely our will, or that reason alone can 
reveal the moral law. 
Rather than according ultimate moral value to the intentions to 
perform duty in accordance with universal moral rules, teleological views 
locate value in the projected or actual outcomes of our actions: the ends to 
which they are directed, or their consequences. Perfectionism holds that, in 
deciding how to conduct ourselves towards others, we ought to consider 
the extent to which our actions promote human excellence, however 
construed.69 A teleological theory of justice, on the other hand, proposes that 
our moral obligations (as individual agents as well as agencies) are to obey 
or create rules that aim at producing the greatest balance of good over evil 
in a political community, while at the same time accommodating the 
interests of all members of that community. 
The general teleological approach is specifically embodied in 
utilitarianism, the most singularly influential teleological theory which 
accords moral significance only to the consequences of actions, measured in 
terms of the amount of overall pleasure, happiness or utility that they 
produce, or in the overall number of desires or preferences that they satisfy. 
Utilitarianism has its modern origins in the works of Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mil1,70 the latter furnishing its paradigmatic formulation. As the 
categorical imperative defines the duties of moral agents in Kantian ethics, 
69 John Rawls discusses (and rejects) perfectionism in his A Theory of Justice. 
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so classical utilitarianism grounds right action in what Mill terms the 
Greatest Happiness Principle: 
The creed which accepts as the foundations of morals, Utility, 
or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness. 71 
We ought to live, according to the utilitarian, by reference to this principle, 
such that our actions produce the greatest amount of utility for the greatest 
possible number of sentient creatures who are affected by them. In 
utilitarianism, intentions to act in certain ways or to produce certain 
outcomes count for nothing in the final analysis, in which only 
consequences, measured in terms of utility, however construed, have value. 
Just what constitutes utility, however, and the extent to which it can 
legitimately direct our actions, remains the subject of serious debate among 
philosophers, as does the notion that the morality of actions is solely 
dependent on their consequences. 72 
Those who embrace the third sense of Socrates' question regard the 
dichotomy of Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism as 
fundamentally flawed. Instead of grounding morality in duties to obey 
rules or to apply formulae to calculate best consequences, they focus on 
how to cultivate forms of character and ways of life which embody a 
plurality of ethical considerations and values. Consequently, a third branch 
of normative ethics has begun to receive the attention of prominent moral 
philosophers who believe that, to quote Julia Annas: 
...there is something deeply inadequate about the view that 
when we systematize theories about our ethical views we are 
faced with the traditional option, a simple choice between 
consequentialist and deontological ways of thinking. 73 
Philosophers like Annas and Williams raise serious questions about the 
expectation that the subject matter of ethics, and of ethical theory, be 
70 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Oxford: 1876), and Mill, op. cit. 
71 John Stuart Mill, op. cit., p. 137 
72 For an excellent debate concerning the relative merits and criticisms of utilitarianism see J.J.C. 
Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: 1973). 
73 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, (New York: 1993), p. 4 
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simple. Williams protests: '...why should it be conceptually simple, using 
only one or two ethical concepts, such as duty or good state of affairs, rather 
than many?'74 On this view, there is something misguided in the endeavour 
to find a small number of principles and maxims to cover the vast and 
complex range of moral situations, that confront complex individuals 
throughout their complex lives. A growing dissatisfaction with the 
traditional ethical views flows from their failure to capture something 
important about the 'messy particularities of life, with all their uncertainties 
and complexities.' 75 This perceived failure leads some philosophers to take 
seriously the responses to first-order questions found in more general 
arguments for valuable ways of life and forms of character, including 
existentialist and self-realisation theories. These theories attempt to knit all 
pertinent aspects of a human life into an integrated, valuable and 
intelligible whole, such as cannot adequately be envisioned in Kantian or 
utilitarian ethics. 
The predominant approach in this view, usually referred to as Virtue 
Ethics or Virtue Theory, originates in the writings of Plato and Aristotle 
and informs the ethical reflections of the Stoics, the Cyrenaics, the 
Epicureans, and the early Christians. Its current resurgence is generally 
held to have commenced in the middle of the twentieth century and it is 
generally acknowledged that this resurgence of philosophical interest in the 
virtues can be traced to G. E. M. Anscombe's article 'Modern Moral 
Philosophy.' 76 Rather than treating moral questions as consisting in What 
should I do? or How should I act? virtue ethics interprets Socrates' question 
as asking What sort of person should I be? What kinds of traits and 
dispositions ought I to cultivate? A virtue-based approach to ethics is no 
less normative, however, for in its emphasis on an agent's character it still 
seeks to answer Socrates' question and shape the conduct of lives. But it 
also takes into consideration other features of the moral life, such as the 
74 Williams, op. cit., p. 17 
75 C. A. J. Coady, "Literature, power, and the recovery of philosophical ethics" in Adamson, et al, op. 
cit., p. 213 
76 G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy' in Philosophy, 33.124 (January 1958). 
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roles played by practical reasoning and the emotions, and the extent to 
which certain dispositions and forms of character inform our ethical choices 
and judgements. 
In whatever ways these approaches differ, and whatever their 
relative strengths and weaknesses, Kantian ethics, utilitarianism and virtue 
ethics all share one thing in common: they attempt to offer an adequate 
account of morality; one which provides insights that can act as genuine 
forces in our lives and which furnishes prescriptive accounts of right action 
or good living that can consistently be acted on or committed to. However, 
moral theories must go beyond mere stipulation: they must provide good 
reasons to act while at the same time accounting for our deeply held moral 
convictions and their origins. Because of these dual exigencies, and 
consistent with the notion that good philosophy must start from life, Adam 
Morton argues that there are two different requirements for moral 
philosophy: 
1. On the one hand a moral philosophy must be in accord 
with many, at least, of the moral opinions that we feel 
intensely. Ideally, it should connect them up together in 
a way that helps us see the deeper values that underlie 
the things we care about. 
2. A moral philosophy must help us to find a way through 
the moral problems that really trouble us. It ought to 
help us to see more clearly what makes a problem 
difficult, and how we might find a solution to it77 
However, notable philosophers argue that traditional philosophical 
reflection and discourse is insufficient to fully meet these requirements, 
despite how well its emphasis on 'rigour, consistency, completeness, 
perspicuity, and orderliness' suits the task of thinking about the kinds of 
ultimate concerns embodied in morality. 78 As Cunningham argues: 'Even if 
philosophical reflection has much to offer, such reflection alone cannot tell 
us everything we need to know about life.' 79 And even if no mode, or 
combination of modes, of reflection can tell us everything we need to know 
77 Adam Morton, Philosophy in Practice (Oxford: 1996), p. 120 
78 0111111inghaM, op. cit., p. 71 
79 ibid. 
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(such an expectation is inconsistent with reasonable beliefs concerning the 
limits of knowledge), a substantive moral response to the first-order issues 
enumerated by Kekes88 seems to require more than traditional reflection 
alone, with its emphasis on generality, can offer. As John Norris argues: 
Rules and principles of conduct are important, but they alone 
cannot decide for an agent in any given situation how they are 
to be applied nor adequately prescribe how to act. The sheer 
complexity of many situations could not be accounted for by 
any fixed set of rules. 81 
Norris does not suggest that traditional philosophical reflection, with its 
emphasis on generality and abstract rationality, is totally misguided. 
Rather, he argues that a mode of ethical reflection confined to the 
traditional method is inadequate to the complexity of particular situations 
and that this inadequacy impedes philosophy's endeavour to fully satisfy 
the requirements of moral philosophy identified by Morton. However, 
none of these philosophers claim that philosophical reflection and its 
traditional methods cannot make a substantive contribution to our 
understanding of morality and its demands; only that it needs augmenting 
in ways that ensure that these requirements are met and thus better help us 
to navigate through the complexities of moral life. Acknowledging that 
Socrates' question is the best place to start for moral philosophy, and how it 
may help to find a way through moral problems, Bernard Williams writes: 
Philosophy starts from questions that, on any view of it, it can 
and should ask, about the chances we have of finding out how 
best to live; in the course of that, it comes to see how much of it 
itself may help, with discursive methods of analysis and 
argument, critical discontent, and an imaginative comparison of 
possibilities. 82 
The questions that Williams suggests philosophy should ask of itself lead to 
the central problem of the limits to philosophy's ability to address the heart 
of what matters in a human life and character. If philosophy is to make a 
substantive contribution to morality by engaging ultimate concerns about 
80 See p. 28, above. 
81 Norris, op. cit., p. 20 
82 Williams, op. cit., p. 4 
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what to do and how to live, and by giving good reasons to act or live in 
some ways rather than others, and if it cannot do this via its traditional 
discursive methods alone, yet wishes, for very good reasons, to retain the 
more valuable aspects of these methods, then how does it achieve this? This 
problem is crystallised in Williams' concern over the limitations of 
philosophy's traditional endeavours: 
How does one combine argument (which is after all likely to 
constitute the philosopher's special claim on anyone's attention) 
with either the longer leaps or the more concrete detail which 
provide the more interesting stuff of moral thought? 83 
Accepting the limitations of previous responses, a number of prominent 
philosophers look beyond the conventional boundaries of their discipline 
for resources that could lead them to reasonable and meaningful answers to 
Socrates' question. These philosophers have two important things in 
common: first, they all share the view that there is something deeply 
inadequate about the ethical theories that constitute the western normative 
tradition; and, second, they express a conviction that imaginative literature 
offers something of value to philosophical reflection that may help to 
overcome these inadequacies. In the chapters that follow I examine their 
arguments and attempt to give a critical account of how the incorporation 
of literature into philosophical reflection can enrich our exploration of 
morality. 
83 Williams, Morality, (Harmondsworth: 1972), p. 11 
31 
2 
THE FORM AND CONTENT CONNECTION 
My task which I am trying to achieve is by the power 
of the written word, to make you hear, to make you 
feel - it is, before all, to make you see. That - and no 
more, and it is everything. 
Joseph Conrad' 
Targeting the Issues 
As noted previously, two meanings could attach to Raphael's proposition 
that literature can feed moral philosophy. The first meaning was termed the 
'propositional' account of the relation between literature and ethical 
reflection. In this account, a work of literature can illustrate, reveal, 
elucidate or remind us of some ethical fact or possibility with the potential 
to contribute substantively to moral philosophy. Raphael suggests that 
literary characters and situations may furnish 'evidence for some issues in 
moral philosophy,' and that this constitutes by far 'the most obvious, the 
richest and the most satisfying' relation between moral philosophy and 
literature. 2 Here, insofar as its contribution is valuable for what it can reveal 
about ethics and ethical issues, literature's role is largely cognitive. But, 
Joseph Conrad, Preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus. 
2 Raphael, op. cit. p. 1 
while certainly valuable in this regard, literature can contribute more to 
ethical reflection than the mere provision of creative illustrations of ethical 
concepts, hypothetical counter-examples and confirming instances of 
ethical arguments. In what was termed the 'attitudinal' account, it was 
argued that, in 'stimulating a philosophical perception which might have 
been missed,' 3 literature can lead to a more acute awareness of possibilities 
of moral seriousness than can traditional philosophical reflection alone. 
Thus, the incorporation of literature in ethical reflection may help to 
develop certain moral capacities that allow us better to grasp, commit to or 
act on or, as Nussbaum has said, 'to make reality out of,' worthwhile ethical 
prescriptions. To a certain extent, these two meanings interpenetrate and 
overlap. However, as one's assessment of the truth value or plausibility of 
ethical propositions necessarily affects one's moral outlook and one's views 
on the validity and practicalities of ethical theories, the bulk of this thesis 
deals with the first of these meanings, the propositional account. Where 
they overlap, however, some explanation of the value of their connection 
will be offered. 
In examining Raphael's claim that it entails the most obvious, richest and 
satisfying relation between the two enterprises, my aim is to develop and 
evaluate arguments for the value of literature in illustrating, testing, 
reminding us of and exemplifying ethical issues. The following two 
chapters are thus devoted to revealing the supplemental contribution that 
literature offers philosophical ethics. To this end, two ethical theories, 
Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, are discussed in light of a select number 
of literary works. While it must be acknowledged that there exist many 
ethical theories with which to explore the relation between ethics and 
literature, and many works which themselves constitute examples of how 
this relation may be exploited, the two 'classical' theories were chosen 
because each provides the fundamental principles that underpin their more 
nuanced and sophisticated derivatives, and both continue to hold currency 
3 ibid. 
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in ethical discourse while informing public as well as academic ethical 
debate. However, it is perhaps important to note here that Kant and Mill 
have not been chosen as the only representatives of traditional moral 
philosophy, nor as the only representatives of prevailing ethical discourse. 
Rather, in referring principally to their theories, the intention is to respond 
to the contrast between Kant's and Mill's approaches to ethics as 
representative of (and fundamental to) two general approaches to ethics that 
derive from their positions and have undeniably dominated post-
enlightenment ethical discourse. 
Moreover, while it must also be acknowledged that a vast body of 
contemporary literature is concerned with ethical perspectives not directly 
related to those derived from Kant or Mill, to argue against the currency of 
the general ethical positions for which they are progenitors is to ignore the 
status and influence of a number of contemporary works of moral 
philosophy. Insofar as it argues against the utilitarian hegemony, for 
instance, the clearly (and self-consciously) Kantian position developed in 
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is responsive to this dichotomy; as is the 
thematic preoccupation of Nussbaum's Poetic Justice, which explicitly seeks 
to establish as the default position a more discursive ethical mode, thus 
displacing the utilitarianism that she sees dominating contemporary 
debates in western economic and justice policy. 
The fact that there have been, and continue to be, other distinctive 
approaches to ethics is neither rejected nor diminished by an 
acknowledgement of the stranglehold that the Kantian/ Utilitarian 
dichotomy has had on contemporary western moral thought. Moreover, 
given that this thesis explicitly focuses on how literature may be harnessed 
to help philosophical ethics transcend the limits entailed in this dichotomy, 
and on how ethical reflection in general may benefit from the contemplation 
of literary depictions of ethical seriousness, it seems reasonable to focus on 
the most general positions that clearly represent the dominant views. And 
these are still undeniably informed (either explicitly or in spirit) by the 
arguments advanced by Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. 
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Granted, to this approach it might be asked: 'What price is then left 
on the exclusive disjunction of deontology and consequentialism?' To this 
question it may be flatly answered: 'No price.' Indeed, this thesis rejects the 
exclusivity of the disjunction and, as the discussion of thick ethical concepts 
conceived by Williams and Cunningham (as well as the brief discussion of 
virtue ethics) reveals in Chapter Three, the disjunction itself is fallacious. 
Just as there is more to ethical reflection than the meanings of moral terms, 
there is more to ethical choice than that which is offered in the disjunction 
between rules and formulae. But arguing that the disjunction is fallacious is 
not the same thing as arguing that the perceived dichotomy that informs it, 
however falsely, is not dominant, influential or extensive. Moreover, the 
suggestion that the deontological/consequentialist disjunction has not 
dominated modern ethical discourse ignores the very real fact that so much 
philosophical ethics in recent years (starting with, but not limited to, 
Anscombe's aforementioned 1958 landmark paper) has been explicitly 
responsive to the disjunction. Indeed, to argue that the views represented in 
generally Kantian or generally utilitarian ethics are out-dated is to ignore a 
• great deal of contemporary debate and there exists an extremely vast body 
of contemporary literature devoted- to the analysis, support or rejection of 
Kantian and utilitarian ethics, all of which serves, at least perceptually, to 
give the disjunction ontological validity. 
But, as already noted, this is not to suggest that modern ethical 
theories that are unrelated to the Kant/Mill divide lack validity. Quite the 
contrary is true. Indeed, while much of their early work is clearly 
responsive to the divide, the recent writings of philosophers such as 
Bernard Williams, Alisdair MacIntyre, Sabina Lovibond, John McDowell, 
John Kekes and Julia Annas embody approaches to ethics that are quite 
unrelated to those taken by the deontologists and utilitarians. However, it 
is not the aim of this thesis to construct or evaluate an independent ethical 
theory, but to explore the question concerning how literature may be 
harnessed to assist in the construction and evaluation of such an approach. 
To this end, these works are not examined in this thesis and the question of 
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precisely what an appropriate outcome would consist of has been left open. 
Rather, it is suggested only that it might profitably resemble the approach 
to ethics generally comprehended under the genus of more holistic inquiry 
that focuses on ways of life and forms of character, and which 
accommodates an appreciation of the diversity of humanness such as may 
fruitfully be apprehended in the detailed, extended, connected 
presentations of character typically found in serious (but not necessarily 
closely realistic) novels. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
literature's ability to furnish content to ostensive definitions of moral 
concepts makes it an ideal supplement for ethical theories, such as virtue 
ethics, that endeavour to propound certain traits or dispositions as ethically 
desirable. 
In its most fundamental construal, the claim that literature can feed 
or valuably supplement philosophical reflection implies that literature can 
furnish something that cannot be derived from traditional philosophical 
reflection alone. This in turn implies that there is a distinction between 
philosophy and literature, and that the value of the relation between the 
two is embedded in this distinction. I begin this chapter by considering the 
unity of form and content to draw a formal distinction between 
philosophical writing and imaginative literature. I then examine how this 
distinction contributes to the value of the connection between the two 
enterprises. 
Philosophical and Literary Discourse 
A criticism of philosophical discourse is that its formal features, its 
language and its expositional structure, render it unable adequately to 
reflect all that is important ethically to human life and character. It was 
shown earlier that, in addressing first order questions about the moral life, 
at least one aim of philosophical ethics is to provide guidance to the moral 
agent in the form of a universal test for right or wrong applicable to all 
• persons in all situations. However, the argument in question here is that the 
propositions of philosophical discourse cannot convey or embody the 
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particular, individualised concerns which inform concrete moral situations 
and which, at least indirectly, underpin moral philosophy's endeavour to 
achieve a systematic understanding of the ethical life. Whether specific 
ethical theories fail to achieve this goal, or whether the objective itself is 
misguided or unattainable by conventional argument, proponents of this 
criticism hold that philosophy, in its quest for valid and universal moral 
principles, tends to ignore the full complexities of 'real-life' situations faced 
by moral agents. That is, in specifying the logical conditions for an objective 
moral judgement, philosophical discourse tends to simplify the complex 
reality confronted by a moral agent acting on such a judgement. 
Nussbaum argues that this limitation is at least in part a 
consequence of the formal and stylistic features of traditional philosophical 
discourse. She claims that it could be remedied by philosophers attending 
to imaginative, literary depictions of the ethically significant life. She 
argues that form and style are essential to the meaning of imaginative 
writing and, as such, are indivisible from its content. According to 
Nussbaum, 'there is, with respect to any text carefully written and fully 
imagined, an organic connection between its form and its content.'4 In 
Love's Knowledge, she claims: 
Certain thoughts and ideas, a certain sense of life, reach toward 
expression in writing that has a certain shape and form, that 
uses certain structures, certain terms. 5 
She argues that works of imaginative writing, particularly the novel, derive 
their form from their authors' conceptions and express 'his or her sense of 
what matters.'6 She further claims that 'certain truths about human life can 
only be fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms 
characteristic of the narrative artise 7 and that this allows narrative art to 
capture important aspects of life to which 'the blunt terms of ordinary 
4 Nussbaum 1990, op. cit., p. 4 
5 ibid., pp. 4-5. 
6 ibid., p. 5 
7 ibid. 
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speech, or of theoretical discourse, are blind.' 8 She holds that the world's 
complexity, mysteriousness and 'flawed and imperfect beauty' 9 cannot be 
stated in the prosaic language and expositional style of what she terms 
'conventional' philosophical prose; a style, she states, which is 'remarkably 
flat and lacking in wonder.'w Thus, according to Nussbaum, literature's 
value to ethical reflection flows from the ability of its language to alert the 
reader to the nuances and subtleties of what really matters more effectively 
than can the language of traditional philosophy. For her, our task as moral 
agents, 'is to live as good characters in a good story do, caring about what 
happens, resourcefully confronting each new thing.' 11 And this is how, in 
her view, imaginative literature can augment traditional philosophical 
attempts to understand complex moral phenomena. 
However, the 'organic' relation between form and content is not 
limited to works of imaginative literature. While philosophers like 
Nussbaum regard the philosophical 'style' inattentive to the complexity of 
real life moral issues, attention to the relation between form and content in 
philosophical prose can yield useful insights concerning its limitations and 
the role for imaginative literature in helping to overcome these. It can also 
help to identify the aims of conventional ethics and to assess whether, and 
the extent to which, criticisms such as Nussbaum's are well-founded. 
To highlight the distinction between philosophy and literature, and 
to illustrate the role that literature can play in ethical reflection and the 
value of this distinction, consider the following passages from Immanuel 
Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals as a paradigm of traditional 
philosophical style: 
Now I say that the human being and in general every rational 
being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used 
by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his 
actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational 
beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end (AK 4: 428). 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid., p. 3 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid., pp. 3-4 
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Kant reasons that from this position there follows an objective moral 
principle which, in serving as a universalisable practical law, must be 
applied by all moral agents in all their dealings with all rational beings, 
including themselves. He grounds this principle in the notion that 'rational 
nature exists as an end in itself (AK4: 429). Consistent with his conception of 
a supreme moral principle, Kant articulates a rule for the treatment of 
rational beings as the second formulation of his Categorical Imperative: 
The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act 
that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a 
means (AK 4: 429). 
Kant's prose fulfils the role that is traditionally assigned to moral 
philosophy. Free of hyperbole, symbolism and complex imagery, these 
passages clearly state the principle that Kant embraces. Methodologically, 
Williams would agree that its reflective generality and a style of argument 
that claims to be rationally persuasive qualifies Kant's discourse as 
typically and distinctly philosophical. 12 Moreover, the propositional 
structure of Kant's argument places it in the wider context of rational 
inquiry and evokes in the reader a similarly rational response, inviting a 
dispassionate evaluation of the principle's objective validity. As McGinn 
argues, 'Moral discourse has been construed as essentially a list of moral 
directives or affirmations, and the only question is the proper analysis of 
these directives or affirmations.' 13 Such an analysis typically involves three 
critical questions: First, does the passage or concept hold together under 
scrutiny - that is, does it contain any internal inconsistencies or 
contradictions? Second, how consistent is it with the remainder of the 
philosopher's views in the context of the wider theory in which it is 
located? Third, does it conflict with independently established facts or 
moral intuitions? The outcome of such analysis is critical to the validity of 
the principle under question. But to objectively evaluate validity, the reader 
must maintain a degree of intellectual and emotional distance from what is 
12 Bernard Williams (1985), op. cit., p. 2 
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being analysed. Thus both the theory under scrutiny and the subsequent 
analysis remain in the sphere of abstract thought and reveal few of the 
complexities involved in applying the principle to real-life situations. 
Therefore, while Kant's '... emphasis on rigor, consistency, completeness, 
perspicuity, and orderliness' 14 suits his prose to the task of clearly 
prescribing the logical conditions for moral judgement, Nussbaum's claim 
is that what it fails to address, and what an abstract objective analysis fails 
to reveal, is the complexity of acting according to such conditions and the 
practical and psychological implications that might flow from such 
actions. 15 
However, the criticisms embodied in Nussbaum's concerns would 
be misplaced if directed to the formal features of Kant's argument as they 
relate to his meta-ethical objective to determine the precise locus of moral 
value. This is an important point, and one which Nussbaum's emphasis on 
the stylistic features of philosophical prose might easily miss if she were to 
regard as flawed all moral philosophy which fails to attend to the particular 
concerns of concrete agents. To do this would ignore valuable aspects of 
critical inquiry in which abstraction is not a failing but a necessity and 
which, consequently, shapes the methodology of rational inquiry. It would 
also ignore the other mode of ethical discourse distinguished in the 
previous chapter. If a central function of meta-ethical inquiry is to 
investigate and construct a critical account of the universal nature of moral 
judgement, and if this constitutes a legitimate feature of the landscape of 
philosophical ethics alongside its prescriptive counterpart, then 
Nussbaum's argument that traditional philosophical discourse fails to 
account for the nuanced complexity of concrete moral life could constitute 
the mistake of evaluating one form of inquiry in terms of the aims of 
another form of discourse, however the two may be related. Kant's project 
is a case in point, and he encapsulates its aim in the following question: 
13 Colin McGinn, op. cit., p. 172 
14 Anthony Cunningham, op. cit., p. 71 
13 This argument is explored in some detail John Norris, 'Philosophy and Literature' in 
Cogito, Vol. 11, No. 1, April 1997, p. 18ff. I examine this issue further below. 
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...is it not thought to be of the utmost necessity to work out for 
once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of 
everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to 
anthropology? (AK 4: 389) 
Kant later distinguishes between a 'pure philosophy of morals' in which 
moral principles are 'fixed a priori by themselves' and a philosophy of 
'applied' morals which is based on what is peculiar to human nature and 
which is of mainly 'anthropological' interest (AK 4: 410n). 
Moreover, in the context of Nussbaum's view of the unity of form 
and content, in which 'finding and shaping the words is a matter of finding 
the appropriate ... fit between conception and expression,' 16 Kant's careful 
choice of words and the structure of his text are clearly appropriate to his 
aims, and constitute an effective expression of his sense of what matters in 
philosophical ethics, certainly in terms of his stated meta-ethical objective 
of constructing a pure moral philosophy in which the precise and locus of 
ethical value is identified, whether or not other more recent moral 
philosophers subscribe to this aim. The prosaic, dispassionate language 
employed to convey his view is not accidental to his argument's content, 
but essential to its meaning. As S. Korner observes of Kant's choice of 
terminology: '...by using technical terms he does draw attention to 
important aspects of a subject which the language of polite conversation 
and belles lettres would probably merely adorn but not illuminate: 17 Kant 
himself defends his choice of language when, in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, he writes: 
If readers ... know of more popular expressions that are still 
just as suitable to the thought as the ones I use seem to be to me, 
or if they think they can show the nullity of these thoughts 
themselves and so too of the expressions signifying them, they 
would by the first very much oblige me, for I only desire to be 
understood; but with respect to the second, they would deserve 
well of philosophy (AK 5: 11). 18 
16 Nussbaum, /oc. cit. 
17 S. KOrner, Kant, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), p. 62 
18 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, (1788, trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9 
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Kant concludes that 'as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt 
that expression suitable for them and yet more common can be found' (AK 
5:11). 
Moreover, if there are general ethical duties (or even generally 
desirable ways of life or forms of character), and if these are accessible 
through reason or other means, then they must be cognisable by all rational 
beings, irrespective of their particular circumstances. Nussbaum's 
argument that we ought to 'live as good characters in a good story do' 
expresses a normative component that must be justified in terms of the 
ethical value of those characters' lives and actions. Consistency requires 
that what is good for such fictional characters must also be good for all who 
are enjoined to live like them. As moral examples, therefore, at least two 
questions need to be addressed to Nussbaum's directive: precisely what is 
good about these characters' lives? How are the principles which ground 
this assessment to be justified? As Kant argues: 
... every example of [morality] represented to me must first be 
appraised in accordance with principles of morality, as to 
whether it is also worthy to serve as an original example, that 
is, as a model; it can by no means authoritatively provide the 
concept of morality (AK 4: 408). 
It is necessary to justify the principles that underlie a moral concept to 
avoid the circularity that characterises the form of ethical argument in 
which a moral agent is enjoined to do as good characters do because they 
do good things and it is good to do good things. Insofar as it offers a form 
of guidance that moral agents find accessible and engaging, Nussbaum's 
claim that we ought to live as 'good characters in a good story do' 
possesses clear practical merit.19 However, completeness requires that such 
prescriptions be grounded in a critical account of what constitutes 
goodness in ethical terms, and from which we can infer what makes the 
good characters good, and which, according to Kant, constitutes 'a 
desideratum of utmost importance to the actual fulfilment of [its] precepts' 
19 Although it still remains to give art account of what constitutes a 'good story' in this 
context. I examine this question later. 
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(AK 4: 410). To this end, Nussbaum must explain how literary accounts of 
'good' characters are compelling, rather than just appealing or admirable: 
why ought we to live as good characters in a good story do? By reference to 
precisely what is a good character good? What is it about a character's 
actions or attitudes that render them worthy of approbation, worthy of 
imitation, worthy of standing as ethical for our own actions and attitudes? 
How widely applicable are the criteria against which we evaluate their 
actions and attitudes as morally significant? That is, do they apply to all 
persons in all situations? Or are they authoritative only in situations 
analogous to those represented in the literature in which the characters 
appear? Constructing such an account requires the philosopher to go" 
outside the story and adopt a critical perspective on its characters and their 
actions and attitudes. For this account to have normative force, it must also 
develop a more basic aspect, namely, the ethical principles on which such 
judgements derive. As considered in the previous chapter, this activity 
constitutes the critical endeavour of traditional moral philosophy, for 
which its emphasis on rigor, consistency, completeness, perspicuity, and 
orderliness makes it ideally suited. 
However, while a comprehensive ethical theory must embody a 
defensible account of the good to ground its precepts and from which to 
establish authoritative criteria for right action and good character, once 
grounded the normative function of moral philosophy is to furnish 
imperatives that guide agents in choosing how best to act, which forms of 
character to cultivate, or which ways of life are ethically most worth living. 
As Annas argues, as the implied recipients of the philosopher's wisdom, 
moral agents find it natural to make a number of practical demands on an 
ethical theory. In particular, she says, we assume 'that a moral theory 
should help us to decide what is right for us to do, and in particular, that it 
should help us to resolve moral dilemmas and difficult moral cases.' 20 In 
this respect, Nussbaum's criticism concerning the remarkable flatness and 
lack of wonderment expressed in the language of traditional moral 
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philosophy is better founded. If philosophical ethics is to be of true 
practical value and, as such, offer a compelling account of how we ought to 
live, then it must be attentive not just to the nuances and complexities of 
the ethical life. It must also attend to the formal features that accommodate 
these subtleties, as well as the stylistic aspects of discourse in which the 
prescriptions of normative ethics are communicated. 
Moreover, if it is true that the prescriptions of traditional 
philosophical ethics fail adequately to accommodate the complexities of 
immersed, concrete judgements, then it follows that traditional, objective 
analyses of such theories as Kant's fail to address crucial components of the 
agent's own moral understanding. In addressing the question 'How does 
this apply to all rational beings?' reflecting on the universal force of an 
ethical perspective may ignore certain questions fundamental to an agent's 
practical application of the principle. While it may be true that questions 
such as 'What does the principle mean to me?' To what degree is it 
concordant with my own moral views and presuppositions?' How do I 
recognise when such a principle ought to apply?' How do I put it into 
practice?' fall outside the scope of general objective analysis, they are all 
important to the practical aim of normative ethics which requires first-
order inquiries to provide practical guidance and accommodate the 
genuine motivating force of ethical judgements. For example, suppose 
someone threatens your life in such a way that unless you either, kill or 
seriously disable that person you yourself will be either killed or seriously 
disabled. What is it to treat the other person as an end here? If you kill the 
person, are you using the person as a means to your own survival? Or, if 
you kill or seriously disable the person, are you treating the person as an 
end, a fully rational and responsible moral agent who deserves to be 
forcefully prevented from harming you? How is the personal cost of such 
action accommodated in the ethical judgement? What role in the decision 
does your history play, your deep-seated attitudes concerning violence? 
What of the relationship between you and the aggressor? What effect does 
Annas, op. cit. p. 6 
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the question of desert have on the evaluation? 21 Such examples show that 
the discourse of traditional philosophical analysis and the general 
principles it engenders often ignore the particulars of moral judgements, 
and that this is an important concern if an ethical theory is to carry genuine 
normative force. 
However, the criticism that the language and conceptual simplicities 
of abstract moral philosophy cannot sufficiently accommodate the 
complexities of immersed moral judgements is not limited to Kantian 
ethics. As noted previously, it applies to any ethical system that posits 
universal rules or prescriptions that inevitably fail to capture something 
important about the complex moral situations that confront concrete 
individuals throughout their lives. As McGinn argues, a meaningful 
response to questions the above example elicits falls outside the scope of 
traditional philosophical analysis and requires us to 'draw upon an 
enormous background of tacit knowledge about human life, not clearly 
codffiable into ethical princip1es.' 22 Iris Murdoch maintains that while our 
decisions to act in particular ways or live particular kinds of lives may be 
partially guided by the logical analysis of moral concepts, they need to be 
informed by more than just logic: 'We would like to know what, as moral 
agents, we have got to do because of logic, what we have got to do because 
of human nature, and what we can choose to do.' 23 She argues that 
addressing these questions should form part of philosophical reflection's 
task, but that it may be 'impossible to carry out' by the traditionally 
analytic and neutral philosophical methods. But, she writes: 
even to discover what, under these headings, we can achieve 
certainly demands a much more complex and subtle conceptual 
system than any which we can find readily available.24 
Nussbaum's position on the function of moral philosophy dovetails with 
that expressed by Murdoch. In this respect, she shifts her attention from 
21 I acknowledge the contribution of Dr Edgar Sleinis in articulating this example. 
22 McGinn, op. cit., p. 174 
23 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, (London: RKP, 1970), p. 2 
24 ibid. pp. 2-3 
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stylistic concerns to the normative substance of moral philosophy when she 
argues: 
...general and universal formulations may be inadequate to the 
complexity of particular situations; that immersed particular 
judgements may have a moral value that reflective and general 
judgements cannot capture. 25 
Coady concurs with Nussbaum and claims, 'moral thought and 
imagination need to be rooted in an attentive perception of the messy 
particularities of life, with all their uncertainties and complexities in full 
view.'26 In discussing possibilities for the recovery of philosophical ethics, 
he accepts the importance of reflective and general judgements; but he 
argues that, since 'the moral life is part of the practical life and so has 
essential reference to action, challenge and problem solving,' 27 ethical 
prescriptions must accommodate the imagination and resourcefulness of 
moral agents: 
Moral thinking can, and must, strive for objectivity, but this 
does not entail a mindless and insensitive application of a grid 
of rules and formulae to whatever situation arises. 28 
According to Cunningham, moral thinking requires an approach to ethics 
which '...opens the door to a richer conception of moral philosophy that 
can speak to the heart of what matters in a human life and character.' 29 
McGinn, too, is dubious of the more narrowly conceived methodologies of 
moral philosophy and argues that moral philosophers must aim 'to do 
justice to the varieties of moral experience, to the entire range of ethical life, 
and this ... requires us to go beyond the usual assumptions and methods.' 30 
A Vital Role for Literature 
But if this richer conception of moral philosophy which does justice to the 
entire range of ethical life cannot be achieved via traditional philosophical 
25 Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge, (Oxford: OUP, 1989), p. 182 
26 C. A. J. Coady, op. cit., p. 213. 
27 ibid., p. 220 
28 ibid., p. 213 
29 Anthony Cunningham, op. cit. p. 5 
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reflection alone, either in terms of its ability to communicate its precepts or 
something more conceptually significant, then what means are available to 
the moral philosopher for accommodating the full complexity of moral 
judgements? As Williams asks: 
Can the reality of complex moral situations be represented by 
means other than those of imaginative literature? If not, can 
more schematic approaches represent enough of the reality? 
How much of what genuinely worries anyone is responsive to 
general theory? 31 
It is here that literature can make its most valuable contribution. Writers of 
imaginative literature are not bound by the same constraints that confine 
philosophical discourse. As a result of this freedom, the author of creative 
fiction is able to furnish us with a wider range of problems, situations and 
possibilities with which to illustrate and test our theories than those 
portrayed in traditional philosophical argument. 32 Moreover, in the absence 
of direct experience from which to evaluate our own subjective responses 
to moral situations and hence contribute to our self-understanding, 
literature can provide a range of experiential possibilities that are not 
available in the realm of abstract reasoning. As Ducasse notes, 'In a good 
work of fiction the reader enters imaginatively into actions and experiences 
for many of which no opportunities occur in real life and which he could 
not actually perform.'33 
However, not all philosophers agree with this account of the value of 
literature to ethical reflection. R. M. Hare, while arguing that 'sympathetic 
imagination plays an important part in moral thought,' 34 questions the 
value of literature in investigating the factual grounds of moral thought. 
According to Hare: 
For story-books, though they help to stimulate our 
imaginations, do not by themselves help us, very much, to 
3° McGinn, op. cit., p. 2 
31 Williams (1972), op. cit., p. 11 
32 Beardsmore, op. cit., p. 62 
Ducasse, S., 'Taste, Meaning and Reality in Art' in S. Hook (ed.), Art and Philosophy, 
(New York: University Press), p. 190. Cited in Beardsmore, op. cit. pp. 62,63 
34 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, (Oxford: OUP, 1963), pp. 182-3 
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separate what is really likely to happen from what is not, nor to 
assess the probable frequency of its occurrence. 35 
He argues that the use of literature in philosophical discourse obscures the 
real issues with which philosophy is properly concerned, and presents an 
impediment to clarity of thought.36 John Locke was a particularly trenchant 
critic of the use of narrative devices common to imaginative literature to 
embellish prose intended to 'inform or instruct' its readers: 
... in discourses where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight, 
than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments ... can 
scarce pass for Faults. But yet, if we would speak of Things 
as they are, we must allow that all the Art of Rhetoric, 
besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative 
application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for 
nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the 
Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgement; and so indeed 
are perfect cheat; and therefore however laudable or 
allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and 
popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that 
pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. 37 
For Locke, the use of metaphor to signify ideas is 'plain cheat and abuse,' 
and wilfully using words that stand 'sometime for one thing, and some 
times for another,' constitutes 'great Folly or greater dishonesty.' 38 Locke 
firmly believes that morality is capable of demonstration and that 'the 
precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly 
known.' 39 However, for Locke a barrier to this perfect moral knowledge 
derivable from the meanings of words arises from the use of words that 
have uncertain and dubious meanings; this, in turn, renders 'discourse 
about moral things' uncertain and obscure. 40 Indeed, he suggests that, if 
stripped of obscurity and ambiguity, the meaning and significance of many 
35 ibid., p. 183 
36 R. M. Hare, 'Universalisability' in The Monist, 49, pp. 199-200. Also see my reference to 
Hare in this context in chapter one of this thesis, n. 5. 
37 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Niddich, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), III.X.34, P.  508. 
38 ibid., III.X.5, pp. 402-403 
39 ibid., III.X1.16, P.  516 
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works of philosophy and imaginative literature could be '...contained in a 
nutshell.'41 
However, while in its quest for conceptual clarity, philosophy has a 
central role to play in our understanding of moral phenomena, as Phillips 
argues, 'attempts at philosophical analysis can go either way: they can 
obscure as well as clarffy.' 42 He claims that in its quest for a clear, universal 
and general account of morality, philosophy often treats as inimical to its 
aims the forms of 'complexity and particularity of character and situation 
explored in literature.' 43 But in ignoring the complexity and particularity of 
moral judgements, philosophical reflection can obscure the ways that a 
moral perspective '...may change, be eroded, be found wanting, or become 
impossible for people." To say that a moral perspective may be found 
wanting or impossible for people is to suggest that its prescriptions cannot 
be committed to or consistently enacted by the moral agent. Therefore, 
while the quest for clarity is a good start, as H. H. Price said, 'it is not 
enough.'45 As McGinn observes of the traditionally conceived 'aridity' of 
moral philosophy: 'The danger in philosophical ethics is that what we gain 
in philosophical precision we lose in intrinsic interest, and conversely.'46 He 
goes on to argue: 
The task is to develop a moral philosophy that is both 
philosophically substantial and which also engages our ethical 
concems.47 
This is not to suggest that moral philosophy ought totally to reject its 
traditional methods in favour of a whole new approach. In acknowledging 
the shortcomings of traditional normative ethics, and in prescribing a 
literary supplement to overcome them, it would be counterproductive to 
sacrifice the qualities of rigour, consistency, completeness, perspicuity, and 
41 ibid., III.X1.26 p. 523 
42 Phillips, op. cit., p. 1 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 H. H. Price 'Clarity is Not Enough' in Clarity is Not Enough, H. D. Lewis (Ed.), (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 15-16 
46 McGinn, op. cit., p. 6 
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orderliness which can endow philosophical reflection with the power to 
illuminate moral concepts and propose worthwhile ethical prescriptions. 
Indeed, the detailed analysis of moral concepts is essential to its task. John 
Norris emphasises this point in his encapsulation of the propositional 
account: 
The importance of literature ... lies not in its presenting an 
alternative view to philosophical ethics but in its ability to 
supplement any such study by drawing our attention to other 
important features, such as the significance of aspects that are 
particular to any situation. 48 
Norris claims that these important features are often overlooked in 
traditional philosophical discourse, with its emphasis on the development 
of universal ethical principles. He endorses Nussbaum's position when he 
argues, 'we should be alert to the way in which various texts may engage 
different aspects of the personality, and that moral insight may be 
presented in a number of different forms.' 49 However, Norris' argument 
implies that if one form of discourse through which moral insight is 
presented is to be of supplemental value to another form, then there must 
be a distinction between the two forms and that the value of the relation 
between them somehow depends on this distinction. 
Language and Perspective in Philosophy and Literature 
To illustrate the formal distinctions between moral philosophy and 
imaginative literature, and to show how literature can supplement an 
account like Kant's distinctively philosophical presentation of a moral 
perspective by drawing attention to the ethical significance of aspects 
particular to the situations it depicts, consider the following extract from 
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness. In the scene presented, the main 
character Marlow describes his first encounter with the indigenous workers 
retained under the authority of the king of Belgium to mine and to harvest 
ivory in the Congo: 
48 John Norris, op. cit. p. 17 
49 ibid. 
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Black shapes crouched, lay, sat between trees, leaning 
against the trunks, clinging to the earth, half coming out, half 
effaced within the dim light, in all attitudes of pain, 
abandonment and despair. Another mine on the cliff went off, 
followed by a slight shudder of the soil under my feet. The 
work was going on. The work! And this was the place where 
some of the helpers had withdrawn to die. 
They were dying slowly — it was very clear. They were 
not enemies, they were not criminals, they were nothing 
earthly now, - nothing but black shadows of disease and 
starvation, lying confusedly in the greenish gloom. Brought 
from all the recesses of the coast in all the legality of time 
contracts, lost in uncongenial surroundings, fed on 
unfamiliar food, they sickened, became inefficient and were 
then allowed to crawl away and rest. These moribund shapes 
were as free as air — and nearly as thin. I began to 
distinguish the gleam of eyes under the trees. Then, glancing 
down, I saw a face near my hand. The black bones reclined 
at full length with one shoulder against the tree, and slowly 
the eyelids rose and the shrunken eyes looked up at me, 
enormous and vacant, a kind of blind, white flicker in the 
depths of the orbs, which dies out slowly. The man seemed 
young — almost a boy — but you know with them it's hard to 
tell. I found nothing else to do but to offer him one of my 
good Swede's ship's biscuits I had in my pocket. The fingers 
closed slowly on it and held — there was no other movement 
and no other glance. 50 
While not directly autobiographical, this novel is informed by Conrad's 
own experiences in the Congo during the late nineteenth century. In 
writing Heart of Darkness, his stated intention was to alert an ambivalent 
European public to the injustices of imperialism in western Africa; and to 
expose the often brutal, selfish and exploitative means by which ivory and 
other riches were collected and sent to satisfy demand on the 'home front.' 
As Conrad himself wrote in a letter to his publisher, he wanted to expose 
the political ineptitude and moral bankruptcy of those responsible for 
'opening up' the African continent: 'The criminality of inefficiency and 
pure selfishness when tackling the civilising work in Africa seems like a 
justifiable idea.' 51 However, this moral theme only becomes apparent on 
51) Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1995), pp. 34-35 
51 Conrad to Blackwood, cited in John Batchelor, The Life of Joseph Conrad, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994), p. 85 
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reflection and analysis. No explicit moral judgement is passed in the text. 
Instead, the moral significance is subtly embedded in the language 
employed to describe the scene. 
The most apparent formal difference between Kant's principle and 
Conrad's scene appears in the contrast between the perspectives of each 
account. Kant's constitutes what Norris calls an 'outsider's perspective,' by 
which he means that Kant is 'stipulating the objective conditions which 
must apply for an act to have moral worth.' 52 Thus, while Kant stipulates 
the conditions under which a particular kind of moral judgement 
concerning the treatment of humanity must be made, and implies a 
spectator's stance, the passage from Heart of Darkness represents the kind of 
situation about which such a judgement might be made (but not the 
judgement itself). So depicted, the narration in Heart of Darkness constitutes 
very much an insider's perspective on the scene: the reader apprehends the 
moral significance of the scene not as an impartial observer, an outsider, 
but from the perspective of a character immersed in his own deliberative 
field. The insider's perspective is a valuable device through which to 
analyse a character's moral decisions and, in presenting a situation's moral 
aspects from the character's point of view, it helps the reader to penetrate 
behind observable behaviour and see the word through the character's 
eyes, thus revealing the complexity of particular moral judgement. 
For example, in his discussion of the connection between religion 
and ethics, Stewart Sutherland draws on the distinction between inside and 
outside perspectives in his employment of a literary text to exemplify and 
help analyse a particular philosophical issue, the conflict between religious 
conviction and moral intuition.53 Sutherland uses Ibsen's Brand to amplify 
the implications of Soren Kierkegaard's treatment of the moral theme 
contained in the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac, in which God 
52 Norris, op. cit., p. 18 
53 Stewart Sutherland, "Religion and Ethics - 1" in Martin Warner, ed., Religion and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 123-134 
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commands Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. Such an exemplification also 
helps to draw out the connection between the biblical story, the relation 
between religious faith and ethics, and the central question in Plato's 
Euthyphro, concerning how to define piety, holiness or goodness: is 
something good because God wills or approves of it, or does God will or 
approve of it because it is good? If one takes a particular religious stance 
and answers that the former is the correct account of goodness, and one 
accepts that one must always act in accordance with God's will, then ethical 
priority will be assigned to his will, no matter how arbitrary it may seem. 
This arbitrariness is exemplified in the monstrous act he requires of 
Abraham, ostensively for no reason other than to test Abraham's faith. In 
such a situation, Kierkegaard argues that ethical duty may sometimes 
interfere with religious duty. He suggests that where it conflicts with 
ethical priorities, the fulfilment of divine duty requires what he terms a 
'teleological suspension of the ethical,' in which normal ethical judgement 
is suspended as one is bound to the realisation of God's ends, however 
incomprehensible. In Fear and Trembling, he writes: 
In Abraham's life there is no higher expression for the ethical 
than this, that the father shall love his son. Of the ethical in the 
sense of morality [however] there can be no question of this 
instance. ... What ordinarily tempts a man is that which would 
keep one from doing his duty, but in this case the temptation is 
itself the ethical...which would keep him from doing God's 
will. But what then is duty? Duty is precisely the expression of 
God's will. 54 
Kierkegaard describes the teleological suspension of the ethical as a 
resolution of the paradox in one's relation between the universal (ethics) 
and the particular (God, the eternal). 
But the sparseness of the biblical story does little to reveal the 
emotional complexities involved in such a paradox. The reader is afforded 
a spectator's point of view from which to glean the facts of the matter and 
determine simply whether or not Abraham acts according to God's will, 
54 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter Lowry, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), p. 70 
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and whether this act constitutes a teleological suspension of the ethical. 
Sutherland argues that, in considering Kierkegaard's treatment of the link 
between religious belief and ethics in Fear and Trembling, reflection on 
Ibsen's Brand helps to vivify the paradox inherent in an otherwise 
diabolical act's transformation into a holy one simply because it pleases 
God. Brand is valuable, he suggests, not just because it embodies an 
appropriate theme and parallels the biblical story, but because, unlike the 
story of Abraham and Isaac, which he calls 'a story of externals,' Ibsen's 
drama furnishes an insider's perspective on the issue and so exemplifies 
more of the complex reality of ethical choice: 
Ibsen does open the window into Brand's deliberations. In 
Abraham we simply see the deed done, the farewell to Sarah, 
the journey, the preparation of the altar. We know nothing of 
what goes on within. The story is a story of externals. Brand, 
however, occasionally bares his soul: he defends his actions, he 
worries over the lack of reconciliation with his mother, he 
briefly considers moving for the sake of the child's [his son] 
health. Indeed in the third act we move with Brand to what he 
might call the final resolve of faith, to what others might regard 
as the final seduction by illness. 55 
Act III of Brand contains a depiction of Brand's bewilderment as he wrestles 
with his decision whether to leave the parish and so save his son from 
mortal illness, or to remain, as he believes is God's command, and thus 
condemn his child to certain death. Whereas we see Abraham acting almost 
as an automaton, performing without obvious feeling the motions of 
sacrifice, in Brand we see the consciousness behind the externals and can 
make no corresponding evaluation of Brand's approach to his perceived 
duty, irrespective of how we evaluate his resolution to act. But this is not to 
say that Abraham does not experience a similar level of emotional turmoil, 
only that his story's reader does not learn of it and, hence, cannot know 
whether or not he experiences the kind of pain reasonably associated with 
such a choice. From the data in the story, how can one know that Abraham 
is not an automaton? How can one make intelligible such a monstrous 
55 Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 125-126 
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profession of faith? How can one pity him? This last question resonates 
with Wittgenstein's questions concerning how one can know of another's 
pain. In Philosophical Investigations, he asks: 
How am I filled with pity for this man? How does it come out 
what the object of my pity is? (Pity, one might say, is a form of 
conviction that someone is in pain).56 
From the text, we can form no such conviction that Abraham is in pain; 
indeed, he seems fully resigned to God's will. In Brand's case, on the other 
hand, the reader is left in no doubt that he experiences genuine turmoil in 
deciding where his ultimate duty lies. And while one may not precisely 
identify with his situation or condone his indecision (given the ethical 
priority entailed in parental love, for most, such a command would require 
no decision at all), one can at least comprehend it in terms of Kierkegaard's 
construal of the teleological suspension of the ethical. That is to say: based 
on a certain conception of God, one that is at least is partly constituted in 
the definition, 'He whose will we are duty bound to obey,' one can accept 
that those who hold this conception of God feel must a strong compulsion 
to do as he commands. But, Abraham's apparent resignation aside, nothing 
in this definition alone requires that the fulfilment of duty be painless. 
Brand's pain is evident near the end of Act III, in which he ponders 
the family doctor's injunction that the right thing is to renounce his 
religious conviction and leave, and hence save his son from certain death. 
Brand's turmoil is apparent in his pained exclamation: 
As I am now ... as I was then ... 
Where does truth end, error begin ...? 
blind man or seer, which man am I? 57 
Whether or not one agrees with his conclusion, and whatever one's 
evaluation of his mental state, there is cause to pity Brand, and his turmoil 
constitutes sufficient evidence to preclude consideration of him as a mere 
automaton. 
56 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
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Sutherland argues that reflection on such examples advance moral 
discussion in terms of 'how, if at all, moral beliefs and sensitivities may 
modify a conviction based upon religious belief to act in ways contrary to 
moral intuition.' 58 He claims that the psychological complexities and 
implications of such clashes can be drawn out more effectively by 
examining the situation from the agent's point of view than simply by 
analysing disembodied facts in terms of general theory: 'The initial 
point...is that the conflict is within the individual, quite as much as 
between individuals.'59 In presenting the raw data for ethical judgement 
from an individual's point of view rather than the mere spectator's, 
literature is a particularly valuable source of material for such reflection. 
In Heart of Darkness, the narrator's point of view creates the effect of 
experiential immediacy, furnishing the reader with an enhanced 
apprehension of Marlow's experience through which to grasp its ethical 
significance. Moreover, the scene unfolds to the reader in the way that it 
could have unfolded to the narrator in the living moment. The scene's 
description begins with Marlow's first impressions - the black shapes in 
their attitudes of 'pain, abandonment and despair.' His attention is drawn 
away from the workers momentarily by a detonation blast at the nearby 
mine; he registers the 'slight shudder of soil under my feet.' This reminds 
him of the circumstances which led to the predicament of the moribund 
workers - 'The work!' - and directs his attention back to their situation and 
his contemplation of their plight. This mode of describing events as they 
unfold to a character is 'typical of the narrative technique known as 'stream 
of consciousness,' a term coined by William James to denote the 'flow of 
inner experiences:60 A further example from Heart of Darkness illustrates 
the stream of consciousness approach and its ability to furnish a sense of 
immediacy: 
I was looking down at the sounding-pole, and feeling much 
annoyed to see at each try a little more of it stick out of that 
55 ibid., p. 128 
59 ibid. 
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river, when I saw my poleman give up the business suddenly, 
and stretch himself flat on the deck, without even taking the 
trouble to haul his pole in. He kept hold on it though, and it 
trailed in the water. At the same time the fireman, whom I 
could also see below me, sat down abruptly before his furnace 
and ducked his head. I was amazed. Then I had to look at the 
river mighty quick, because there was a snag in the fairway. 
Sticks, little sticks, were flying about - thick: they were 
whizzing before my nose, dropping below me, striking behind 
me against my pilot house. All this time the river, the shore, the 
woods, were very quiet - perfectly quiet. I could only hear the 
heavy splashing thump of the stern-wheel and the patter of 
these things. We cleared the snag clumsily. Arrows, by Jove! 61 
In this very visual passage the reader is not told of things in the order in 
which they happened, but 'sees' them in the order in which they were 
apprehended by the narrator. There is a lag between sight and 
understanding: Marlow sees 'little sticks' first, and realises that they are 
arrows only slightly afterwards, all against a background registration of the 
river environment's silence. Stream of consciousness is a dramatic 
realisation of the insider's perspective; it allows the reader to enter 
imaginatively into the actions and experiences of a literary character and 
'see' things as they do. In this respect, first person narratives in particular 
confer a sense of intimacy and immediacy on the reader's own experience. 
As will be argued later, the ability to view the world through the windows 
of perspective furnished by literature can play an important role in the 
development of our capacity not only to apprehend and understand 
situations of moral seriousness, but also to make reality out of worthwhile 
ethical prescriptions. 
Value also attaches to other narrative viewpoints, and the insider's 
perspective is not limited to narratives presented in the first person. Third 
person narratives are often given from the point of view of one or more 
characters and allow the reader to 'see' the world through their eyes. 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich62 is written 
in the third person and yet is as intimate as though it were in the first 
61 Conrad, op. cit., p. 75 
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person. Buchi Emcheta's The Joys of Motherhood 63 is a third person, strikingly 
intimate character portrait of a woman's struggle to make sense of cultural 
clashes in Nigeria in the 1940s. James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man64 combines to great effect the third person perspective with a 
stream of consciousness approach that allows the reader to share the 
maturing Stephen Dedalus' often tortured perceptions as he confronts the 
psychological complexity of moral choice. Consider the following passage 
in which Dedalus roams the darker streets of Dublin, a world away from 
the cloistered confines of his college: 
He had wandered into a maze of narrow and dirty 
streets. From the foul laneways he heard bursts of wrangling 
and the drawling of drunken singers. He walked onward, 
undismayed, wondering whether he had strayed into the 
quarter of the jews. Women and girls dressed in long vivid 
gowns traversed the street from house to house. They were 
leisurely and perfumed. A trembling seized him and his eyes 
grew dim. The yellow gasflames arose before his troubled 
vision against the vapoury sky, burning as if before an altar. 
Before the doors and in the lighted halls groups were gathered 
arrayed as for some rite. He was in another world: he had 
awakened from a slumber of centuries. 
She stood in the middle of the roadway, his heart 
pounding against his bosom in a tumult. A young woman 
dressed in a long pink gown laid her hand on his arm to detain 
him and gazed into his face. 65 
Stephen's vision is troubled, his heart beats in a tumult, at least partially 
because he is experiencing moral anguish. On the cusp of adulthood, on the 
verge of waking from the slumber of doctrinal oppression, he must choose 
between fidelity to the abstract principles and specific rules of his faith, and 
willingly succumbing to the primordial urges of his senses - virtue or pre-
marital sex? He chooses the latter, and for a time becomes a frequenter of 
Dublin's brothels, transforming his one 'sinful' act into a practice. Later, 
after a lengthy sermon on the subject of sin by the college chaplain which 
precipitates the climax of Dedalus' anguish over his dilemma, he is forced 
62 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) 
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to consider yet another moral choice: does he confess his sinful practice and 
gain redemption at the cost of achieving a freedom of the senses? For to do 
so would deny him a degree of emotional and physical maturity not 
available within the confines of conservative Catholicism: 
No escape. He had to confess, to speak out in words 
what he had done and thought, sin after sin. How? How? 
-Father, I... 
The thought slid like a cold shining rapier into his tender 
flesh. But not there in the chapel of the college. He would 
confess all, every sin of deed and thought, sincerely: but not 
there among his school companions. Far away from there in 
some dark place he would murmur out his own shame: and he 
besought God humbly not to be offended with him if he did not 
dare to confess in the college chapel: and in utter abjection of 
spirit he craved forgiveness mutely of the boyish hearts about 
him.66 
Stories can also be told from multiple perspectives. Joyce's Lllysses67 is an 
amalgam of a number of perspectives, viewpoints and narrative devices, 
including musings by the older Stephen Dedalus, many instances of 
Leopold Bloom's streams of consciousness, and a lengthy interior 
monologue delivered by Molly Bloom, in which the reader acquires a 
detailed account of her thoughts and feelings. Durre11's The Alexandra 
Quartet,68 a classic example of this mode of narration, consists of four 
novels, each of which is a story about the same events, but told from the 
viewpoint of a different character. Similarly, Anton Bock's novel The Ash 
Garden69 contains three intertwined stories, each told from the standpoint of 
different characters whose lives have been affected by a single event, the 
bombing of Hiroshima: Anton Boll, senior scientist on the Manhattan 
Project who in the early parts of the narrative remains convinced of the 
necessity of bombing Nagasaki and Hiroshima near the end of World War 
Two; Emiko Amai, victim of the atom bomb blast at Hiroshima that Boll's 
research facilitated; and Sophie Boll, Anton's wife who cannot see the 
65 ibid., p. 107 
66 ibid., p. 136 
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world from her husband's perspective and has little understanding for the 
value he attaches to his role in creating the atom bomb. 
The value of the insider's perspective is not limited to the novel. In 
drama we find the dramatic counterpart to the interior monologue in 
soliloquy. Shakespeare's Hamlet, Macbeth and Othello are classic examples of 
plays that make extensive use of soliloquy to convey a character's '...state 
of mind and heart, his most intimate thoughts and feelings, his motives and 
intentions.' 70 In poetry, we find the insider's perspective in poems written 
from first, second and third person viewpoints. William Wordsworth's The 
Prelude71 is a richly detailed poetic account of one person's perspective on 
the world. Other narratives, such as Solzhenitsyn's For the Good of the 
Cause,72 written from a more 'reporterly' third person viewpoint, employ a 
less overtly insider's perspective to tell their story; but they nevertheless 
manage to convey the complexity of ethical choices and how the 
implications of those choices impinge on the lives of their characters. 
The argument here is that the individual viewpoints from which a 
narrative may be presented make a crucial contribution to literature's value 
to ethical reflection. Sleinis expresses this point when he writes: 
... the display of individual points of view is characteristic of 
literature and grounds its capacity to engage our interest 
because we all possess an individual point of view. Seeing 
things from new points of view that we could not invent 
ourselves enlarges the ways we conceive of things, frees us 
from our routine modes of interpretation and enriches our 
inner life. 73 
This also brings out a key difference between literature and ethics. The 
function of ethics is to construct a normative theory that includes a concept 
of 'goodness' that grounds the principles of action that govern the conduct 
of moral agents. However, as Sleinis argues, 'It is not the function of 
morality to create new objects for conscious awareness with power to 
69 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001) 
" Cuddon, op. cit., p. 889 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995) 
72 (London: Sphere, 1971) 
73 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 51 
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command, sustain, and reward contemplation.' 74 This is the function of 
literature; and to regard moral philosophy as such, and to evaluate it in 
terms of its ability to fulfil these functions, would constitute a serious 
category error. But these functions can be harnessed to support the 
philosophical enterprise: seeing the world from Marlow's perspective in 
Heart of Darkness helps us to contextualise the principle in Kant's argument 
and enlarges the way we conceive its moral significance; seeing the world 
through Brand's eyes allows us to consider aspects of the relation between 
religion and ethics that may be overlooked or receive too little attention in 
philosophical argument; and seeing the world through Stephen Dedalus' 
eyes allows us to better understand the internal conflict between faith, duty 
and certain natural drives. Literature may not offer definitive solutions to 
the real life equivalents of these moral issues but, as Seamus Heaney writes, 
'if our given experience is a labyrinth, its impassibility can still be 
countered by the poet's imagining some equivalent of the labyrinth and 
presenting himself and us with a vivid experience of it.' 75 While Heaney's 
argument concerns poetry in particular, it applies with equal effectiveness 
to all forms of literature which engage the imaginative faculty. The 
argument here is that the furnishing of unique perspectives unavailable via 
traditional philosophical discourse allows readers to see, to feel and to 
understand what they would do in the kinds of ethical situations depicted 
in literature and thus better understand the labyrinthine character of moral 
judgement, and to see how the real concerns of concrete individuals may be 
accommodated in the theoretical stances of moral philosophy. But 
perspective is not the only device that adds value to literature as an adjunct 
to moral reflection; language, too, has a key role to play. 
In Theory of Literature, Wellek and Warren argue, 'Language is quite literally 
the material of the literary artist.' 76 In the passages from Heart of Darkness, 
74 ibid., pp. 3-4 
75 Seamus Heaney, The Redress of Poetry, (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 2 
76 Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, 3rd Edn., (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1963), 
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language is employed not only to create a scene, but also to emphasise the 
dehumanising effect of exploitation. It reduces the status of the indigenous 
workers encountered by Marlow to that of mere objects. They are not 
described in terms normally associated with persons, but in metaphors that 
draw attention to the bodily effects of their working conditions: 'black 
shapes,' moribund shapes,' nothing earthly,' black shadows of disease 
and starvation,' black bones.' In a further emphasis on objectification, the 
impersonal articles 'the' and 'a' are employed, rather than the personal and 
possessive pronouns 'their' or 'his,' the use of which implies personhood. 
Human status, signified by 'The man,' is not conferred until Marlow makes 
eye contact with one of the workers; and it is significant that the first time 
the personal pronoun is used, signifying personhood, is when Marlow 
interacts with him by giving him a biscuit. The images portrayed by this 
language create a representation of what exploitation has reduced these 
workers to, at least in the eyes of the exploiters: inefficient objects. The 
language used to describe the scene emphasises its pathos, evoking feelings 
of pity or even sorrow over the workers' plights. This scene from Heart of 
Darkness illustrates Norris' point that the writer of imaginative literature 
'...is able to draw attention to aspects that easily become lost in 
philosophical prose or which receive too little emphasis.' 77 Rather than 
obscuring the ethical issues in this scene, the language focuses the reader's 
attention on the workers' physical and mental suffering, thus emphasising 
the effects of their exploitation. 
The language's ironic tone also conveys ethical significance. In one 
line we find a subversion of the moral authority of the legal system that 
validated the workers' engagement and their subsequent redundancy. As 
H. L. A. Hart writes: 'Few perhaps ... would find any contradiction in the 
assertion that a rule of law was valid and yet conflicted with some binding 
moral principle.' 78 The ironic reference to 'all the legality of time contracts,' 
P. 174 
77 Norris, op. cit., p. 19 
78 H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality, (London; OUP, 1963), p. 3 
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is a vivid reminder that there is often such conflict between ethics and the 
law. While the legality of the situation could perhaps be demonstrated, few 
would agree that the workers were immersed in a morally acceptable 
situation. Another ironic allusion, this one to the racism that characterised 
much of Conrad's contemporary audience, is apparent in the reference to 
the indeterminate age of the man with whom Marlow interacts, and turns 
the racial stereotype ironically against its users: '...but you know with them 
it's hard to tell.' 79 
Stylistic devices and imaginative language are predominant features 
of the extract from Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. When read in 
the context of the entire novel, the passage quoted can be seen to represent 
a turning point in the young man's life: the bifurcation between boyhood 
and manhood. Its language captures with compelling simplicity the 
atmosphere of the clash between Stephen's world of ardent religiosity 
enforced by his Jesuit teachers and the temporal pleasures of the secular 
world, with which he is, until now, almost completely unfamiliar. In so 
doing, the author ingeniously brings to the fore the hitherto mostly 
subtextual tension between these two worlds - the religious and the secular 
- that exists within Dedalus. It is a powerful illustration of the 
Kierkegaardian concept of choice: Dedalus confronts the clash between his 
religious world of righteousness and Christian ethics and the secular world 
of sinful temptation and he must choose to make a choice between the 
two.80 The tone of the passage clearly reflects Dedalus' naiveté and 
indecision: can he choose to live in either world, leaving behind the other, 
or can he embrace both, and deal with the mental and ethical compromises 
incumbent in such a life? It is perhaps no accident that this scene takes 
79 There is a vast body of critical literature on Conrad's Heart of Darkness. My intention here 
is not to offer a criticism of the novel, but to elucidate how a certain reading can illustrate a 
moral issue. For a critical account of racist allusions and other themes in the novel, see 
Anthony Fothergill, Heart of Darkness, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989). See 
also Chinua Achebe, 'An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness, in The 
Massachusetts Review, 18.4(winter 1975). For a critical anthology dealing with the novel, see 
Kimbrough, R. (ed.), Heart of Darkness, (Norton Edition, 1988). 
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place in Dublin's Jewish quarter, a 'neutral' territory outside the milieu of 
religiosity and nationalism in which Dedalus is immersed and from which 
he wishes to escape. 
The extent of Dedalus' dilemma is invoked by language which 
describes the physical effects of the turmoil he is experiencing: 'A trembling 
seized him and his eyes grew dim;' he suffers from '...troubled vision;' and 
finds '...his heart clamouring against his bosom in a tumult.' It is 
noteworthy that 'trembling' and 'dim vision' are motifs that recur 
throughout the narrative to convey a sense of Dedalus' enduring turmoil. 
Moreover, the passage does not so much describe a chronologically ordered 
chain of events in a realistically drawn setting, but rather takes the reader 
to the scene confronting the character; and it does so by using rich mental 
imagery that does not directly tell us what Stephen sees, but invites us to 
share how he sees it. It is a journey into the mind of the character and we 
experience the scene as Dedalus himself perceives it. Indeed, the characters' 
sensations, feelings, impressions and thoughts are offered via so subjective 
a perspective as to give the impression that Dedalus is referring to himself 
in the third person. 
One of the first stylistic observations the reader makes concerns the 
technique Joyce employs to punctuate and attribute dialogue. Rather than 
placing dialogue in inverted commas, Joyce indicates speech by placing a 
hyphen before utterances. This has the effect of producing dialogue that 
appears more immediate. The language, too, although rich with imagery 
and symbolism, is basically in 'everyday' form. Syntax is no more 
complicated or formal than in everyday speech. By Joyce's control of the 
written artform, images are achieved with remarkable economy. In 
describing the setting, 'foul laneways' seems to convey more about the 
environment than a more detailed, referential description might achieve. 
Indeed, referential description is all but absent from the passage, and the 
8° Kierkegaard's concept of choosing to choose is given its clearest expression in his 
Either/Or, in A Kierkegaard Anthology, Robert Bretall, ed., (New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press), pp. 19-107. 
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reader must infer such details as time, setting and social context via the 
powerful yet economic imagery. That it is night, or at least evening, is 
indicated by the women's dress ('...long, vivid gowns'), the 'lighted halls,' 
and the 'yellow gasflames' burning against the lvapoury sky.' The dress 
and manner of the girls and women that Stephen observes imply a 
particular social context and sharpen the image of a divided world. 
Compare the image of 'leisurely and perfumed' women in vivid attire with 
the archetypical women with whom he would normally come into contact - 
the hard working, pragmatic Irish Catholic mother of many or the idealised 
images of the Virgin Mary to whom Stephen would regularly pray. 
Moreover, would one expect 'bursts of hoarse riot and wrangling and the 
drawling of drunken singers' in the respectable and hallowed grounds of 
Stephen's Clongowes School? 
At sixteen, Stephen is on the verge of surrendering his virginity. In 
this passage, it is as though, in so doing, he is sacrificing his Catholic purity 
in order to perform some rite of passage. This religious motif is evidenced 
in 'The yellow gas flames.. .burning as if before an altar.' Is this a sacrificial 
altar at which 'groups were gathered as if for some rite'? Could the 
'...young woman dressed in a long pink gown' who lays 'her hand on his 
arm to detain him' be his escort to the sacrificial altar? Or could she be the 
executor of his passage? As it turns out, she is both. In the passage which 
follows, she leads him to her room and Stephen gains his first sexual 
experience. This decision to go with her heralds Dedalus' symbolic 
entrance to the other world and his journey towards maturity. Of particular 
note is the line: '...he had awakened from the slumber of centuries.' He has 
reached a turning point in his life; he had inherited from his Irish forebears 
a willing submission to rule by both the English and the Roman Catholic 
Church that has dominated Irish culture for centuries and which he will 
soon choose to reject. He is on the verge of breaking free, of waking from 
the slumber of centuries and eventually freeing himself of the moral 
shackles that he feels have so constrained his artistic expression. 
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Narrative devices such as metaphor and irony, and qualities such as 
pathos, are not used in these and other literary texts as mere 
embellishments to their content. Rather, as Sleinis maintains in Art and 
Freedom, they are 'integral to literature's substantive content.' 81 He argues 
that metaphor and other literary devices such as 'irony, satire, hyperbole, 
synechdote, and even allegory ... are principally devices to induce us to 
look at things in new ways.'82 If language is quite literally the material of 
the literary artist, then metaphor in particular has an essential function in 
literature. 
Norris argues, pace Locke, that the language of imaginative literature 
expresses a content that could not 'equally well find expression in some 
other words.' 83 Stripped of metaphor and other literary devices, the 
passages from Heart of Darkness and Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
would not speak as clearly to what matters in a human life and character. 
Indeed, to paraphrase the moral significance of the scenes from these 
novels in referential, non-metaphorical language - that is, to contain it in 
the nutshell about which Locke speaks - would be to reduce its description 
to bald propositional form: 'These workers are suffering;' This suffering is 
the result of some practice;' This practice is the kind of use of persons as 
mere means to an end against which Kant rails;' The choice between 
sensual experience and religious or national obedience can cause moral 
anguish.' While it may not be the case that all scenes such as those from 
Heart of Darkness and Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man cannot effectively 
be paraphrased while retaining their substantive content, the argument 
here is that such passages express a content the richness and complexity of 
which cannot equally well find expression in other words and definitely 
cannot be reduced to the abstract propositional form of traditional 
philosophical discourse. 
81 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 50 
82 ibid., p. 51 
83 Norris, op. cit., p. 17. cf Cleanth Brookes who, in The Well Wrought Urn, (London: 
Methuen, 1971), argues that a poem's precise meaning is inseparable from its form. See 
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The significance of language and literary devices to a work's 
substantive content is particularly evident in poetry and, as Graham 
argues, 'There are many poems in which the interconnectedness of image 
and utterance is so marked that it is difficult to differentiate the two.' 84 To 
illustrate this argument for the unity of form and content, consider Chinua 
Achebe's poem Refugee Mother and Child, conceived by the poet as a 
representation of the human suffering that resulted from the Biafran War in 
Nigeria in the nineteen-sixties: 
No Madonna and child could touch 
that picture of a mother's tenderness 
for a son she would soon have to forget. 
The air was heavy with odours 
of diarrhoea of unwashed children 
with washed-out ribs and died-up 
bottoms struggling in laboured 
steps behind blown empty bellies. Most 
mothers there had long ceased 
to care but not this one; she held 
a ghost smile between her teeth 
and in her eyes the ghost of a mother's 
pride as she combed the rust-coloured 
hair left on the skull and then - 
singing in her eyes - began carefully 
to part it ... in another life this 
would have been a little daily 
act of no consequence before his 
breakfast and school; now she 
did it like putting flowers 
on a tiny grave.85 
The reader's apprehension of the ethical significance of Achebe's poem 
turns on pathos. The poem's imagery is vivid: the picture of starving, 
unwashed children struggling to move through air heavy with the odour of 
illness is an arresting presentation of great degradation. The description of 
the child as a 'son she would soon have to forget' invokes a sense of 
pathetic inevitability to his plight and the emotional burden of his mother 
also A. C. Bradley's essay 'Poetry for Poetry's Sake' in Oxford Lectures on Poetry, (London: 
Macmillan, 1909). 
84 Graham 1997, p. 113 
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coming to terms with her grief. The death motif prevails throughout the 
poem: she holds a 'ghost smile' and the 'ghost of a mother's pride;' .the 
skull,' instead of 'his head' and the simile 'like putting flowers on a tiny 
grave' all invoke a sense of impending mortality. The simple and, in 
another context, inconsequential ritual of a mother combing her dying 
child's hair is given tragic dignity as a representation of the depravation 
caused by war. The ironic juxtaposition of the first stanza's meaning 
relative to the poem's larger stanza is a striking yet subtle use of irony: the 
Christian imagery of the Madonna and child and the purity it symbolises, 
followed by a representation of deep maternal love in a scene of utter 
degradation subverts the stereotypical view that the African mother may 
love, or grieve over, her child less than her European counterpart. The 
poem does not treat the mother and her child merely as victims of war, it 
reveals them as persons. Just as the workers in Heart of Darkness remain 
persons despite the effects of their exploitation, the effects of war have not 
turned the mother and child into mere things. In attending to her dying 
child the mother is shown, in the words of Simone Weil, as 'fully another 
perspective on the world.'86 As Raimond Gaita comments on Weil's point, 
this does not mean that she is 'merely a centre of consciousness,' 87 but an 
individual perspective whose grief resists the statistical representation of its 
owner either as a victim ofwar or as a mere unit in the abstract reasoning 
of those who would justify such a war on statistical grounds. 
Acknowledging that victims of war are also persons - unique perspectives 
on the world - is the first step to seeing the world through the eyes of 
others, and endows us with the power, as King Lear put it, to 'feel what 
wretches feel.' 88 Thus Achebe's poem furnishes the reader with an intimate 
impression of the human cost of war that no impartial record or statistical 
representation could ever achieve. 
85 From Achebe, Beware Soul Brother, (Oxford: Heinemann, 1971), p.12 




Moreover, the poem resists reduction to bare abstract propositional 
form because, while each of the propositions it embodies (such as 'War can 
cause the innocent to suffer' and 'African mothers love their children or 
grieve over their loss as much as European mothers do') may well be 
contained in a Lockean nutshell, their meaning and significance is, as 
Norris explains, 'dependent upon just these words being used, and is not 
reducible to some other form of words.' 89 This is what Graham means 
when he writes that, like the passages cited from Conrad's and Joyce's 
novels, the lines of a poem 'do not merely record a scene or episode; they 
get us to apprehend it in a certain way.' 90 He goes on to argue: 
It may be incorrect to say that the same idea cannot be 
conveyed in any other way, but it is clear that paraphrase 
would require extended explanation and equally clear that this 
process of spelling everything out would destroy the inner 
complexity of the lines which makes the poetic expression 
arresting. 91 
It is through its range of forms and narrative devices that literature can 
illuminate and thus direct attention to important aspects of the moral life 
that may be ignored or distorted in traditional ethical discourse. As he 
writes: 
... in great imaginative literature, the devices of poetry, story 
and drama can be harnessed, not just to please and entertain, 
but to create images through which the reader is given an 
enhanced apprehension of human experience. 92 
Raphael agrees, and in his response to Cora Diamond's criticism that his 
account of the value of literature to ethics reflects a merely descriptive view 
of its role,93 he argues that a literary work's form distinguishes it from the 
bald discourse of moral philosophy and adds value and significance to the 
role for literature in developing moral understanding. He asks of Diamond: 
88 Shakespeare, King Lear, III, iv. The notions of compassion and narrative sympathy are 
the constituents of the attitudinal account. 
89 Norris, op. cit., p. 77 
9° Graham 1997, p. 114 
91 ibid. 
92 ibid., p. 128 
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'But why should she suppose that what counts in this conception is only 
"the story itself" and not "how the story is told"?' Raphael argues: 
A plain history of Antigone, or Lear and Cordelia, or Emma 
Bovary, or Michael Henchard, the Mayor of Casterbridge, 
would clearly not give us the depth of understanding which 
comes from the language and the mode in which they are 
portrayed by Sophocles, Shakespeare, Flaubert, and Hardy. 94 
If Graham, Sleinis, Norris and Raphael are correct that the enhanced 
•apprehension of human experience furnished in literary discourse can 
reveal features of the ethical that are not available through traditional 
philosophical discourse, then the value of the propositional account for the 
connection between moral philosophy and imaginative literature is 
soundly based. 
The Role of Plot 
However, the amalgam of ethically significant content with a unique 
perspective, imaginative language and thought-provoking stylistic devices 
does not alone ensure sufficient material for substantive ethical reflection. 
To convey the full complexity of life and ethical decision making, a story 
needs to contain more than just these elements: it needs to structure its 
material in such a way as to make intelligible the ethical significance of its 
episodes. Herein lies a further important formal distinction between 
philosophical argument and creative literature: whereas a philosophical 
argument is a connected series of ideas that support a conclusion, an 
extended literary narrative consists in a connected series of events and 
episodes in some character's life. Moreover, if this is a valuable feature of 
literature's contribution to ethical reflection, then the novel, as the 
paradigm of extended connected narratives, is a particularly valuable 
supplement. 
93 Cora Diamond 'Having a Rough Story about What Moral Philosophy Is,' in New Literary 
History, op. cit., pp. 155-169 
94 D. D. Raphael, 'Response to Cora Diamond,' in New Literary History, op. cit, p. 175 
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Arguably, the most valuable feature of the novel's contribution to 
ethical reflection is its ability to structure, contextualise, and make 
intelligible the narrated episodes of a character's life. This structuring is a 
function of a novel's plot. As Margaret Doody writes: 
A novelist 'ties everything together,' weaving and unravelling 
the tissue of text. A novel must supply means by which the 
reader can create coherence. Without structures that induce 
coherence, even a story with very dashing characters or pretty 
settings or stunning ekphraseis will founder. We tend to think 
that what ensures sustained interest is 'a good story' - what has 
been called 'a good read.' 95 
She chides Forster, who, in Aspects of the Novel, complains that a novel's 
story 'runs like a ... tapeworm, for its beginning and end are arbitrary.' 96 
While he accepts that to a novel, its story is 'the fundamental aspect 
without which it could not exist,' 97 he wishes that it were not so. Forster 
seems to occupy a contradictory position concerning story and its value to 
the novel. On the one hand, he considers it necessary for the novel's 
existence - indeed, while he considers story to be 'the lowest and simplest 
of literary organisms,' he acknowledges that it is 'the highest factor 
common to all the very complicated organisms known as novels: 95 For 
Forster, then, story seems to be a defining aspect of the genre. On the other 
hand, his 'wish that it were not so,' signals that the novel would somehow 
be a superior form of literary art were it not required to tell a story. But if 
story is, as he grudgingly concedes, an essential feature of the novel, then it 
is unintelligible to suppose that the two are separable. Indeed, if a novel is 
to count as a form of narrative art, whatever other features it may have, as 
Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg argue, it must be distinguished by two 
characteristics: 'the presence of a story and a story-teller.' 99 
95 Margaret Doody, The True Story of the Novel, (London: Fontana, 1998), p. 142 
96 E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1927), p. 26 
97 ibid. 
95 ibid., pp. 27, 28 
99 Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, 'The Narrative Tradition,' in R. M. Davis (ed.), The 
Novel: modern Essays in Criticism, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 17 
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Forster's concern is that, in itself, the story is merely a device to keep 
the reader in suspense: 'Qua story, it can only have one merit: that of 
making the audience want to know what happens next.' 100 But success in 
this task is an insufficient measure of a novel's quality, and he argues that 
story alone fails to engage an important valuational aspect of the reader's 
experience. This unease over the value of story stems from his definition of 
story as a 'narrative of events arranged in their time sequence - dinner 
coming after breakfast, Tuesday after Monday, decay after death, and so 
on.'iol He argues that this requires a linear conception of narrative time that 
fails to accommodate the emphasis humans place on events, the value of 
which are not measured merely in terms of time, but in terms of their 
intensity. However, whatever else a novel might do, at the very least it 
must tell a story, and Doody attributes more value to the function of story 
than Forster allows. While Forster contends that the ordinances of matter 
and time, configured through story, are regrettable features of a novel 
o2\ ('Yes-' he writes, 'oh, dear, yes-the novel tells a story'l ), Doody responds 
that given the inevitable fate of temporal matter and the intensity with 
which humans reflect on death, 'they are no small things, and if the story 
gives us those, it gives us much.'10 She considers that a 'good read' is one 
in which the 'offal and bones' of a story are configured in an intelligible 
temporality. 104 
But Doody, like others, argues that this temporality need not be 
furnished sequentially. While between its covers, a novel's story has a 
beginning, middle and end, and, as Forster acknowledges, `no novelist can 
deny time inside the fabric of his novel,' 105 there is no obligation to 
construct the narrative in any particular order except to achieve one or a 
number of effects, including suspense, or to make intelligible by their 
relations the relative importance of narrated events. The intensity of 
100 ibid., p. 27 
1°1 ibid. 
102 ibid., p. 42 
10 Doody, /oc cit. 
1°4 ibid. 
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Stephen's anguish during the priest's sermon in A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man is intelligible only by reference to his earlier moral choice, 
indeed as a consequence of his choice. Imaginably, his anguish would be 
less intense, and its intensity less intelligible, were he merely contemplating 
alternatives in anticipation of making this choice; even less so if the reader 
were simply unaware of the dilemma that informs his anxiety. But the 
order in which these episodes are related is less important than their causal 
and valuational relations. For the anguish to be intelligible, the reader is 
required to apprehend its relation to another episode; and this 
apprehension may be effected either at the reading moment - in sequential 
order - or as a dawning of sorts during denouement. Thus, while 
temporality is important, narrated sequence is less so; most important is the 
significance of narrated events and their valuational, rather than their 
temporal, relations. According to Forster, a story qua story only narrates life 
in time and, in so doing, ignores that value attaches to events based on their 
importance rather than on their chronological position. Forster 
distinguishes between story and plot: while he confines the role of story to 
the arrangement of events according to their time sequence, he considers 
that a novel's plot configures episodes in such a way as to allow the reader 
to discern the causal and valuational relations of narrated events. In so 
doing, a novel's plot both configures episodes in an intelligible order and 
assigns each episode ethical significance relative not only to other episodes, 
but to the story itself. Plot thus makes intelligible a narrative's moral theme 
and, in so doing, illuminates the possibilities for ethical seriousness it 
represents. The importance of plot on the propositional account is clarified 
thereby. Moreover, in enhancing the reader's ability to grasp the nuances 
and complexities of ethical judgement and stimulate moral perceptions that 
may be unavailable through traditional philosophical discourse, the 
benefits envisaged in the attitudinal account are also realised. 
In On Stories, Kearney draws on Paul Ricoeur when he observes, 'A 
story is made out of events, and the plot (mythos) is what mediates between 
105 Forster, op. cit., p. 29 
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events and a story.' 106 A plot, in other words, gives the story a coherence 
that transcends synthesising the spatial and temporal relations of the 
characters, their actions and the settings in which they occur. By 
introducing and organising causal and valuational relations between the 
story's components, plot allows the reader to draw from the story an idea 
of the intricate and complex network of motives, relationships and other 
influences that infuse lived experience as it is represented in the narrative. 
The role and value of representation will be discussed more fully 
later, but note that plot adds something extra to the narrative: a configured 
temporal and causal aspect that represents more truly the complexity of 
ethical reality with which the reader can identify and engage with. It is a 
feature of existential reality that our lives are often enmeshed in a tangled 
web of causal relations. Novels that offer insights concerning the ethical life 
will almost certainly reflect this feature of lived experience, and the 
configuration of causal relations will be central to its plot. However, the 
reader must still do some work in this regard. To be captivated by a story, a 
mature and reflective reader needs more than to be told what happened 
and why - part of a novel's full effectiveness lies in the reader's engagement 
with the plot in order to grasp its intricacies and the complex web of 
relations between the story's characters and events. This is one feature that 
makes a good story so compelling and, conversely, a compelling story so 
good. It also requires the reader to enter imaginatively into the story so as 
to grasp these relations and, hence, discover the ethical significance of the 
story as a whole. This, in turn, implies that the whole story configured by 
its plot is greater than the mere sum of its episodes. 
While a clearer idea of the nature and significance of plot will be 
developed as the discussion unfolds, a serviceable contemporary definition 
of 'Plot' is given by John Cuddon: 
The plan, design, scheme or pattern of events in a play, poem or 
work of fiction; and, further, the organisation of incident and 
106 Richard Kearney, op. cit., p. 130 
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character in such a way as to induce curiosity and suspense in 
the spectator or reader. 107 
In echoing previous observations about the shortcomings of schematised 
examples and simple stories, he writes, 'In the space/time continuum of 
plot the continual question operates in three tenses: Why did that happen? 
Why is this happening? What is going to happen next - and why?' In 
facilitating answers to questions of the form 'Why...?', plot allows the 
reader to discern causal relations from a network of spatial and temporal 
relations. As Scholes and Kellogg write, 'Plot is, in every sense of the word, 
the articulation of the skeleton of narrative:' 108 
A narrative's plot can take the form of a discreet thread running 
through the narrative, offering only subtle hints at the connections between 
temporally and spatially discrete characters, actions, episodes and 
incidents. The structure of Joyce's Ulysses comes to mind as an example of 
an amorphous plot which is subtly embedded in an otherwise seemingly 
discordant story filled with lacunae and 'zones of indetermination.' Ricoeur 
suggests that such works almost abandon the reader, who is left alone to 
carry the burden of emplotment. Many modernist novels of the early 
twentieth century fall into this category, exemplified particularly in the 
stream of consciousness novels by authors, in addition to Joyce, such as 
Virginia Woolf and William Faulkner; as do works by more contemporary 
writers such as Nadine Gordimer and Len Deighton. Alternatively, in what 
critics term 'middle-brow fiction,' the novel's plot can be an overt device 
intended to make the narrative's meaning obvious to a less reflective 
readership. 
Whether the burden of emplotment is carried mainly by the reader 
or the author, wherever Cuddon's questions can intelligibly be asked of a 
narrative, and wherever that narrative incorporates some operation that 
permits cogent answers, there exists a discernible plot which, in Ricoeur's 
107 • John Cuddon, ed., The Penguin Dictionary of Literary terms and Literary Theory, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 719 
108 Scholes and Kellogg, op. cit., p. 23 
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way of thinking, draws configuration from succession, irrespective of the 
order in which the succession is portrayed. In an idea that comports with 
the propositional account examined here, Ricoeur holds that plot allows a 
narrative to lend intelligibility to abstract moral reasoning and, as such, can 
supplement a reader's practical understanding of the ethical life and its 
requirements. In 'Life in Quest of Narrative,' 109 Ricoeur advances the thesis 
that literary texts may be employed to: 
... develop a sort of understanding that can be termed narrative 
understanding and which is much closer to the practical 
' wisdom of moral judgement than to ... the theoretical use of 
reason.1" 
Like Norris, Nussbaum, Cunningham, Williams, McGinn and Phillips, 
Ricoeur argues that reflection on the moral situations depicted in literature 
can contribute to our practical understanding of morality and the human 
condition in a way that no abstract theoretical reasoning on moral 
principles can. He suggests that at least one function of imaginative 
literature is to: 
... propose to the imagination and to its mediation various 
figures that constitute so many thought experiments by which we 
learn to link together the ethical aspects of human conduct and 
happiness and misfortune. 111 
Ricoeur maintains that narrative can add an intelligibility not otherwise 
evident in the theoretical disquisitions of traditional philosophical ethics. 
He cites Aristotle, who holds, 'every well-told story teaches something,'112 to 
support his notion that the story 'reveals universal aspects of the human 
condition'm in a way that is much closer to the 'practical wisdom of moral 
judgement.' 114 
An informed response to ethical questions addressed to the scene 
from Heart of Darkness, for instance, requires more than reflecting on the 
109 Paul Ricoeur, 'Life in Quest of Narrative' in On Paul Ricoeur, Ed. David Wood, 
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 23-33 
110 ibid., p. 23 
111 ibid. 
112 ibid., p. 22 
113 ibid. 
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reader's response to its pathos. Taken by itself, like the scene from Joyce's 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the extract from Heart of Darkness is 
merely an event, an episode in the life of the narrator, an otherwise 
heterogeneous passage from a book. Moreover, while we may possess the 
type of literary 'preunderstanding,' which Ricoeur terms mimesisi, that 
allows us to discern meaning in the parts of speech and imagery employed 
by an author, without reading the extract in relation to the story in which it 
is positioned, we can only apprehend the passage as a semi-cohesive 
multiplicity of literary images. 115 That we discern some meaning and 
cohesion is due to our possession of what Ricoeur terms our practical 
understanding of 'the symbolic resources of the practical field,' by which he 
means the reader's ability to comprehend the meaning of words, 
expressions, metaphors and other literary devices in the context of the 
narrative. 116 
The full moral import of the passage, however, does not emerge 
until we place it in the wider context of the story as a whole and see it as an 
instantiation of the narrative's ethical theme. According to Ricoeur, it is the 
operation of emplotment that allows the reader to position such an otherwise 
isolated episode, event or incident. Thus, emplotment performs a 
mediating function between the reader's preunderstanding of the 
narrative's symbolic resources (the complex of images, devices and parts of 
speech) and his or her understanding of the ethical significance of the story 
as a whole. 
Ricoeur defines the operation of emplotment as: '...a synthesis of 
heterogeneous elements.' 117 He enumerates three ways in which the 
mediating feature of emplotment occurs: 
The mediation performed by the plot between the multiple 
incidents and unified story; the primacy of concordance over 
114 ibid., p. 23 
115 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 
54ff 
116 ibid ., p . 57 
117 Paul Ricoeur, 1991, op. cit., p. 21 - 
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discordance; and, finally, the competition between succession 
and configuration. 118 
First, emplotment synthesises all of the events contained in a story so that 
they can be understood in relation to the whole narrative. This synthesis is 
'between the events or incidents which are multiple and the story which is 
unified and complete.' 119 In this way, the plot around which Conrad's 
narrative is constructed positions the extract cited earlier among a complex 
of other events and in the wider context of the whole story. As Ricoeur 
writes, emplotment 'serves to make one story out of the multiple incidents 
or, if you prefer, transforms the many incidents into one story.' 12° Without 
emplotment, the moral theme that runs through Heart of Darkness would be 
fragmentary, and as elusive as the cause of Stephen Dedalus' moral 
anguish in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Emplotment serves also to 
render the whole narrative greater than the sum of its parts. According to 
Ricoeur: 
the recounted story is always more than the enumeration, in an 
order that would be merely serial or successive, of the incidents 
or events that it organizes into an intelligible whole. 121 
In reflecting on Marlow's first encounter with the native workers, the 
reader may well form moral opinions concerning their apparent 
mistreatment; but without the synthesis afforded by emplotment, he or she 
would be left to ponder a number of unresolved issues: what is the purpose 
of Marlow's visit to the African shore? Who are the 'black shapes'? How 
did they land in such a predicament? Who, if anyone, deserves censure 
over this treatment in the first place? But perhaps most importantly from a 
narrative point of view, how does this scene fit into the story as a whole? 
While this first feature concerns events that are primarily sequential 
and episodic, such as organising the way in which Conrad's narrative 
traces Marlow's progress upriver and into the 'heart of darkness,' and 
118 ibid., p. 22 




Joyce's narrative chronicles the vicissitudes of Dedalus' developing 
maturity, the second synthesising feature of emplotment involves the 
organisation of a story's apparently unconnected and totally heterogeneous 
elements. In this respect, according to Ricoeur, the narrative's plot: 
organizes together components that are as heterogeneous as 
unintended circumstances, discoveries, those who perform actions 
and those who suffer them, chance or planned encounters, 
interactions between actors ranging from conflict to collaboration, 
means that are well or poorly adjusted to ends, and finally 
unintended results.122 
Emplotment affords a narrative scope for subsequent enrichments that 
augment the central theme and allow for the emergence of the story's 
ethical significance as the tangle of episodes, events and incidents is 
gradually unravelled to the reader. 'Gathering all these factors into a single 
story,' writes Ricoeur, 'makes the plot a totality which can be said to be at 
once concordant and discordant: 123 As Ricoeur uses the term 'concordant 
discordance,' he accords primacy to concordance over discordance. In this 
way, emplotment allows the reader to discern narrative order 
(concordance) out of chaos (discordance) and also to determine, on 
reflection, how seemingly discordant elements contribute to the ethical 
significance of the story as a whole and how its composition leads to the 
narrative's conclusion. It is this feature which lends intelligibility and 
significance to Dedalus' ultimate expression of independence from Church, 
state and family, and which informs the declaration he makes to his friend 
Cranly: 'I will not serve: 124 
The final feature of emplotment concerns the way in which it 
configures a narrative's temporal characteristics. This feature, above all, 
allows the reader to apprehend the synthesis of heterogeneous elements 
and, ultimately, discern a coherent narrative. According to Ricoeur: 
We could say that there are two sorts of time in every story told: 
on the one hand, a discrete succession that is open and 
122 'ibid. 
123 ibid. 
124 Joyce, op. cit., p. 260 
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theoretically indefinite, a series of incidents; on the other hand, the 
story told presents another temporal aspect characterised by the 
integration, culmination and closure owing to which the story 
receives its particular configuration. 125 
In the first sense, Ricoeur holds that the temporal aspect of emplotment 
imparts a linear quality to a narrative in which the reader can 'pose the 
question: and then? and then?'126 This coherence allows the reader of Heart 
of Darkness, for example, to trace the chronology of events that led to 
Marlow's encounter with the native workers then to the story's 
culmination. It allows the reader to comprehend Dedalus' ultimate rejection 
of Church, family and state in favour of the 'reality of experience'127 that 
may be encountered beyond the shackles of these connections. This, 
Ricoeur considers to be the episodic dimension of narrative which 
characterises the story as comprising of events or incidents in which time is 
represented as passage. 
In the second sense, Ricoeur observes, 'composing a story is, from a 
temporal point of view, drawing a configuration out of a succession.' 128 
Insofar as the succession is features time in the first sense, as passage, this 
configuring function of ernplotment renders the story as a temporal totality. 
In explication of this idea in Time and Narrative, he characterises this 
mediating feature of emplotment as critical to the creative process: 
This configurational act consists of "grasping together" the 
detailed actions or what I have called the story's incidents. It 
draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal 
whole. 129 
The act of emplotment, according to Ricoeur, 'extracts a configuration from 
a succession.'130 While time as passage allows the reader to discern a linear 
sequence of the story's episodes, it is the second sort of time employed by 
plot, time as duration, which gives the narrated story its temporal totality: 
125 Ricoeur, /oc. cit. 
126 ibid . 
127 Joyce, op. cit., p. 275 
128 ibid. 
129 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1984, op. cit., p. 66 
13° ibid. 
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If we may speak of the temporal identity of a story, it must be 
characterized as something that endures and remains across that 
which passes and flows away. 131 
The temporal aspect of emplotment allows the reader to 'move forward in 
the midst of contingencies and peripeteia under the guidance of an 
expectation that finds its fulfilment in the "conclusion" of a story. ,132 This 
notion of the value of a novel's configuration corresponds with Graham's 
observation that in presenting material in a particular order, the novel 
allows readers to attribute ethical significance to its events by reference to 
their relations. 133 Perhaps most importantly, the way in which a novel 
configures material also allows readers to grasp the characters' moral 
decisions and their consequences. In Hardy's Tess of the D'Urbervilles, for 
instance, our bewilderment over Tess Durbeyfield's reluctance to inform 
her betrothed, Angel Clare, of important aspects of her past would be all 
the greater for our not knowing of her mother's influence in the matter, 
revealed earlier in the narrative. In a letter responding to Tess' question 
concerning whether she should reveal to Clare that she had been raped by 
Alec D'Urberville who masqueraded as a distant relative of Tess, and that 
the illicit union had produced a child that subsequently died, her mother 
Joan, writes: 
Dear Tess, we are all glad to hear that you are going really to be 
married soon. But with respect to your question, Tess, J say 
between ourselves, quite private but very strong, that on no 
account do you say a word of your Bygone Trouble to him)- 34 
But while Tess does, for a while, conceal her bygone trouble from Clare, 
Hardy employs emplotment to leave us in no doubt about the mental 
anguish caused by her deceit. The extent of her moral turmoil is revealed to 
us before the wedding date is set, and in a climax of conscience she finally 
decides to reveal the truth: 
131 Paul Ricoeur, 1991, op. cit., p. 22 
132 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1984, op. cit., p. 66 
133 Graham (1997), op. cit., p. 124ff. See also p. 206 of this thesis, n. 49 
134 Thomas Hardy, Tess of the D'Urbervilles, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), P.  191 
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...she resolved, with a bursting heart, to tell her story to Angel 
Clare, despite her mother's command - to let him for whom she 
lived and breathed despise her if he would, and her mother regard 
her as a fool, rather than preserve a silence which might be 
deemed a treachery to him, and which somehow seemed a wrong 
to these. 135 
Tess chooses to inform Clare of her past in a letter she places under the 
door to his room. Unfortunately, it becomes concealed beneath the carpet 
and her fiancé never reads it. On the eve of the wedding, Tess is desperate 
to apprise Clare of her past trouble: 'I am so anxious to talk to you - I want 
to confess all my faults and blunders!' 136 But Clare will not hear of it, 
preferring to preserve the buoyant mood of the wedding day: 
'No, no - we can't have faults talked of - you must be deemed 
perfect to-day at least, Sweet!' he cried. 'We shall have plenty of 
time, hereafter, I hope, to talk over our failings. I will confess mine 
at the same time.' 137 
Thus Tess, 'swayed to accept the silence he presses on her by her appetite 
for joy,' 138 delays her decision to reveal her past to Clare and, in so doing, 
prompts a chain of events that lead to her tragic demise. While Hardy has 
been criticised for the needlessly complicated and somewhat melodramatic 
nature of his plots,139 emplotment makes intelligible the temporal 
dimension of the causal relations between events in Tess' life and her 
relationship with Clare, and helps the reader to understand the ethical 
significance and consequences of these relations. 
Not all stories, however, have so clear a denouement as to explicitly 
fulfil a reader's expectations. Many stories of 'great' literature are open-
ended, with interpretative space for readers to form their own conclusions. 
As noted, Ricoeur understands emplotment as the ordering of events into a 
total action constitutive of the narrated story. But how does emplotment 
help a reader to discern the moral significance of the less structured 
135 ibid. p. 200 
136 ibid., p. 211 
137 ibid. 
135 Margaret Higonnet, !Introduction' to Thomas Hardy, ibid., p. xxxi 
139 Frank O'Connor, The Mirror in the Roadway, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), p. 244 
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narratives? Ricoeur addresses this point by arguing that emplotment alone 
is not sufficient to actualise the meaning of a story. The reader too must act 
for a narrative's didactic value to be realised: 
And if emplotment can be described as an act of judgement and of 
the productive imagination, it is so insofar as this act is the joint 
work of the text and reader, just as Aristotle said that sensation is 
the common work of sensing and what is sensed.140 
For Ricoeur, readers ultimately complete the story; they configure 
narratives that are otherwise unfigured, such as, to cite his example, Joyce's 
Ulysses. He writes, 'in such extreme cases it is the reader, almost abandoned 
by the work, who carries the burden of emplotment.' 141 Seymour Chatman 
accepts Ricoeur's account of the role of the reader in configuring and 
assigning causal significance to the sequence of a story's events. In 'Story 
and Narrative,' he argues that readers must often: 
... fill in gaps with essential or likely events, traits and objects for 
which various reasons have gone unmentioned. If in one sentence 
we are told that John got dressed and in the next that he rushed to 
an airport ticket counter, we surmise that in the interval occurred 
a number of artistically inessential yet logically necessary events: 
grabbing his suitcase, walking from the bedroom to the living 
room and out the front door, then to his car or to the bus or to a 
taxi, opening the door of the car, getting in and so on. The 
audience's capacity to supply plausible detail is virtually limitless, 
as is a geometer's to conceive of an infinity of fractional spaces 
between two points. Not, of course, that we do so in normal 
reading. We are speaking only of a logical property of narratives: 
that they evoke a world of potential plot details, many of which go 
unmentioned but can be supplied. 142 
Accordingly, it is in the interaction between emplotment, the narrative, and 
the reader, augmented by the operations of configuration and reading, that 
the cognitive value of fictional narrative to a moral agent's practical 
understanding is revealed and developed. In short, while a story permits 
the reader to ask questions concerning what, where, how and when, plot 
allows the reader to address questions concerning why, and what 
140 Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 76 
141 ibid., p. 77 
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significance attaches to events and their relations. It is through the 
representation of complexity that a plot helps the reader to distinguish 
between merely biological, episodic existence, and meaningfully lived and 
interpreted truly human life. As Hannah Arendt argues: 
The chief characteristic of the specifically human life ... is that it is 
always full of events which ultimately can be told as a story.... It is 
of this life, bios, as distinguished from mere zoe, that Aristotle said 
that it "somehow is a kind of action (praxis)" .143 
The importance of plot to situate these events and make intelligible their 
relations is clear. Moreover, the relevant difference between the two forms 
of life parallels the distinction between creative literature and traditional 
ethics. Arguably, in much of traditional ethics, the conception of a life most 
worth pursuing reflects a disembodied rationality that reduces all ethical 
decisions to considerations of duty, utility, or mutual interest, with 
exclusive focus on single, unconnected acts. On the other hand, the actions 
and attitudes of the literary characters, to whom we can fruitfully pay 
attention, reflect the complex motives, emotions, passions, ambitions,' 
incentives, inclinations and dispositions that characterise real-life, concrete 
human existence. Plot forms the basis for literature's unique contribution to 
ethical reflection and accentuates the value of the distinction between 
philosophy and literature. As philosophical treatises do not have plots, 
philosophy cannot furnish the same positive contribution from within its 
own resources. 
In investigating the ways in which literature can augment 
philosophical enquiry by increasing a reader's moral understanding, it 
emerges that Ricoeur's idea of emplotment provides a plausible account of 
the nexus between a narrative's moral theme and its reader's 
comprehension of its significance. As such, together with the contribution 
to ethical reflection envisaged in the attitudinal account, it shows how 
142 Seymour Chatman, "Story and Narrative" in Literature in the Modern World, edited by Dennis 
Walder (Oxford: 1990) pp. 107-8 
143 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 
72. 
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literature can supplement purely philosophical inquiry and contribute to 
the development of a moral agent's practical wisdom. 
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3 
THE EXPANSION OF METHODS 
Read not to contradict and refute; nor to believe and 
take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to 
weigh and consider. 
Francis Baconl 
The central claim in the propositional account is that literature can 
significantly enhance reflection on ethics and ethical theory. Literary 
situations of moral seriousness can reveal things about ethics that could not 
emerge from a more direct, purely rational approach, in which moral 
concerns are abstracted from particular circumstances so as to formulate 
universal prescriptions for conduct. If the rigour, consistency, scope, 
perspicuity, and orderliness expected of philosophical ethics were sufficient 
to establish an adequate, problem free guide to life, then further 
enhancement would be superfluous. On the propositional account, 
imaginative literature can reveal and illuminate aspects of the moral life not 
accommodated in the universal and abstract reflections of purely 
philosophical ethics. In arguing that literature can effectively supplement 
I Francis Bacon, 'Of Studies' in Essays, cited in David Crystal and Hilary Crystal, eds, 
Words on Words, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2000), p. 103 
ethical reflection, McGinn draws on the formal differences between the two 
modes of discourse and regards the novel as the prime exemplar of this 
distinction: 
The novel, in particular, is a text of a very different kind from a 
scientific treatise. It is also very different from the philosophical 
text, which is what philosophers, naturally, are most comfortable 
with.2 
So construed, the cognitive contributions envisaged by the propositional 
account are valuable because moral philosophy belongs to a different 
species of reflection from that of metaphysics, logic, and mathematics. It is 
difficult to imagine the devices of metaphor, pathos, irony, satire, 
hyperbole, synechdote, and allegory revealing very much about the axioms 
of mathematics, the principles of logic, or the ontology of universals. But 
these devices, common to imaginative literature, can augment 
philosophical attempts to understand ethics and ethical theories. 
Kant and a Passage from Conrad 
One plain reading of the scene from Conrad's Heart of Darkness reveals a 
clear message: it is wrong to use persons in the manner depicted, as mere 
means to some commercial end, and then discard them when their 
usefulness has passed. When active reflection reveals this theme, the 
parallels between the scene from Heart of Darkness and Kant's ethics also 
emerge. For Kant, the scene represents the natural consequences of an act of 
gross immorality. The workers have been used as mere means to someone's 
ends, and have had their dignity compromised thereby. This represents a 
clear transgression of the second formulation of the categorical imperative, 
which expresses Kant's notion of the intrinsic value of human dignity: 
... morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is 
that alone which has dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a 
market price; wit, lively imagination and humour have a fancy 
price; on the other hand, fidelity in promises and benevolence 
from basic principles (not from instinct) have an inner worth. 
2 McGinn, op. cit., p. 174 
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(AK 4: 435) 
Conrad's passage and Kant's imperative offer two different expressions of 
the same attitude. While Kant prescribes a universal rule for moral conduct, 
Heart of Darkness constitutes a fictional representation of the plausible 
implications of its transgression. Herein lies part of literature's 
supplemental value. As a supplement to Kant's ethical reasoning, we have 
amplified his argument with a richer, concrete representation that speaks 
directly to what matters in a human life and character. By treating this 
passage as a convincing representation of how things could be, we can 
more clearly discern the possible real-world implications of the moral issue 
in question which, in turn, helps to refine our understanding of the 
categorical imperative and its demands. 
Further, by reflecting on our responses to the scene, we can gain 
insights concerning our own moral understanding, insights that can re-
shape our moral views and enhance our capacities to make reality out of 
clarified ethical idea. Do we sympathise with the ill workers? Or, because 
their conditions of employment were 'legal', do we opine that their plight is 
just an unfortunate consequence of hard work in a harsh environment? Do 
we morally condemn the imperial traders who exploited them? Or do we 
regard their treatment of the workers as amoral, on the grounds that such 
treatment of humanity was acceptable, relative to the historical and social 
context in which it occurred? Perhaps we have always possessed some 
inclination that one ought not to treat persons only as means to an end, but 
were unaware of how strongly we embraced this principle until confronted 
by this depiction of human suffering. Further, how do we judge the moral 
value of the Marlow's actions - should he have done more than simply offer 
a biscuit to the dying man? Or do we evaluate his action as commensurate 
with the role of 'reporter', whereby wider society is alerted to the immoral 
conduct that he wishes to expose? Our responses to these questions 
determine how far we agree with Kant's position and, in turn, reveal the 
nature and scope of our own moral presuppositions. They also reveal how 
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certain moral perspectives from which this scene is viewed may have 
changed, been eroded, be found wanting or become impossible for people. 
Reflection on these factors enlarges the capacity to recognise and evaluate 
situations of moral seriousness, and act accordingly. In this way literature, 
while not a substitute for philosophy, can supplement traditional 
philosophical reflection by adding an extra dimension to the understanding 
of moral issues. 
The scene from Heart of Darkness represents indisputable moral significance. 
It sheds light on the connection between Kant's ethics with its focus on the 
preservation of human dignity and exploitative practices that serve 
dubious ends. But what of the immersed judgement of particular actions? 
For Kant, ethical value attaches only to the operations of the will. And then 
only by reference to an agent's willing to obey the moral law for its own 
sake, rather than as a means for the attainment of some other end. Leaving 
aside the broader questions concerning an individual's ethical relation to 
the institutions and practices that cause suffering on a scale represented in 
Heart of Darkness (i.e. concerning how Marlow ought to conduct himself in 
relation to the imperial traders and, ultimately, the sovereign powers that 
endorse their practices), what can be made of the ethical significance of 
Marlow's interaction with the worker to whom he offered a biscuit? To 
extend the role that literature can play in moral philosophy, I propose to 
argue that evaluating a character's actions and attitudes in light of a 
particular theory can not only reveal the ethical significance of those actions 
and attitudes, it can also reveal important facets of the theory itself that 
may be overlooked or receive too little attention in a purely rational 
inquiry. For example, an examination of one aspect of Marlow's contact 
with the workers - his offering a biscuit to the dying man - illuminates a 
further aspect of Kant's ethics, one which is central to his account of moral 
value. 
Marlow's gesture seems to accord with a moral duty stipulated in 
Kant's ethics. Indeed, in enumerating a number of duties to illustrate his 
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reasoning in the Groundwork, Kant employs a similar notion in the last of 
four examples of duties derivable from the categorical imperative. He 
writes that a prosperous person who withholds charity is acting contrary to 
reason, because, as there could be many instances in which persons 
(including himself) require the 'love and sympathy' of others, he could not 
reasonably will that a principle of miserliness should become a universal 
law of nature (AK 4: 423). In light of Kant's argument, it is difficult to 
imagine that the maxim of Marlow's act of simple generosity could not be 
willed to become a universal law. That is, it is consistent with reason that 
the 'subjective principle of volition' which motivates an individual's act of 
generosity should become what Kant calls an objective principle: such as 
would serve as a practical law that is grasped through the categorical 
imperative and which applies to all rational beings at all times. 3 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that, because Kant regards beneficence as a duty, 
Marlow's gesture deserves 'praise and encouragement' (AK 4: 398). What 
may be surprising, however, is that Kant would reckon the maxim of 
Marlow's act to be wholly unworthy of moral esteem. 
For Kant, 'it is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or 
indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation 
except a good will.' (AK 4: 393). Kant's point is that ethical value cannot be 
attributed to actions or events. Kant's position here has its consummate 
literary embodiment in the revelation experienced by Angel Clare in 
Hardy's Tess of the D'Urbervilles. Having morally condemned Tess after 
learning of her rape by Alec D'Urberville and its tragic consequences, and 
of her failure to disclose these events to him prior to their marriage, Clare 
travels to Brazil to be away from her. There he witnesses events that not 
only broaden his general outlook, but which also allow him to put into 
perspective the egregious event in Tess' past, and her reasons for not 
revealing it to him. In a revelation that echoes Kant's own realisation of the 
3 Kant's definition of a maxim as a 'subjective principle volition' and his explanation for its 
transition to an objective principle appear in a footnote to the Groundwork, (AK 4: 421). He 
offers a fuller account in The Critique of Practical Reason, (1788, trans. Mary Gregor, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 17 (AK 5: 19) 
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locus of moral value, Clare discovers that, for him, evaluation of acts and 
their consequences alone are not sufficient to justify moral approbation or 
condemnation: 
During this time of absence he had mentally aged a dozen years. 
What arrested him now as of value in life was less its beauty than 
its pathos. Having long discredited the old systems of mysticism, 
he now began to discredit the old appraisements of morality. He 
thought they wanted re-adjusting. Who was the moral man? Still 
more pertinently, who was the moral woman? The beauty and 
ugliness of character lay not only in its achievements, but in its 
aims and impulses; its true history lay, not among things done, 
but among things willed. 4 
Clare's insight is reflected in Tess' almost simultaneous realisation that, 
given her lack of intention to submit to D'Urberville's seduction, her 
husband's judgement of her is too harsh: 
...her husband, Angel Clare herself, had dealt out hard measure to 
her, surely he had! She had never before admitted such a thought; 
but he had surely! Never in her life - she could swear it from the 
bottom of her soul - had she ever intended to do wrong; yet these 
harsh judgements had come. Whatever her sins, they were not sins 
of intention, but of inadvertence, and why should she have been 
punished so persistently?5 
Tess is not a willing participant in some licentious affair that might 
justifiably attract her husband's moral censure; rather, she was the victim of 
her phoney cousin's hunger for sexual dominance over a pretty and 
vulnerable young girl. Indeed, she was in a drugged sleep at the time of the 
rape and thus can hardly be held morally responsible for her participation. 
Both Tess and Clare share the realisation that moral value derives from the 
agent's intention to act in a certain way, rather than in the act itself or its 
consequences. Accordingly, it is unreasonable to condemn Tess for her 
involvement in events over which she had no control, and in which she had 
no intention of participating. This realisation brings Tess to condemn 
Clare's denunciation, and Clare to forgive Tess the events in her past, and 
4 Hardy, op. cit., p.340 
5 ibid., p. 353 
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to beg her forgiveness for his unjust reproach. For their relationship, 
however, and for Tess' life, it is too late. 
For Kant, there are no 'good' or 'bad' actions - ethical value resides 
only in the will which informs their performance. In the context of Kantian 
ethics, a clue to the moral value of Marlow's gesture is in the text. It comes 
in his tacit admission that he felt he had no choice but to act the way that he 
did: 'What else could I do but to offer him one of my good Swede's ship's 
biscuits I had in my pocket.' As an act of generosity, his gesture is 
undoubtedly in accord with the moral law. However, the rhetorical phrase 
'What else could I do...?' implies a lack of choice in the matter (at least he 
considers this to be the case); and in the absence of any external coercion to 
make the gesture, we must deduce that Marlow's sense of impotence was 
due to the operation of some internal compulsion. 
From his admission, we can infer that Marlow offered the biscuit to 
the dying man not because of some operation of the will, but from a direct 
inclination to sympathy. This is an important distinction in Kantian ethics 
because for Kant, the moral import of any action turns on whether it was 
performed from volition (which implies an act of will) or from some 
inclination in the agent. According to Kant, all distinctively moral value 
derives from reason alone. In the Groundwork, he emphasises that an act can 
only be regarded as good by reference to its being performed from a duty 
derivable from the categorical imperative, the only means by which an 
agent can apprehend the moral law. He identifies as the 'third proposition 
of morality' that 'Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law' (AK 4: 
400). He argues: 
... an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of 
inclination and with it every object of the will; hence there is left 
for the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the 
law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so the 
maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all 
my inclinations. (AK 4:400-1) 
The performance of an act in accordance with duty under the law but 
performed from some other motivation such as love, instinct, sympathy, or 
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prudence, is morally insignificant, however otherwise praiseworthy. We 
saw that Marlow's gesture, while in accord with the moral law, was 
performed from an inclination to sympathy or some other compulsion and 
not out of respect for the moral law. In Kant's eyes, therefore, while 
honourable, the act has no intrinsic moral worth: 
To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and besides there are 
many souls so sympathetically attuned that, without any motive 
of vanity or self-interest they find an inner satisfaction of 
spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction 
of others so far as it is their own work. But I assert that in such a 
case an action of this kind, however it may conform with duty and 
however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth 
... for the maxim lacks moral content, namely that of doing such 
actions not from inclination but from duty. (AK 4: 398) 
However, Kant's emphasis on duty has drawn criticism from philosophers 
who argue that the moral value of acts, attitudes and forms of character 
that constitute the ethical life cannot be reduced to questions of duty alone. 
As Graham writes: 
... the emphasis he [Kant] places upon moral goodness residing in 
our will or intention to do our duty and not in the good or bad 
consequences of our action is mistaken, since a complete divorce 
between intention, action and outcome is impossible. 6 
Philosophers who hold this view maintain that Marlow's gesture possesses 
moral value because the sympathy which motivated his offering the biscuit 
is itself ethically valuable, irrespective of its relation to the moral law. They 
would further argue that if it brought even a glimmer of happiness to the 
dying man (whether from being the recipient of a small gift, the object of 
compassion, or the recognition on the part of another human being that he 
is member of a common humanity), then value also attaches to the 
consequences of the act, even if it were performed from inclination rather 
than duty. One valuable function of literature in presenting an ethical 
perspective is that it can draw critical attention to features of a theory that 
conflict with other, perhaps more deeply seated ethical concepts. Kant's 
6 Graham 1990, op. cit., p. 118 
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dismissal as non-moral of otherwise highly valued traits such as sympathy, 
generosity and compassion exemplifies this kind of dissonance. 
Indeed, Jonathan Bennett argues perforce that sympathy in particular 
deserves to be accorded greater moral weight than it is normally given in 
predominant ethical theories such as Kant's. He employs Mark Twain's The 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as a literary example to support his argument 
that one's sympathies can sometimes better guide one's actions and 
attitudes than can one's moral principles, because not all morality, as a set 
of principles that guide one's behaviour, is good morality. In 'The 
Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,' Bennett examines the relation between 
sympathy and what he calls 'bad morality.' 7 To illustrate his argument for 
the value of sympathy over rigid adherence to moral principles, he 
compares the actions and attitudes of the Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler 
and the Puritan theologian Jonathan Edwards with those of Huck Finn. He 
concludes that, while Himrnler and Edwards each acted on a set of clear 
moral principles (the former according to his perception of duty, the latter 
to his Puritan beliefs), their rigid adherence to these principles gave rise to 
undesirable and even horrid consequences and, as such, constitute 
examples of bad morality. The actions of Huck Finn, on the other hand, 
which are influenced more by his intuitive sympathy than by any explicit 
moral principle, indeed which expressly contravene a dominant moral 
principle (that which enjoins one to respect another's right to own slaves), 
are morally superior. To illustrate this argument, and show how literature 
can help to amplify the issues, it suffices to compare the actions and 
attitudes of only two agents; and because the moral conflict at issue is most 
evident in Himmler's situation, Bennett's analysis of Jonathan Edwards will 
be omitted here. 
Bennett argues that Himmler retained his sympathies for human 
suffering and, in so doing, paid a price for suppressing his feelings in 
favour of his perceived duty. This price is foretold in the Nazi leader's 
7 Jonathan Bennett, "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn," in Philosophy, 49, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), reprinted in Pojman (2000), op. cit., pp. 441455 
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admission that personally overseeing the implementation of Hitler's 
command to execute millions of innocent people will be ' ...a great burden 
for me to bear.'8 The result of bearing this burden manifested itself 
physically, inasmuch as his physician reports that he 'suffered a variety of 
nervous and physical disabilities, including nausea and stomach-
convulsions.' 9 But Himmler seemed resigned to the cost of committing to 
his decision to support Nazi policy, regarding it merely as a consequence of 
the realisation of greater ends. Indeed, in considering the clash between his 
will to perform his duty and his sympathy towards those whose suffering 
his policies caused, Himmler described himself as being caught in 'the old 
tragic conflict between will and obligation.'w Bennett argues that, whatever 
the burden and its effects, Himmler's preparedness to carry it is grounded 
in 'a set of principles that constituted his morality - a sick, bad, wicked 
morality 
It is a bad morality to be sure, but a morality nevertheless, one to 
whose principles Himmler was fully prepared to commit. However, as 
Graham argues, 'bad actions become truly evil when they are freely, 
deliberately, and sincerely performed.' 12 He claims that in cases like these, 
recourse to Kant's categorical imperative may not resolve this kind of moral 
conflict. Graham argues that the universalisability condition stipulated in 
the categorical imperative, though it informs the 'Kantian ethics of 
intention' 13 and constitutes the basis for an unambiguous moral principle, 
is unconscionable in cases that entail a dubious maxim. He develops the 
hypothetical case of the 'consistent Nazi' to illustrate his position. The 
consistent Nazi he says, 'is the person who acts on the maxim "This person 
should be exterminated because he or she is a Jew." 14 Graham argues that, 
given certain fundamental socio-political convictions, testing this maxim by 








an appeal to the universalisability condition may well• require that it be 
positively endorsed by the consistent moral agent. Therefore, if one willed 
that the extermination of Jews become a universal law, then one is bound 
by the categorical imperative to act accordingly and endorse genocide. 
While I have some reservations accepting that such a law may wilfully be 
universalisable in Kant's sense, that is, a law accepted by all moral agents 
rather than one that can be generalised merely by a subset of moral agents, 
I take Graham's point insofar as it illustrates that consistency alone is an 
insufficient guide to moral conduct. The convictions behind Himmler's 
adherence to his morality are evident in his claim that 'it is the curse of 
greatness that it must step over dead bodies to create new life. Yet we must 
... cleanse the soil or it will never bear fruit.' 15 Thus Himmler regarded his 
overseeing the implementation of genocide, however emotionally 
burdensome, as his clear moral duty. However, as Graham argues, 'if a 
policy of genocide is deeply mistaken from a moral and every other point 
of view, consistency in its application is hardly an improvement.'16 
To be sure, Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, 
the dignity principle, specifically prevents the situation exemplified in 
Graham's case of the consistent Nazi. One cannot universalise a maxim 
which entails the use of humanity as mere means to one's own ends, even 
when its use is seen to be for a greater cause, such as ethnic purity. But in 
order to recognise the applicability and force of Kant's dignity principle, 
one must first recognise the humanity of one's victims and, in so doing, 
acknowledge them fully as other perspectives on the world. This requires 
sympathy - the ability to see the world from another's point of view. 
Certainly, in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant acknowledges a role for sympathy 
which parallels his view on the amiability of beneficence, and argues that it 
is an indirect duty to possess certain 'sensitive feelings' and, as he writes, 
not to shun sickrooms and prisons and so on in order to avoid the pain of 
15 Bennett, /oc. cit. 
16 Graham, op. cit., p. 117 
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compassion.' 17 Cunningham suggests that one way to interpret Kant's 
notion 'is to conclude that without the motivational impetus of sensitive 
feeling, we may not be able to get ourselves to do what our duty 
commands, even though we can understand the command perfectly well.' 18 
But, as he also points out, accepting this interpretation presents Kantian 
ethics with a serious contradiction given his account of the purity of moral 
motivation. If reason alone is sufficient to reveal our binding moral duties, 
and if all non-rational dispositions such as sympathy are to be excised from 
moral consideration, then how can his ethics account for the 'indirect' 
duties of these sensitive feelings? Cunningham offers another 
interpretation of the role for sympathy and its moral value, one which is 
not accommodated in Kantian ethics, but which nonetheless appears to 
comport with our more deeply seated moral convictions: 
The better way to interpret the assistance of sensitive feelings is 
not as a reinforcement of the will but as an assistant to the 
understanding. Without firsthand (or vicarious) experience of 
suffering, we may not be able to recognize chances for 
beneficence, and our vigilance for the same may be poor. 19 
Cunningham's point emerges with special clarity in a passage from J. M. 
Coetzee's novel The Lives of Animals, in which Elizabeth Costello reflects on 
the Nazi perpetrators of genocide's inability to put themselves in the shoes 
of their victims: 
The heart is the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us to share 
at times the being of another.... There are people who have the 
capacity to imagine themselves as someone else, there are people 
who have no such capacity, and there are people who have the 
capacity but choose not to exercise it...there is no limit to the 
extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another. 
There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination.28 
17 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, part II (Metaphysical Principles of Virtue), in Ethical 
Philosophy: The Complete Texts of Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, and 
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James 
Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), p. 457 
18 Curmingham, op. cit., p. 76 
19 ibid., p. 77 
20 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). p. 35. 
Kearney also uses the same passage to illustrate his account of the role for narrative 
sympathy. 
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Himmler belongs to the last class of persons nominated by Costello: those 
who have the capacity to exercise sympathy, to recognise another's 
humanity, yet who, in choosing not to exercise it, deny the moral authority 
of the dignity principle while reassuring themselves that, despite the inner 
tension, they are acting according to duty. 
Bennett uses the term 'sympathy' to 'cover every sort of fellow-
feeling, as when one feels pity over someone's loneliness, or horrified 
compassion over his pain, or when he feels a shrinking reluctance to act in 
a way which will bring misfortune to someone else.' 21 He distinguishes 
sympathy as a feeling for others from making actual moral judgements 
about persons or situations: 'My sympathy for someone in distress may 
lead me to help him, or even to think that I ought to help him; but in itself it 
is not a judgement about what I ought to do but just a feeling for him in his 
plight.' 22 
Himmler suppressed his sympathy for others in order to willingly 
perform what he saw as his moral duty. To an extent then, it is his sincerity 
here, his wilful suppression of his inclination to sympathy and denial of 
another's humanity, that makes him truly evil. Huck Finn, on the other 
hand, chooses to help his friend Jim the slave escape from his owner, 
despite his belief that doing so contravenes the demands of his 
community's prevalent morality. In so doing, he suppresses his inclination 
to duty and acts out of sympathy for his friend. A quotation from the novel 
exemplifies this tension: 
Jim said it made him all over trembly and feverish to be so close to 
freedom. Well I can tell you it made me all trembly and feverish, 
too, to hear him, because I begun to get it through my head that he 
was most free - and who was to blame for it? Why, me. I couldn't 
get that out of my conscience, no matter nor no way... .It hadn't 
ever come home to me, before, what this thing was that I was 
doing. But now it did; and it stayed with me, and scorched with 
me more and more. I tried to make out to myself that I warn't to 
blame, because I didn't help Jim run off from his rightful owner; 
21 Bennett, op. cit., pp. 442-443 
22 ibid., p. 443 
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but it warn't no use, conscience up and say, every time: "but you 
knowed he was running for his freedom, and you coulda paddled 
ashore and told somebody." That was so - I couldn't get around 
that, no way. That was where it pinched. Conscience says to me: 
"What had poor Miss Watson done to you, that you could see her 
nigger go off right under your eyes and never say one single 
word? What did that poor old woman do to you, that you could 
treat her so mean?..." I got to feeling so mean and miserable I most 
wished I was dead. 23 
It is evident from this passage that Huck's turmoil stems from the conflict 
between what his fellow-feelings toward another human being tell him to 
do and what he sees as 'right' by reference his community's values. While 
in contemporary society there would be no such conflict - both morality 
and sympathy would dictate the assistance of Jim's escape - as Bennett 
observes, in the rural Missouri of Huck's childhood, 'slave-owning is just 
one kind of ownership and is not subject to critical pressure.' 24 Just as clear 
as Himmler's duty to endorse and perpetrate genocide is to him, so does 
turning Jim into the authorities present itself to Huck as the right thing to 
do. But unlike Himmler, Huck lacks, as he sees it, the 'strength' to do the 
'right' thing. In Elizabeth Costello's terms, Huck has the capacity to 
imagine himself in Jim's shoes and, despite pressure to do otherwise, 
chooses to exercise it. As Bennett writes, 'in this conflict between sympathy 
and morality, sympathy wins.' 25 
What does the passage from Huckleberry Finn show? First, as Bennett 
argues, it illuminates 'the difference between general moral principles and 
particular unreasoned emotional pulls.' 26 Huck thinks knows the right 
action to take, and he knows it by reference to the moral principles that 
guide behaviour in his society. But Huck's conceding to the dictates of 
sympathy over duty reveals that, at least in Huck's case, his rational 
apprehension of moral duty is attenuated by his sympathy for Jim. And 
that his actions are evaluated as morally right despite their divergence from 
23 ibid., p. 444 




established moral principles, reveals something about the principles 
themselves. It shows that principles that support the ownership of human 
beings as slaves and that enshrined the property rights of their masters, 
despite being principles that supposedly hold by reference to reasoned 
argument alone, fail to embody what truly matters in human life and 
character. Namely, that dignity and autonomy matter to all persons, 
irrespective of race or creed. In other words, these principles constitute bad 
morality. 
Therefore, just as sympathy can guide one's apprehension of a 
situation's ethical significance, so it can reveal the extent to which a moral 
position fails fully to accommodate one's ethical priorities. Cunningham 
argues that the capacity to see the world from another's point of view is 
vital to the development of an ethical consciousness, the ability to 
apprehend ethical significance and direct one's will accordingly: 
If we know little or nothing about what brings pain and pleasure 
to actual human beings, or if we fail to develop the practical habits 
that can provide us with greater knowledge of the same by 
keeping our eyes on the landscape of suffering, all the good will in 
the world won't accomplish much for all its beneficent but largely 
idle intent. 27 
But this is not to suggest that sympathy alone ought to guide one's ethical 
actions, and, as such, reduce all ethical deliberations to a species of 
subjectivism. One's own inchoate ethical priorities may be wrong: just 
because Kantian ethics does not accommodate Himmler's conception of 
duty, it does not mean that he is justified in embracing a new theory that 
does. Rather, sympathy, the faculty whereby one is able to see the world 
through the eyes of another, alerts one to the consequences for the other of 
acting in a certain ways and, as such, can reveal the extent to which these 
consequences are not accommodated in theories that prescribe those 
actions, and to the ethical significance of consequences per se. As 
Cunningham observes, 'pure practical reasoning cannot help much when it 
comes to contingent, empirical facts and details of human life and 
27 Cunningham, op. cit., p. 77 
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character.' 28 That is, ceteris paribus, we can know what an ethical theory 
requires us to do in certain situations; but in the contingent, empirical 
realm of complex human life, all things are rarely equal. 
Moreover, ethical sensitivity, the development of which can be aided 
by sympathetically attending to the complex pictures of human life and 
character presented in literature, also helps the moral agent realise the 
extent to which life is a shared journey. Reflecting on one's responses to 
situations depicted in literature, and comparing these responses to those of 
the immersed characters ('Yes, I would do what Huck did, absolutely...'), 
can reveal cross-cultural and -temporal parallels the acknowledgement of 
which brings us one step closer to the ideal of a global ethic. As Gaita 
argues: 
Some experiences are common to all human beings. They are 
responses to what R. F. Holland called the 'big facts' of human life 
- our mortality, our sexuality, our vulnerability to suffering, and 
so on. The commonness of these experiences is thought to 
transcend culture, even though different cultures make different 
things of them. It sometimes includes the thought, often voices 
outside of philosophy, that human beings are at bottom the same, 
and that were we to fully acknowledge it, then that would of itself 
place certain ethical limits on our conduct. 29 
In presenting the world from another's viewpoint, and in thus eliciting the 
reader's empathy, literature can reveal not only the extent to which 
sympathy ought to be accommodated as a force in our lives, but also that 
reason alone may be insufficient to place needed limits on our conduct. 
That is to say, insofar as rational principles alone are inadequate to cover 
the complexity of human life and character, traits such as sympathy, 
empathy and compassion aid the understanding of a principle's 
applicability to particular situations and give the moral agent the impetus 
to act. As Frankena writes, 'I am inclined to think that traits without 
principles are blind, but principles without traits are impotent.' 30 
28 ibid. 
28 Raimond Gaita, in Adamson, et al, op. cit., p. 269 
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While adherence to the dignity principle ought to overcome the objection 
embodied in Graham's case of the consistent Nazi, and while attention to 
one's sympathetic response to others may reveal the extent to which certain 
principles speak to the heart of what matters in ethics, the implication of 
the categorical imperative that all rational beings ought to be regarded 
identically draws criticism from philosophers who argue that its account of 
a morally binding maxim ignores the special bonds that define our 
relationships with those to whom we are intimately attached. As 
Cunningham argues: 
... for all its welcome appeals to the basic dignity we all share, 
Kantian ethics errs by fitting everything that matters morally 
under the umbrella of respect for equally worthy rational human 
beings. 31 
This criticism implies that, in practice, human beings frequently make, and 
should make, moral decisions based on a more nuanced, ordinal 
appreciation of the effects of their actions on others: offspring, parents, 
siblings, neighbours, friends, enemies, and workmates. Cunningham 
objects to Kantian ethics on the grounds that it fails to accommodate the 
priority humans naturally assign to intimate attachments and, in so doing, 
it 'leaves out or twists all sorts of intimate attachments that provide shape 
and meaning to our lives.' 32 
Defenders of Kantian ethics might argue that Cunningham's 
objection rests on a fundamental misconstruction of Kant's critical project. 
As noted earlier, in seeking to determine the conditions for 'pure' morality 
and, in so doing, isolate an a priori metaphysics of morals from the 'foreign 
addition of empirical inducements' (AK 4: 400), Kant deliberately excludes 
all subjective motivations to act, including those which constitute our 
inclinations to sympathy, beneficence, compassion, prudence, and the 
natural priority given to intimate attachments. In isolating the principle on 
the basis of which moral action is performed, Kant believes that we can 
30 Frankena, op. cit., p. 65 
31 Cunningham, op. cit., p. 2 
32 ibid., p. 3 
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come to know precisely what makes a good action good. Once we know 
this, we come to apprehend the moral law which, as autonomous citizens 
of the kingdom of ends, we impose on ourselves via the categorical 
imperative. Therefore, as the moral law has claim over all rational beings, 
moral value must reside in their will to act from duty to obey the moral law. 
As we saw in the scene from Heart of Darkness, Marlow's gesture fails to 
qualify as a moral action because it was not motivated by an obligation 
derived a priori from the categorical imperative. As the categorical 
imperative defines moral duty, inclinations to act well fall outside its ambit 
and, however otherwise admirable, are excluded from purely ethical 
considerations. For Kant, our actions are endowed with moral value by 
reference to the presence of a good will to correct our volitions and, by 
conformity with universalisable maxims, bring them 'into conformity with 
universal ends' (AK 4: 393). The locating of moral value in the will is crucial 
to Kant's account of ethics because, he believes, it serves to bring out by 
contrast the most fundamental principle of morality and makes it 'shine 
forth all the more brightly' (AK 4: 397). It also serves to reinforce Kant's 
argument for the non-reductive uniqueness of moral value and places 
moral experience, in all its varieties, on his own foundation. 
This reasoning is exemplified in the person who refrains from 
murdering an innocent only for fear of being caught and punished. While 
the would-be murderer's refraining is consistent with the moral law which 
proscribes murder, it is difficult to imagine that an examination of that 
person's motives would conclude that he or she acted morally, irrespective 
of the outcome of the act (the potential victim's being spared). Thus the 
potential murderer's prudence, like all other inclinations, must be excluded 
from the realm of distinctly ethical motives. 
However, the prudence of a potential murderer belongs to a 
different species of inclinations and dispositions from those we have 
towards our loved ones and, as Cunningham notes, it must be 
acknowledged 'that intimate bonds assume a large place within the life 
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plans of most people.' 33 As such, they occupy a special position in our 
conception of the ethical life, one which conflicts with Kant's conception of 
the kingdom of ends as a 'systematic union of rational beings through 
common objective laws' (AK 4: 433). When, in a situation of moral conflict, 
the categorical imperative requires the agent to choose between furthering 
the interests of just anybody and those of an intimate attachment, the 
argument runs that he or she is naturally, powerfully and justifiably 
inclined to regard the interests of the intimate as prior to the other person's. 
Because intimate attachments are informed by love rather than an agent's 
fidelity to abstract principles, and because love is held to be basic to our 
conception of 'life as we might know it at our best,' 34 the excessive 
emphasis that Kantian ethics places on universality can 'squeeze out, ignore 
or deform'35 aspects of life that really matter, such as the place in our lives 
we accord to intimate attachments. How are we to account for the ethical 
aspects of the relationship between the Biaf ran mother and her dying son in 
purely rational terms? Her attention to her child is informed by manifestly 
non-rational motives - she prioritises her son's interests, even in his dying 
moments, not out of respect for the moral law, nor from duty, but from 
love. One can imagine her sacrificing her own interests, and her duties to 
further those of others, to continue to ease her son's last moments. And in 
attending to her relationship with her son, it is difficult to condemn her lack 
of attention to duties to others that may be prescribed in the universal 
moral law. Moreover, while her relationship with her son is non-rational, it 
is unequivocally ethical: wheresoever our actions impinge on or affect the 
lives of others, they have an ethical dimension. Thus Achebe's poem 
describes a proximity relation between the parent and her offspring that 
transcends questions of universal moral duty, and is not accommodated in 
Kantian ethics. It is not difficult to imagine situations in which her attention 
to the child conflicts with her ability to fulfil other duties derived from the 
33 ibid., p. 48 
34 ibid., p. 1 
35 ibid., p. 3 
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categorical imperative, yet it is difficult to imagine the grounds on which 
her attention to him at the cost of rejecting other duties may be censured. 
However, Cunningham argues that attention to the moral place of intimate 
attachments and inclinations such as compassion and beneficence need not 
fall outside all rational considerations of the moral law. Indeed, as he 
suggests, their cultivation may even contribute to our apprehension of its 
requirements: 
Conceivably, my roles as son, brother, friend, spouse, and father 
may help awaken me to the needs of my fellow beings and 
develop loving sentiments that parallel the spirit of the moral law 
and express my complete fidelity. 36 
Considerable recent scholarship has been devoted to investigating the role 
for virtuous dispositions and the place for intimate attachments in Kantian 
ethics and whether they can be successfully defended against charges such 
as those made by Cunningham.37 While Cunningham's claim that intimate 
bonds are a central feature of an agent's life is persuasive, he still needs to 
explain the ethical importance of this observation and identify the reasons 
why it should carry normative force. However, if these considerations are 
basic to our conception of life, as he suggests, and as such ought to inform 
the normative features of ethical theory, and if it is true that Kant's 
conception of morality does not adequately accommodate the importance 
we attach to human dispositions and intimate attachments, then 
proponents of Kantian ethics must look beyond the categorical imperative 
for a corrective to this inadequacy. Cunningham argues that the Kantian 
perspective excludes, ignores or deforms the things that matter, and that 
this is revealed by examining the particular concerns of concrete moral 
agents: 
The error of Kantian ways and, more generally, the errors of 
ethical theory can best be corrected by a moral philosophy that 
pays attention to particular people leading particular lives, 
36 ibid., p. 48 
37 See for example Barbara Herman The Practice of Moral Judgement, (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1993); and Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
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complete with the rich emotional attachments that are prey and 
sometimes prone to conflict.38 
According to Cunningham, reading and reflecting on serious literature can 
play a unique and valuable role in the development of such a philosophy. 
To this end, he places great value on the insider's perspective furnished by 
imaginative literature. He argues: 
By providing detailed depictions of the complex inner life of 
fictional characters embroiled in the messy business of living, fine 
literature directs our attention to the subtleties and nuances of 
what should rightly command our attention. 39 
While it must be acknowledged that Kant can pack a great deal and variety 
of moral experience into a universalised maxim, the suggestion here is that, 
in providing a more realistic view of individual persons in situ than can be 
accommodated in abstract and general principles, literature is better able 
than unaided philosophical reflection to accommodate the complexities of 
ethical decision-making, including reflection on the identification and 
universalisation of maxims. As such, literature can depict the complex 
network of attachments that shapes our sense of what matters in a human 
life and character and which, in Kantian terms, must be accommodated in 
our maxims for action. 
However, it is not the principal object here to determine whether 
Cunningham's main criticism of Kantian ethics is decisive or whether it 
constitutes a misconstruction of the fundamental aims of Kant's project. 
Rather, it is to show that attention to a literary depiction of moral 
seriousness can reveal important features of an ethical perspective that may 
have been lost or received too little emphasis in the philosophical discourse 
from which it arose. If it is true that moral philosophy must pay attention to 
particular lives, then it seems that literature can furnish the ideal 
supplement in the form of almost limitless detailed depictions of complex 
characters and situations. Examining Kant's theory in light of an intuitive 
response to Marlow's situation in Heart of Darkness reveals aspects of his 
38 Cunningham, op. cit., p.3 
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ethics that are worthy of further critical attention. Thus revealed, the 
philosopher may then consider What implications follow from within that 
perspective, and what considerations bear on it from outside; and perhaps 
most of all, as Williams notes, 'what would be implied by certain ways of 
thinking about the situations' so depicted. 40 Moreover, incorporating 
literature into ethical reflection in this way, employed as a source of 
material with which to inform argument, illustrate claims and 
counterclaims, and raise questions concerning an ethical perspective, is 
entirely consistent with the dialectic method for moral philosophy 
described by Graham and discussed in the previous chapter. 41 If examples 
and counterexamples have value in moral argument, then the detail, 
complexity, and plausibility of literary examples must be useful in eliciting 
and examining the implications of ethical positions. 
Aside from the criticisms concerning its excessive emphasis on the moral 
value of duty, and despite its philosophical rigour and illuminating appeal 
to universal respect for human dignity, Kant's ethical theory presents at 
least one major practical difficulty. While the scene from Heart of Darkness 
can illustrate aspects of his theory and alert us to their possible real-world 
implications, it fails to address a major problem in his universal 
prescription for moral conduct: the dilemma presented by competing 
obligations. If we must always act in such a way that we could will that our 
maxim become a universal law, then how is the agent to decide what is 
right when the categorical imperative requires that one act (such as not 
lying) in a way that yields a decidedly negative outcome for another moral 
agent (such as death)? This conflict is recognisable in the example of the 
inquiring murderer, in which objectors to Kant argue that a universal 
prescription for truthfulness enjoins an agent to tell the truth at all times, 
even though doing so would reveal the whereabouts of a vicious 
39 Cunningham, op. cit., p.3 
4° Bernard Williams, 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' in Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat 
(eds.), Philosophy As It Is (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), P.  37. 
41 Graham (1990), pp. xiii-xiv. See also chapter one of this thesis. 
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murderer's innocent victim, and that this prescription clearly contradicts an 
intuitive sense of what constitutes justifiable grounds for moral 
compromise. While some philosophers argue that this objection rests on a 
misunderstanding of the categorical imperative, 42 Kant himself held that it 
is always wrong to lie, even from altruistic motives. Nevertheless, the case 
is invoked in defence of moral theories in which value turns on the 
consequences of an action rather than the will or intention of its actors. 
Utilitarianism and a Passage from Conrad 
Utilitarianism offers a deceptively simple solution to the moral dilemma 
presented by the inquiring murderer. 43 In act utilitarianism, moral 
evaluation turns solely on the consequences of an action, expressed in 
terms of utility (which, for the purposes of simplicity, will here be equated 
to happiness). Thus the agent whose actions bring about the greater 
amount of happiness to the greatest number of people possesses moral 
priority. In the case of the inquiring murderer, the utilitarian recognises no 
moral dilemma: unless the murderer's disappointment at missing the 
intended victim outweighs the happiness that results in the intended 
victim's reprieve, then the greatest good can only be produced by lying 
about the victim's whereabouts. The utilitarian's supreme moral principle 
enjoins that we always act to bring about the balance of greatest happiness 
over unhappiness. And this holds for the utilitarian even when the 
production of such a favourable outcome requires other agents to be 
treated as a means to the end stipulated by the Greatest Happiness 
42 Rachels, op. cit., p. 126. Rachels argues that lying is acceptable under the categorical 
imperative provided that the agent violates the rule proscribing lying 'for a reason that we 
would be willing for anyone to accept' were they in the same position as the agent. It falls 
outside the scope of this thesis to examine whether or not this account of the categorical 
imperative is true to the spirit of Kant's ethics. 
43 I acknowledge that there are many forms of utilitarianism and that the theory continues 
to develop. My aim here is to illustrate how literature can be used to reveal issues 
concerning utilitarianism generally and I believe that examining the 'classical' version of 
the theory in light of literary examples serves to illustrate my argument most effectively. A 
distinction between two forms of classical utilitarianism must also be noted - that between 
Act and Rule utilitarianism. In this section I am principally concerned with elucidating act 
utilitarianism. 
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Principle. Therefore, provided that the utilitarian can demonstrate that the 
suffering of a relative few contract workers is outweighed by the economic 
benefits derived from the fruits of this suffering, then the exploitation 
depicted in Conrad's passage is not merely morally acceptable, but strictly 
morally required. 
Moreover, the sympathy felt towards the exploited workers, and 
one's disapproval of the dehumanising effect of such a calculation, obtains 
only marginal consideration in determining the balance of happiness over 
unhappiness. In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill specifies the conditions 
under which an agent must evaluate the morality of any given situation: 
...utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested 
and benevolent spectator.'" 
When subjected to rational analysis, utilitarianism may emerge free 
of internal contradictions and inconsistencies. It may even appear to offer 
common-sense and fair solutions to many moral dilemmas. However, 
when we consider the implications further, and submit it to tests available 
through literature, a number of significant issues emerge. The example 
from Conrad raises the dilemma of competing duties in Kant's theory, and 
when applied to the Greatest Happiness Principle, it highlights the 
complexities in real-life moral decisions and, in turn, prompts us to 
question the adequacy of utilitarianism as a comprehensive moral theory. 
General questions raised against utilitarianism can take several 
forms, and each can effectively be explored through literature. How can a 
moral agent effectively quantify suffering and happiness? On what 
objective scale are pleasure and pain measured? By what criteria do we 
evaluate the suffering of the few against the happiness of the many? To rate 
the pain, suffering and utter degradation of a few as acceptable for 
furthering the ease, comfort and pleasure even of the many involves an 
evaluative stance that cannot be reconciled with individual human 
interests. Moreover, what of questions of justice? Can a utilitarian reconcile 
such exploitation with the notion of autonomy? Further, in making an 
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evaluation in accord with the Greatest Happiness Principle, could a moral 
agent, confronted by the scene in Conrad's passage, truly exercise the 
detachment that Mill prescribes? Consistent with the attitudinal account of 
the connection between literature and philosophy, responses to this last 
question illuminate important aspects of an agent's commitment to the 
theory and, in so doing, reveal the feasibility of implementing its 
prescriptions. As impartiality is pivotal to utilitarian ethics, the way it 
accounts for dispositions such as sympathy is crucial to its function as a 
first order theory. 
These problems may not definitively defeat a staunch utilitarian's 
claim that the theory offers the best all-round compromise in moral 
dilemmas, despite unfortunate negative implications. But reflecting on 
them may uncover complexities in moral decision-making that are 
unaccounted for in the hedonic calculus of utilitarianism, in which a 
particular action is right simply because it brings about a greater amount of 
utility, however construed, than its alternatives. Moreover, by revealing the 
potential human cost in making an otherwise clinical calculation of 
happiness over unhappiness (if, indeed, such a calculation is feasible), a 
literary example such as the scene from Conrad's novel can highlight the 
difficulties involved in maintaining the detachment required by Mill. 
Two objections could be raised against the use of literary texts such as 
Heart of Darkness to illustrate and test moral perspectives. First, the 'legal' 
exploitation of indigenous workers is barely one step removed from 
slavery, a practice proscribed for many years by most civilised states, both 
legally and on moral grounds. Arguably, to apply this example to a 
contemporary moral argument is an anachronism. The reader of Conrad 
may therefore consider that, as the situation depicted is unacceptable in his 
or her own time, it is an anachronistic portrayal of moral seriousness and 
dismiss the passage as an invalid example by which to supplement, 
challenge, or test a moral perspective. Moreover, the same reader, because 
44 Mill, J. S., On Liberty and Other.Essays, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 148 
110 
of the passage's racist overtones (the objectification and the ironic reference 
to the dying man's age could be misunderstood as representative of the 
narrator's own attitude to indigenous Africans), may view the extract as the 
embodiment of an unacceptable racist attitude. Therefore, as an illustration 
or test of a contemporary moral perspective, Heart of Darkness cannot reveal 
much about current utilitarian thought, let alone help moral philosophy to 
guide our own ethical practices. Second, as a literary depiction of suffering, 
the scene is graphic; few readers would doubt that the workers have been 
treated inhumanely. But even allowing for the reminder that valid rules of 
law can conflict with moral principles, the scene reveals nothing about the 
reasoning which led to these circumstances. It could be that this situation is 
just a product of the institutional greed which motivated the 'opening up' 
of Africa in the nineteenth century. It might be that the 'bags of bones' that 
confront Marlow are victims not of utilitarian reasoning, but of the 
exploitative practices employed to extract as much high-demand product 
as possible for as little financial cost as possible, to a marketplace ignorant 
or uncaring of the human cost of bringing it to market. Perhaps the strategy 
employed by traders for harvesting ivory in the Congo was purely 
instrumental, informed by economic and logistic rather than moral 
considerations; in which case we can infer no connection between the 
inhumanity observed by Marlow and utilitarianism's formula for right 
action. That the suffering is a result of some practice is indisputable; but 
that it embodies the consequences of adopting some ethical perspective or 
another is moot. How can we blame utilitarian decision making when 
distinctly ethical reasoning may have played no part in the decision 
making? 
Both of these responses miss the point. In response to the first 
objection, it can be acknowledged that, since the adoption in 1948 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, such exploitation as depicted in Heart of Darkness is 
indefensible in a modern global society which embraces respect for the 
dignity of persons. Like a society's body of laws, moral perspectives change 
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with time, evolving within particular cultures and more widely. As 
Cunningham writes, 'when we think of examples such as slavery, racism 
and patriarchy, we have little problem recognizing the potential for 
profound ethical change.' 45 But the fact that we now find certain historical 
practices morally repugnant does not preclude the investigation of 
questions concerning how a contemporary ethical theory stands in relation 
to those practices. Nor does it attenuate the power of an image to capture 
attention and induce us to look at suffering and its causes in new ways. 
Consider the following statement made in 1998 by Irwin Gordon, head of a 
US based lapel pin manufacturing company, in which he explains his firm's 
commercial success to Business Week magazine: 
We have a factory in China where we have 250 people. We own 
them; it's our factory. We pay them $40 a month and they work 28 
days a month ... they work from 7 a.m. to 11 p. m. with two 
breaks for lunch and dinner ... they all eat together, 16 people to a 
room, stacked four bunks to a corner. Generally, they're young 
girls that come from the hills. 46 
Entrepreneurs like Gordon would doubtless offer a persuasive justification 
of this situation, arguing that it is not the consequence of exploitation, but 
rather a product of the emergence of a previously closed economy into the 
free market and that his employees chose freely to live under these 
conditions. However, while not as graphic as Conrad's prose, the parallels 
between the scene described by Gordon and state of affairs represented in 
Heart of Darkness, published almost one hundred years earlier, are obvious. 
And they remind us that concern over a moral perspective's relation to the 
repugnant consequences of exploitative practices is not an anachronism. 
To the second objection, it could be replied that in drawing examples 
from literature and applying them to a particular moral theory, we seek a 
more concrete context in which to explore the implications of committing to 
or consistently acting on its principles. For illustrative purposes, it suffices 
that there is a depiction of suffering, and that this suffering can be 
45 Cunningham, op. cit., p. 18 
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understood as the consequence of some practice. This representation, 
therefore, can be employed to flesh out the content of a moral concept: in 
this case, the notion that certain practices are morally significant by 
reference to their tendencies to produce human suffering. 
There is no defect in the situation represented in Heart of Darkness 
being fictional. That the representation is plausible is sufficient, with 
plausible meant in the sense that Andrew Harrison means it: '... in the 
sense that it has to do with how we can make imaginative sense of what we 
are told.' 47 Malcolm Budd emphasises this point in Values of Art: 
The fact of the matter is that we possess the capacity to entertain a 
thought without accepting it, the capacity to make believe, 
without believing, that some state of affairs obtains, and the 
capacity to imagine what we do not know to have happened. 48 
A literary depiction's probative value derives from its plausibility as a 
representation of moral seriousness. The important question in the Heart of 
Darkness example is not about the causal relations between various fictional 
facts, which would involve determining the extent to which the workers' 
suffering is a consequence of adopting some ethical perspective. Rather, in 
testing a moral perspective with a literary example we ask whether certain 
situations could plausibly result from adopting that perspective, and what 
might follow from within that perspective about the moral value of the 
practices that resulted in such situations. 
Utilitarianism and a Dostoyevskian Dilemma 
The critic of utilitarianism can point to other examples from literature to 
clarify utilitarian responses to issues that require ethical reasoning, and to 
illuminate the implications of utilitarian decision making. One way to do 
this is to test how utilitarianism responds to a moral dilemma. In 
Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, a classic dilemma is presented in the 
ethical challenge Ivan Karamazov puts to his brother Alyosha: 
46 cited in Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, Global Village or Global pillage, 2nd edn., (Boston: 
South End Press, 1998), p. xyiii 
47 Andrew Harrison, Philosophy and the Arts, (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), p. 152 
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Tell me yourself directly, I challenge you - reply: imagine that you 
yourself are erecting the edifice of human fortune with the goal of, 
at the finale, making people happy, of at last giving them peace 
and quiet, but that in order to do it would be necessary and 
unavoidable to torture to death only one tiny little creature, that 
same little child that beats its breast with its little fist, and on its 
unavenged tears to found that edifice, would you agree to be the 
architect on those conditions, tell me and tell me truly. 49 
Moore argues that 'it is always the duty of every agent to do that one, 
among all other actions which he can do on any given occasion, whose total 
consequence will have the greatest intrinsic value.'50 According to utilitarian 
philosophers like J. C. C. Smart, intrinsic value consists in happiness, well-
being or some other construal of utility. As he argues, 'the rational way to 
decide what to do is to decide to perform that one of those alternative 
actions open to us (including the null-action, the doing of nothing) which is 
likely to maximize the probable happiness or well-being of humanity as a 
whole, or more accurately, of all sentient beings.' 51 In Ivan's challenge, the 
moral agent can do either one of only two alternative actions and, by 
reference to the principle that underlies Smart's account of utilitarianism, 
the total consequence of only one of these actions will maximise probable 
happiness or well-being for humanity as a whole and, thus, has the greatest 
intrinsic value. Because of this, the utilitarian is bound by the requirements 
of his theory to agree to be Ivan's architect; it is his or her unequivocal 
moral duty to torture the child to death. 
The notion of a moral duty to torture to death an innocent child, or 
indeed any innocent person, clashes with our deep convictions about what 
matters to human life and character. However, when the stakes are as high 
as those in Ivan's challenge, perhaps the moral agent must ignore these 
deeply held moral beliefs and perform seemingly morally repugnant 
actions. Cunningham observes: 
48 Malcolm Budd, Values of Art, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995), p. 86 
49 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, tr. David McDuff, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 2003), p321 
5° G. E. Moore, Ethics, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), p. 232 
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We can imagine catastrophic circumstances in which we have 
neither the luxury nor the inclination to have commitments to 
ways of life and forms of character that are thought to really 
matter.52 
The circumstances envisioned by Cunningham are vividly exemplified in 
William Styron's novel Sophie's Choice. In what Pojman describes as a 
'classic moral dilemma in which both options are bad,' 53 Sophie, a Polish 
Catholic, is, along with her two small children, captured by the Nazis and 
transported to the concentration camp at Auschwitz. On her arrival she is 
confronted by a drunken Nazi doctor who attempts to seduce her. Her 
rejection enrages him and in an act of unmitigated evil he presents her with 
a choice unimaginable in all but extreme circumstances: 
'So you believe in Christ the Redeemer?' the doctor said in a thick-
tongued but oddly abstract way, like that of a lecturer examining 
the delicately shaded facet of a proposition in logic. Then he said 
something which for an instant was totally mystifying: 'Did he not 
say, "Suffer the little children to come unto me"?' He turned back 
to her, moving with the twitchy methodicalness of a drunk. 
Sophie, with an inanity poised on her tongue and choked 
with emotion, was about to attempt a reply when the doctor said, 
'You may keep one of your children.' 
'Bitte?' said Sophie. 
'You may keep one of your children,' he repeated. 'The 
other one will have to go. Which one will you keep?' 
'You mean I have to choose?' 
'You're a Polack, not a Yid. That gives you a privilege - a 
choice.' 
Her thought processes dwindled, ceased. Then she felt her 
legs crumple. 'I can't choose! I can't choose!' She began to scream. 
Oh how she recalled her own screams! Tormented angels never 
screeched so loudly above hell's pandemonium. 'Ich kann nicht 
wahlen!' she screamed. 
The doctor was aware of unwanted attention. 'Shut up!' he 
ordered. 'Hurry now and choose. Choose, goddarnnit, or I'll send 
them both over there. Quick!'54 
51 j. J. C. Smart, 'An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics,' in Smart and Williams (1973), 
op. cit., p. 42 
52 Cunningham, op. cit. p. 16 
53 Louis Pojman, The Moral Life, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 84 
54 Cited in Pojman, ibid., p. 83 
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This is a monstrous dilemma devised by an inhuman architect of suffering, 
an architect authorised by an all-powerful regime which readily 
accommodates his cruelty. How would a moral theory cope with this 
dilemma? How would it deal with the Nazi doctor's sadistic ultimatum? In 
this predicament, Sophie has neither the luxury nor the inclination to 
practice her commitment to a way of life and form of character thought 
really to matter. Either Sophie makes an immediate choice concerning 
which of her two beloved children are to be sent to be killed, or else they 
both die. The death of one is the sole means of survival for the other. It is 
irresolvable in emotional terms; the consequence of either choice is evil. 
That she must choose is out of her control, but her choice is still 
autonomous. It is the preservation of autonomy (in this very narrow 
sphere) that makes the Nazi doctor's command so evil. Can a theoretical 
ethical perspective offer a definitive measure of right and wrong here? Is 
there a rational duty to choose one child over the other? The survival of 
which one of her two children will be most productive of general utility? 
Can Sophie's choice be analysed in terms of duty or utility? One imagines 
that for Sophie, strict adherence to moral principles concerning duty or 
general utility are never further from her mind than they are in the living 
moment of choice. 
Cunningham argues that in anything short of the extreme 
circumstances presented in Sophie's Choice, we expect some vision of life, 
such as that expressed in an adequate moral theory, to command a measure 
of fidelity. This is the point that philosophers like Kekes and Morton make 
when they argue that ethical theories ought to give 'reasonable answers' to 
questions of moral significance and that, in answering these questions, their 
theories ought to clarify the deeper values that underlie the things we care 
about.55 However, in revealing just what these deeper values are, the extent 
to which they inform our moral concerns, and how adequately an ethical 
theory accounts for them, it is sometimes useful to present cases at the 
limits of imagination. Ivan's challenge presents to our imagination 
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circumstances as catastrophic as Cunningham suggests, and for those with 
a deep conviction that torturing innocent children is an unmitigated evil, it 
presents an agonising dilemma. However, to the consistent act utilitarian 
Ivan's challenge poses no special difficulty. As Graham argues, in cases in 
which conflict occurs between general happiness and the rights of the 
innocent, the act utilitarian's commitment to the theory's particular way of 
deciding what is right would not be compromised by torturing the child: 
If the balance of general good over individual loss has been 
properly described, then it is as clear as anything could be that we 
should sacrifice the innocent. From the point of view of act 
utilitarianism, these cases are in principle no different from any 
other calculation about good and bad consequences, and if the 
good outweighs the bad then there is nothing wrong with our 
action. We should sacrifice the innocent. 56 
It is not suggested that the utilitarian would derive even the slightest 
pleasure from torturing to death an innocent child. However, consistency 
requires the utilitarian to regard the act of torture as morally right, that there 
is 'nothing wrong with it,' no matter how personally repugnant he or she 
finds it. A further implication worth noting from utilitarianism's response 
to Ivan's challenge is that if the utilitarian did feel pleasure in torturing the 
innocent child, then, insofar as the torturer's happiness would contribute to 
the summum bonum, this would increase the rightness of the act. 
This ascription of moral correctness to repugnant actions leads 
Graham and others to reject utilitarianism on the grounds that the theory is 
inadequate both to the complexity of moral judgements and to the ethical 
implications of following them through. An evil act is an evil act, 
irrespective of how strong a pragmatic case may be made for it. This is the 
point that Mary Midgley makes in 'Duties Concerning Islands,' in which 
she argues, 'An ethical theory, which, when consistently followed through, 
has iniquitous consequences, is a bad theory and must be changed.' 57 She 
acknowledges that the extent to which these consequences are iniquitous 
55 See the previous chapter, notes 56 & 79 
56 Gordon Graham, 1990, op. cit., p. 146 
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requires investigation, but she argues that an action's consequences cannot 
confer ethical validity just because they are logically consistent with the 
principles from which its performance was derived: 'We cannot directly 
conclude that the consequences cease to stink the moment they are seen to 
follow from our theory.' 58 The iniquitous consequences of utilitarianism's 
response to Ivan's challenge do not arise just from the performance of the 
act, but also from its approbation of the act as morally right solely by 
reference to the utility of its consequences. 
To the difficulties for his theory raised in discussion of Heart of Darkness, a 
defender of utilitarianism might respond that while these criticisms may be 
justified by reference to the inhumane consequences of exploitation 
represented in Conrad's novel, they are effective only against one form of 
utilitarianism, act utilitarianism, and do not apply to all utilitarians. It 
might be argued that to ascribe to utilitarians in general Moore's view that 
the end of a morally significant action always justifies its means is a gross 
and unsympathetic misrepresentation of the arguments contained in the 
theory's foundational text: Mill's Utilitarianism. 59 
On Urmson's account of Mill, a particular action can be justified as 
right by showing that it is in accord with some moral rule; and that it is 
wrong by showing that it transgresses some moral rule.60 A moral rule, in 
turn, is justified by showing that the recognition of that rule promotes the 
ultimate end - in Mill's case, the summum bonum or the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number. Urmson acknowledges that rather than 'moral 
rule,' Mill more generally uses the terms 'secondary principle' or 'moral 
law,' but all three terms refer to a rule, law or principle derived from the 
overarching ethical precept of the Greatest Happiness Principle. 
Understood thus, imperatives such as 'Do no murder,' Tell no lies,' and 
57 Mary Midgley, 'Duties Concerning Islands' reprinted in Singer, P (Ed.), Ethics, (Oxford: 
OUP, 1994), p. 376. 
58 ibid. 
59 J. S. Mill (1991), op. cit., pp. 131 - 205 
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'Keep promises' are moral rules whose correctness derives from the effects 
in the world of their espousal. Greatest happiness would hardly be served 
if murder, lying and promise-breaking were deemed acceptable as common 
practices. 
There is an important distinction between Kantian ethics and rule 
utilitarianism. Kant argues that the second principle of morality is that 'an 
action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it 
but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon' (AK 4: 399). 
For Kant, a moral rule is a universal and necessary a priori principle, and its 
obedience is to be regarded as an end in itself: 
Now, all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. 
The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as 
a means to achieving something else that one wills (or that it is at 
least possible for one to will). The categorical imperative would be 
one which represented an action as objectively necessary of itself, 
without reference to another end. 
[...] if the action would be good merely as a means to something 
else, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as in 
itself good, hence as necessary in a will in itself conforming to 
reason, as its principle, then it is categorical. (AK 4: 414) 
For the rule utilitarian, and utilitarians in general, all sound imperatives 
command hypothetically. Obedience to a moral rule is a means to 
something else: the greatest happiness. Moral rules are thus inferred, a 
posteriori, from their tendency to effect total happiness in the world, and a 
rule's validity is contingent on the extent to which its practice promotes the 
greatest happiness. 
In the case from Heart of Darkness, in replying to the objection that 
utilitarianism allows such exploitation on the grounds that the consequent 
happiness of a great many people outweighs the misery of a few, the 
defender of rule utilitarianism can deny that practices which in general 
result in negative consequences such as promise-breaking, murder, telling 
lies and the kind of inhumane treatment represented in Heart of Darkness 
60 J. 0. Urmson, 'The Interpretation of the Moral philosophy of J. S. Mill,' in Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 3 (1953), pp. 33-39. 
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are in accord with moral rules that promote general happiness. Thus it 
could be argued that the unpropitious circumstances of the indigenous 
workers in Conrad's novel are precisely the consequences by reference to 
which rule utilitarianism would evaluate a general practice as morally 
wrong. And this would be so whether or not it could be shown that, in this 
particular situation, refraining from these exploitative practices does less 
'good'. As Mabbott explains: 
... on Urmson's view it may be right to do an action which is in 
accord with a moral rule, even if that particular action does less 
good that some alternative action - on the ground that the general 
practice of the rule does more good than the omission of such 
practice or the practice of an alternative rule. 61 
Here rule utilitarianism seems to overcome the objection that consistently 
acting on its normative conclusions may require the violation of the deep 
moral convictions that proscribe murder, lying, promise-breaking and the 
inhumane treatment of innocent persons. In relation to the situation 
represented in Heart of Darkness, rule utilitarianism seems successfully to 
forestall the non-utilitarian's rejection of act utilitarianism on the grounds 
that commitment to its precepts may result in such an iniquitous 
consequence as the moral approbation of egregious acts. 
But how would the rule utilitarian respond to Ivan's challenge? 
Ivan's challenge raises a different moral issue from that which arises from 
the scene in Conrad's novel. So long as it can be shown that a certain form 
of exploitation produces the kinds of negative consequences suffered by the 
indigenous workers in Heart of Darkness, we can see how a rule proscribing 
its practice could be inferred from its tendency to affect the greatest good. 
This is basic inductive reasoning at work. However, insofar as it is unique, 
and entirely situational in character, Ivan's challenge precludes an 
inductive appeal to the tendencies of certain practices to produce certain 
consequences. 




Could the rule utilitarian remain faithful to the theory and at the 
same time refuse to torture the child? For a moral judgement to qualify as 
distinctly utilitarian two conditions must be met: first, the judgement must 
be made according to the actual or anticipated consequences of an action; 
and second, those consequences must be expressed in relation to some 
ultimate end. As we saw earlier, Ivan's challenge presents no special 
difficulties for the act utilitarian: as a consequence of torturing the child, the 
ultimate end, expressed in terms of the greatest good, will be promoted; 
hence both conditions obtain. 
However, the scenario in Dostoyevsky's novel poses a serious 
internal challenge to rule utilitarianism in that it engenders a conflict 
between two logically distinct yet equally necessary features of the theory: 
the obedience to moral rules and the promotion of the greatest good. To 
torture the child would be to transgress a moral rule 'Do not torture 
innocent children.' Yet not to transgress this rule would bring about the 
worst possible state of affairs for the greatest number of people. Unlike the 
act utilitarian, Ivan's challenge clearly presents a dilemma to the rule 
utilitarian; but it also poses a dilemma to the logical structure of the theory 
itself, the resolution of which requires either a serious compromise or 
renunciation in the rule utilitarian: either transgress a moral rule the 
recognition of which in general brings about the greatest happiness, or else 
obey the rule and, in so doing, forgo the greatest happiness. Arguably, 
Ivan's challenge shows that even rule utilitarianism is ultimately untenable. 
The respondent to the difficulties posed by Ivan's challenge may object to 
this way of testing a moral theory on two grounds. First, this kind of 
dilemma is too unrealistic or implausible to be of serious value and, as 
such, reveals nothing of significance about the real implications of rule 
utilitarianism. It might be argued that dilemmas in real life constitute less 
difficult moral choices the resolution of which involves less sinister 
compromises between the interests or preferences of the many over the 
few. Ivan's challenge, on the other, hand presents an either/or situation of 
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such extremes that it will not admit of resolution. Second, there could exist 
alternatives beyond the two choices offered by Ivan. It might be suggested 
that an appeal for clemency might extract a compromise from whichever 
entity has the power to appoint Ivan's architect. Or he or she might insist 
that, like Socrates staying home rather than participate in the morally 
dubious action of arresting Leon, 62 the protagonist could void the process 
and simply refuse to participate in any action that might lead to any moral 
consequences whatsoever. 
The rule utilitarian's first objection misses the point entirely. While 
the desire for 'realism' or 'plausibility' may in some cases be warranted, we 
can nevertheless make imaginative sense of Ivan's challenge and see that, 
while extreme, it represents a moral dilemma in the most useful sense of 
the term and, as shown in the example of Sophie's choice, one which is 
entirely plausible from an historical perspective. Monstrous consequences 
of choosing between either course offered in a dilemma are not always 
beyond the bounds of reality. Moreover, the use of dilemma to test a moral 
perspective is not new to philosophy. For example, in Plato's Republic we 
see Socrates employing a dilemma to test the implications of Cephalus' 
conception of right action which he defines as 'truthfulness and returning 
anything we have borrowed': 
'For instance [asks Socrates], if one borrowed a weapon from a 
friend who subsequently went out of his mind and then asked for 
it back, surely it would be generally agreed that one ought not to 
return it, and that it would not be right to do so, not to consent to 
tell the strict truth to a madman?' 
'That is true,' he replied. 
'Well then,' I said, 'telling the truth and returning what we have 
borrowed is not the definition of doing right.' 63 
As Graham writes, 'What is of interest ... is not how dilemmas like these 
are to be resolved, but how they are to be analysed.' 64 The object of raising 
Ivan's challenge as a hypothetical case in the context of utilitarian ethics is 
62 Plato, The Apology, 32d, in The Last Days of Socrates, trans. Hugh Treddenick and Harold 
Tarrant, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), p. 56 
63 Plato, The Republic, 331e,d, op. cit, p. 8 
64 Graham, op. cit., p. 146 
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not to resolve the dilemma it poses, but to analyse it in terms of that 
particular ethical perspective and, in so doing, use it to reveal and clarify 
the implications for that theory and, like Socrates questioning Cephalus, to 
test its responses to these implications and to see whether their 
consequences are acceptable. Jonathon Glover defends the use of 
hypothetical cases against the objection that they are artificial and hence 
lack probative value by claiming that they have been 'fruitful in other 
fields' including scientific experiment, in which the influences of factors not 
being studied are, as far as possible, artificially eliminated. 65 He argues, 'A 
defence of the experimental method has its parallel in the case for arguing 
about ethics by means of asking for responses to deliberately simplified 
imaginary situations.' 66 Irrespective of the plausibility of its sinister 
extremes, the value of Ivan's challenge lies in how an ethical theory's 
response to it may be understood and what implications follow from this 
response. Which of the two alternatives given to Alyosha would rule 
utilitarianism require him to take? How would this decision be justified, 
and what are the implications for the theory of making such a choice? 
The rule utilitarian's other argument seeks to show that there is no 
real dilemma in Ivan's challenge; not because, like the act utilitarian, he or 
she does not recognise moral dilemmas of this nature, nor because the 
extremes it entails are too sinister or outlandish to be plausible, but because 
we can always imagine alternatives to those given in the text. This objection 
resembles an argument alleging the fallacy of false dichotomy: the 
challenge is fallacious because there are hidden alternative course of action 
to those offered. However, if we use the text as a heuristic device to reveal, 
clarify and reflect on the implications of a moral theory, and if we take 
these reflections seriously, then we are bound by its content. As Michael 
Butor writes, 'the novel tends naturally towards its own elucidation.' 67 In 
the world of The Brothers Karamazov, there are only two alternative courses 
65 Jonathon Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 34 
66 ibid. 
67 Michael Butor, 'The Novel as Research' in Malcom Bradbury, ed., The Novel Today 
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), p. 52 
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of action open to Alyosha, only two horns of the dilemma, neither of which 
admits of amendment from outside its domain: either torture the child to 
death and bring happiness and contentment to the world, or else reprieve 
the child and leave the world in misery. These are the only two choices. The 
objector cannot refuse to act because that constitutes a reprieve for the child 
and serves only to forfeit the opportunity for greatest happiness. Moreover, 
there can be no ad hoc addition of further alternatives for the purposes of 
resolving the dilemma in favour of one theory or another. To do so would 
be to enter into an open-ended dialectic in which an unlimited number of 
new hypothetical conditions emerge: But what if? But then what if? Yes, but 
then what if? And to allow this would without warrant empty the concept 
of a moral dilemma of any substantive content, and rob Ivan's challenge of 
any probative value. As there are no possibilities for action other than those 
described in the text, the either/or situation represented in Ivan's challenge 
is not misused and Alyosha's dilemma is genuine. Ivan's challenge does 
not involve a false dichotomy and the objection fails. 
Nor does Urmson's account of Mill offer any substantive resolution. 
Urmson argues that for a moral rule to be correct it must be shown that its 
implementation promotes the ultimate end, i.e. greatest happiness. But in 
Ivan's challenge, the greatest happiness can only be served by torturing the 
child to death. And as already shown, no general rule can be inferred from 
the particular circumstances represented in Ivan's challenge (that is, 
torturing the innocent in general does not tend to increase total happiness). 
If a rule is invoked here, and for the rule utilitarian consistency requires 
this, that rule must entail that it is wrong to torture innocent children 
except when doing so serves to promote greatest happiness. 
Thus, in specific cases such as Ivan's challenge, a moral rule's force 
becomes contingent on the extent to which, in particular situations, its 
practice brings about the greatest happiness to the greatest number. 
Considered in this light, the overriding precept of rule utilitarianism 
becomes: obey moral rules except where obedience does not promote the 
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greatest happiness. In which case, a particular action is justified as right not 
because it accords with some moral rule, but because it is consistent with 
the fundamental maxim which informs all utilitarian calculations and 
enjoins the moral agent to act so as to maximise probable utility. Indeed, 
Smart argues in his defence of act utilitarianism, '...an adequate rule-
utilitarianism would not only be extensionally equivalent to the act 
utilitarian principle (i.e. would enjoin the same set of actions as it) but 
would in fact consist of one rule only, the act utilitarian one: "maximize 
probable benefit".' 68 Therefore, to remain faithful to the theory, the rule 
utilitarian must either alter whichever moral rule concerns the torture of 
innocent children to accommodate the situation and allow the specific act 
in favour of maximum probable benefit, in which case rule utilitarianism 
collapses into act utilitarianism, or else abandon utilitarianism altogether. 
Instructive Reminders 
In addition to illustrating, challenging and testing a moral perspective, 
literature can fulfil another valuable function in ethical reflection: that of 
providing reminders of facts or issues that pertain to an ethical perspective. 
Phillips argues that much of literature's value to ethical reflection lies in its 
capacity to reveal the ways in which an ethical perspective, such as Kantian 
Ethics or Utilitarianism, '...may change, be eroded, be found wanting, or 
become impossible for people.' 69 He suggests: 
This can be brought out powerfully ... by using literature as a 
source of reminders (not examples) from which philosophy can 
benefit in wrestling with the issues concerning the firm or 
slackening hold on various perspectives in human life. 78 
Using literature to remind us of these issues concerning an ethical 
perspective echoes Wittgenstein's idea of the central role that reminders 
play in philosophical reflection. In Philosophical Investigations he writes, 'The 
68 Smart, op. cit., pp. 11-12 
ibid 
78 Phillips, op. cit., p. 1 
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work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular 
purpose. '71 
While McTaggart claims that philosophers are '...concerned at 
almost every step with proving or disproving something,' 72 the 
counterargument put by Phillips and Wittgenstein is that many 
philosophers engage in a broader range of philosophical tasks. As 
Passmore writes, 'the philosopher spends a great deal of his time in 
describing, or classifying, or defining, or analysing, or disproving.' 73 He 
contends that the philosopher 'is trying to solve certain problems, and in 
the attempt to solve problems, proof plays only a limited part.' 74 He agrees 
that some philosophers seek to construct arguments that resemble 
mathematical or experimental proofs, but maintains that most arguments 
take the form of neither. Indeed, many consist in reminders of some fact that 
bears on their investigations. Passmore argues that reminders play an 
important part in philosophy, and that the act of reminding is a legitimate, 
effective and 'appropriately modest sort of thing to do: 75 Nor do these 
reminders always concern matters of deep philosophic import. Some 
arguments, he suggests, 'simply remind us of a familiar fact of everyday 
lffe' 76 that may have been overlooked or received too little attention. He 
cites the example of the person who may has had imposed upon him too 
heavy a workload and offers the reminder that 'I can't do everything; I've 
only got two legs.' Passmore argues that while the premise and conclusion 
of this argument 'are not the sort with which scientists and mathematicians 
concern themselves,' the reminder nonetheless does constitute an 
argument77 
71 Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit., §127, p. 43  
72 J. M. E. McTaggart, cited in John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (London: Duckworth, 
1961), p. 7 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid., p. 10 
76 ibid., p. 8 
77 ibid. 
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Passmore argues that philosophers traditionally 'assert very wide 
generalizations referring to a great range of facts.' 78 An example of such a 
generalisation might be Mill's assertion that for all persons happiness is the 
only thing desirable as an end, and that all other things are valuable only as 
a means to that end. For Mill, the Greatest Happiness Principle thus 
constitutes the soundest basis for all moral reasoning, and this position is 
embraced enthusiastically by his utilitarian successors. Passmore argues 'a 
natural way of dealing with the enthusiasm of philosophers is to pull them 
up with a reminder.' 79 A philosopher who enthusiastically adopts Mill's 
view on the supreme value of happiness, for instance, might be reminded 
that whilst desirable, happiness is not necessarily the only thing valuable as 
an end and that it questionable whether all other things are valuable solely 
by reference to their being means to that end. The objector to Mill's position 
must then choose the method to furnish this reminder and, as Passmore 
writes (citing Popper), 'philosophers are as free as others to use any method 
in searching for the truth.' 80 Nor are reminders new to the methods of 
philosophical reflection. Renford Bambrough argues for the soundness of 
Plato's link between dialectic and Anamnesis - the reminding of what we 
might already know but which may have become lost in the broader issues 
of our reflections. As he argues, 'reminders are usually of minute 
particulars, of forgotten instances to which some hasty generality is 
vulnerable.'81 A central claim in the propositional account of the role for 
literature in philosophical reflection is that, in considering the available 
methods and evidence by which the philosopher may support an argument 
for an ethical truth, literature can be a rich source of these reminders. 
For example, one could point to the plight of the workers in Heart of 
Dhrkness as a reminder of the intrinsic value of human dignity, arguing that 
the degradation is clearly a consequence of using the workers merely as 
78 ibid. 
79 ibid., p. 8-9 
80 ibid., p. 
Renford Bambrough, 'Literature and Philosophy,' in Wisdom: Twelve Essays, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1975), p. 278 
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means to the happiness of others. If we sympathise with the workers, we 
do so not just because they appear to be unhappy, or merely because their 
plight fails to promote some utility, or because their preferences for an 
alternative situation are not satisfied; we sympathise with them because 
their dignity has been compromised by the imposition of egregious 
working conditions. Dignity, then, has value beyond its instrumental 
relation to happiness, utility, or the satisfaction of preferences. Further, to 
those who argue that, because it is a consequence of their being engaged 
legally, the workers' suffering is morally insignificant, the scene is a 
graphic reminder of Hart's point that ethics and the law sometimes conflict, 
and that 'legal' does not always entail 'ethical.' Besides lending support to 
the Kantian perspective, the passages from Heart of Darkness also present it 
with a challenge: Marlow's interaction with the dying worker reminds us 
that there is more to moral life than the apprehension of duty; and that 
certain dispositions, such as sympathy, compassion and beneficence, are 
traits whose moral value requires a more adequate account than that 
furnished by the Kantian perspective. Indeed, as shown, Huck's turmoil in 
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn reminds us of the centrality of 
sympathy's role in humane ethical decision making. 
Doubtless a pragmatic argument justifying the plight of the refugee 
mother and child in Achebe's poem might be made in terms of 'sustainable 
losses,' collateral damage,' or 'the unavoidable consequences of a 
necessary and just war.' The poetic depiction of tragic dignity, however, 
coupled with the vivid imagery of suffering, reminds us that no purely 
rational argument for a just war can adequately accommodate the human 
cost of armed conflict. Nor can it be supported from the victims' 
perspective. In considering how agents apprehend the moral significance of 
the truism 'war is hell,' Cunningham writes: 
We try to extrapolate from our own experience and exercise our 
imagination as best we can, but surely this is not the same thing as 
actually being there. And short of firsthand experience, the best 
way to appreciate the horrors of war certainly is not through any 
abstract philosophical description or analysis. Any such 
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description or analysis is destined to ring hollow because it fails to 
capture the nature and significance of war. 82 
Cunningham argues that a narrative, such as that represented in a film like 
Saving Private Ryan, graphically depicts the horrors of war and leads to an 
appreciation of its moral significance 'far better ... than any traditional 
philosophical analysis could possibly hope to provide: 83 He does not claim 
that such depictions of the horror of real war, or of the complex reality of 
concrete moral situations, can in any way replace systematic ethical 
reflection; rather, he argues that philosophy cannot fruitfully operate 
completely independent from the 'raw data of human experience,' even if 
this experience be vicarious. Indeed, his stance is that philosophical 
reflection 'must be brought to our experiences and observations of the 
world so as to order and ultimately command them in one way or 
another.' 84 In terms of literary imagery, Achebe's poem is equally graphic 
and constitutes a valuable reminder of war's horror and its effects on the 
innocent. As Cunningham argues, 'Just-war theory and the like cannot 
hope to affect our deliberation and appreciation in quite the same way, and 
without insights of this sort, we deliberate and decide about war at our 
own moral peril.' 85 Thus the reminder contained in this poem may prompt 
us to review how an ethical perspective deals with war; and consequently 
induce proponents of just-war arguments to rethink whether and how their 
positions can be justified on purely rational grounds. 
Finally, the testing of act utilitarianism with Ivan's challenge 
reminds us of the potential iniquitous consequences of rigid adherence to a 
particular ethical perspective and reveals the ways in which it may be 
found wanting. It reminds us that our most deeply held moral convictions 
may conflict with the demands of an ethical theory, and thus raises serious 
questions concerning the viability of that theory. The same test applied to 
rule utilitarianism reminds us that, despite its sober appeal to general rules, 
82 Cunningham, op. cit., p. 72 
83 ibid. 
84 ibid., p. 73 
85 ibid. 
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there are cases in which it may be impossible to consistently act on the 
principles of the theory, and thus lends support to the position that general 
rules and formulations are often inadequate to the complexity of particular 
situations. 
The Exemplification and Range of Moral Concepts 
Reminders are thus important and literature can be a rich source of these. 
Further, Phillips' parenthetical rejection of the value of literature as source 
of examples is mistaken. The case against Phillips is that many moral 
concepts are ostensively definable; that is, they are exemplifiable by 
showing instances of the correct application of the concept. In the absence 
of actual instantiations of moral concepts, we can look to representations of 
paradigm cases of the concepts as clear examples of their instantiation. An 
important aspect of literature's contribution to ethical reflection is its ability 
to furnish an almost unlimited number of fictional instantiations of ethical 
concepts which can clarify and enrich an ethical perspective's content. 
Ostensive definition can aid philosophical analysis. Exemplification 
can help us to clarify ethical concepts by highlighting instantiations of the 
concept we seek to understand. For example, if a Kantian were asked 'What 
do you mean by "using persons as mere means to an end" and how is the 
cost explained in terms of the loss of human dignity?' he or she could cite 
the scene from Heart of Darkness, which not only reminds us that 
exploitation compromises human dignity, but is itself a clear example of the 
degrading effect exploitation has on human dignity. Similarly, Ivan's 
challenge not only reminds us of the cost of rigid adherence to an ethical 
perspective, it is itself a clear example of an ethical dilemma. To the 
question: 'What do you mean by "ethical dilemma"?' one can point to the 
difficult choice between alternative actions offered to the would-be torturer, 
exhibiting his quandary as an ethical dilemma: a situation in which he must 
choose between two ethically repugnant acts. The significance of Sophie's 
Choice in this regard is obvious. Similarly, Dedalus' turmoil in Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man exemplifies a certain kind of moral anguish, such as 
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may be experienced when choosing between fidelity to one's principles and 
submitting to other, less rational drives. Achebe's poem Refugee Mother and 
Child not only reminds us of the human cost of war, it is itself a clear 
example of the suffering, degradation and personal cost of war. Thus, a 
number of moral concepts are exemplified in these literary works, 
including: dignity, exploitation, dilemma, suffering, fidelity, and the 
human cost of war. 
An objection here is that these are not ostensive definitions of moral 
concepts, but mere examples of morally significant events. According to 
this argument, the moral value of these events is derived via judgements 
that are analysable in terms of either one of only two fundamental moral 
concepts: duty, as derived from the categorical imperative; or good state of 
affairs, as derived from the Greatest Happiness Principle. This argument 
presupposes that all that is important morally can be reduced to one of 
these two concepts, each of which is informed by either of two dominant 
ethical perspectives. By extension, the argument that moral judgements are 
only analysable in terms of a formal principle also entails that the proper 
definitions of 'good' or 'evil' (this list could be extended to include 'right' or 
'wrong,' ethicar or 'unethical') can only be established by reference to 
these principles. 
In the Heart of Darkness example, for the Kantian, the moral 
significance of the workers' plight lies not in their suffering, but in the fact 
that an act contrary to a duty prescribed in the second formulation of the 
categorical imperative has been performed. On this account, the moral 
significance of all events is reducible to the most basic and only relevant 
concept: moral duty defined by the categorical imperative, our duty not to 
use people merely as means to our ends. An action is right only if it is 
performed according to duty, wrong if it contravenes duty. All other 
considerations are subordinate, and subsumed under the categorical 
imperative. As such, they are only derivatively moral, not moral in their 
own right. As shown earlier, this is why Marlow's engagement with the 
dying worker is seen by Kantians as ethically insignificant. 
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For the utilitarian, on the other hand, moral significance lies in how 
the workers' plight relates to the Greatest Happiness Principle and its 
cognate precepts. That is, the moral significance of their situation is 
evaluated by reference to the extent to which their suffering reduces overall 
utility and whether it is compensated for by a corresponding increase in 
overall utility. Individualised considerations such as personal suffering and 
the extent to which a person's dignity has been compromised are 
subsumed under the concern for general happiness or utility. Thus, for the 
utilitarian, moral significance is reducible to the most basic and only 
relevant moral concept: utility. An action is right if it increases overall 
utility, wrong if it produces the reverse. Again, Marlow's beneficence is only 
a derivatively moral consideration; and is given ethical value only by 
reference to the extent to which it increases general utility. 
To philosophers like Williams, however, this quest for simplicity in 
moral judgements is 'wrongheaded' 86 and that 'in ethics the reductive 
enterprise has no justification and should disappear.' 87 He puts the 
question: 
If there is such a thing as the truth about the subject matter of 
ethics - the truth, we might say, about the ethical - why is there 
any expectation that it should be so simple? In particular, why 
should it be conceptually simple, using only one of two ethical 
concepts, such as duty or good state of affairs rather than many?88 
Williams argues that we employ a greater variety of different ethical 
considerations than can be accounted for in the reduction of ethics to only 
one of two basic concepts. He maintains, 'perhaps we need as many 
concepts to describe [the ethical] as we need, and no fewer.' 89 Cunningham 
echoes Williams' concern that the reductive approach of traditional 
philosophical reflection produces only an impoverished ethical vocabulary, 
arguing that a richer vocabulary is required if philosophical ethics is to 
effectively reach its ultimate target: 'insight about ethical concerns which 





can and should operate as a genuine force in life and character! 90 He 
accepts: 
Concepts such as 'right,' wrong,"good,' and 'bad' may be 
important elements of our ethical lexicon because they provide a 
ready vocabulary for expressing general, all-things-considered 
judgements about actions, ways of life, and forms of character. 91 
While accepting that the conceptual simplicity of some ethical judgements 
is important, he argues that in everyday life - such as may be represented 
in literary depictions of life and character - we can 'learn and express more 
by way of the vast number of ethical concepts we use to articulate 
descriptions about human life and character.' 92 He argues that humans can 
be good or bad, or do right or wrong in many ways, none of which need 
share any common core, and not all of which can be reduced to questions of 
duty or greatest happiness. Cunningham lists a number of questions which, 
he maintains, we are entitled to expect a conception of the ethical to 
address, and which the conceptual simplicity of traditional ethics cannot 
accommodate: 
What do I owe others, what do they owe me? When do the needs 
of others limit my pursuit of my own needs? How do the needs of 
strangers stack_up against loved ones? What would a just life look 
like? What character traits should I inculcate? Are all ethical 
concerns compatible? How am I to choose between competing 
ethical loves?93 
He writes, 'not only do we expect any conception of ethics to address such 
questions, but we do not start with a blank slate with respect to the 
answers.'94 That is, we have pre-theoretical notions of what ethics consists 
in, and we have a ready-made vocabulary to describe its constituents. An 
adequate moral philosophy must consider whether and how these 
constituents have a hold on us, and the extent to which they ought to act as 
forces in our lives. This is what Morton means when he argues that, in 
9° Cunningham, op. cit., p. 18 
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helping us to find our way through the moral problems that really trouble 
us, an adequate moral philosophy must identify and connect our intensely 
felt moral concerns and help us to 'see the deeper values that underlie the 
things we care about.' 95 In order to address these concerns, Williams argues 
that we require an ethics that consists in more substantive, or 'thicker' 
ethical notions that not only express a union of fact and value, but also 
entail some general connection to action, and can thus be employed to 
enrich a perspective's prescriptive content for the ethical life. 96 In 
contrasting thick moral concepts with thinner concepts such as 'good,' 
'bad,' right,"wrong,"duty' and 'state of affairs,' Williams cites examples 
such as 'coward, lie, brutality, gratitude, and so forth.' 97 Cunningham 
enumerates a more comprehensive list of thick concepts from everyday life 
which, he suggests, an adequate account of ethics must accommodate as 
factors in the life of a moral agent: 
shame, pride, respect, mercy, forgiveness, honor, cruelty, envy, 
compassion, dignity, justice, jealousy, lust, servility, pity, modesty, 
benevolence, honesty, autonomy, integrity, loyalty, greed, 
malevolence, guilt, authenticity, self-respect, self-deception, 
generosity, magnanimity, spite, arrogance, courage, revenge, 
sympathy, humiliation, oppression, conceit, selfishness, despair, 
intolerance, narcissism, hate, redemption, trust, hope, grace, 
love.98 
He argues that reflection on these concepts better accommodates the 
complexity of moral judgements than the reductive enterprise of traditional 
ethics, characterised by the dichotomy between judgements concerning 
duty and those which ascribe moral value solely to consequences. We care 
about Marlow's interaction with the workers not just because of how it 
relates to the categorical imperative, but because we value compassion, 
generosity and beneficence, and consider them traits worth cultivating in 
their own right. We sympathise with the workers and ascribe moral value 
to their plight not just because we apprehend duties to act in certain ways, 
95 Morton, op. cit., p. 120 
96 Williams (1985), op. cit., pp. 129ff 
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nor because we are concerned merely to calculate the effect of their 
situation on overall happiness, but because we regard suffering, servility, 
and indignity as moral evils in their own right. So too, we regard the 
corporate greed and oppressive conduct which led to this situation as 
distinct moral evils. Similarly, we understand and respond to the despair of 
Achebe's refugee mother; and we can at least comprehend, if not empathise 
with, Dedalus' anguish, whether or not we've experienced the same and 
despite how we may judge his thoughts and acts. Williams and 
Cunningham agree that how ethical theories may account for thick moral 
concepts varies greatly, as will the extent to which they act as forces in an 
agent's life. But because they are forces that shape attachments constitutive 
of who we are, their normative value is not to be underrated. According to 
Williams, thick concepts: 
... are characteristically related to reasons for action. If a concept 
of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a reason for 
action, though that reason may be outweighed by other reasons... 
Of course, exactly what reason for action is provided, and for 
whom, depends on the situation in ways that may well be 
governed by this and by other ethical concepts, but some general 
connection with action is clear enough. 99 
If Williams is correct, then the fictional instantiations of those moral 
concepts discussed earlier may furnish reasons to act in particular ways in 
real life, given sufficient similarities between actual situations and those 
depicted in the literary passages. Accordingly, Williams and Cunningham 
argue that these moral concepts deserve serious attention, and that, as 
Cunningham observes, in accommodating a greater range of ethical 
concerns, 'a bigger, richer ethical vocabulary can only serve the interests of 
philosophical reflection.' 10° 
The propositional account holds that literature can play a valuable 
role in ethical reflection by furnishing a virtually inexhaustible supply of 
instantiations of thick ethical concepts. The attitudinal account holds that 
literature can help to reveal the extent to which these concepts can act as 
99 Williams (1985), /oc. cit. 
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forces in our lives. This application for literature is particularly valuable in 
examining and elucidating the prescriptions of virtue-based ethical 
systems. These theories seek to identify the most desirable ways of life and 
forms of character. In so doing, normative virtue theories prescribes those 
traits and dispositions which are most worth cultivating, and those vices 
which are most worth suppressing, and which are not adequately 
comprehended in perspectives which limit ethical considerations to those 
of bare duty or utilitarian consequence. As a response to the reductive 
enterprise of traditional ethics, Annas argues that recent attention to the 
virtues: 
has seemed to many to be a useful corrective to modern theories 
which operate with a narrow and abstract notion of what is 
relevant to morality, and which are frequently criticized for 
producing theories which are seriously at odds with our 
conceptions of what matters in our lives. 101 
As Rachels defines it, a virtue is 'a trait of character, manifested in habitual 
action, that is good for a person to have.' 102 Literature can flesh out the 
substantive content of a virtue ethics perspective by providing examples of 
the distinctive features of the virtues - desirable character traits - such as 
honesty, courage, generosity, and compassion. These instantiations can 
exemplify the principles on which the virtues are founded and, as such, 
fortify arguments that seek to justify their value. 
Literary depictions of virtuous characters abound, but Louis Pojman 
considers that one of 'the most poignant examples of virtue' can be found 
in the character of the bishop of Digne in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables. 103 In 
Hugo's novel, the bishop's saintly character is exemplified in his response 
to learning that the main protagonist, Jean Valjean, has been arrested for 
stealing the bishop's silverware. It is a cold evening and Valjean, a recently 
freed and homeless convict, is turned away from the doors of many village 
houses when at last a woman takes pity on him and directs him to a house 
too Cunnirtgham, op. cit., p. 19 
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of possible refuge for the night. Valjean does not know that this is the house 
of the Bishop of Digne, a man committed to service to the poor. To 
Valjean's surprise, the bishop admits him, feeds him and allows him to stay 
at no charge. He is unaccustomed to such hospitality; his identification as 
an ex-convict generally causes others to shun him. This is his first night in a 
real bed after nineteen years imprisonment and he sleeps only a few hours. 
He awakes long before dawn and, after an hour of indecision, struggling 
with his inclinations, he finally decides to make off with the silverware he 
spied earlier, reasoning that it will fetch more money in one sale than he 
had been able to save in the previous nineteen years of false imprisonment. 
He steals the silverware, but before he travels far he is arrested by the 
gendarmerie and taken back to the Bishop's house: 
The door opened. A strange fierce group appeared on the 
threshold. Three men were holding a fourth by the collar. The 
three men were gendarmes; the fourth was Jean Valjean. 
"Ah, there you are!" said he [the bishop], looking at Jean 
Valjean, "I am glad to see you. But I gave you the candlesticks 
also, which are silver like the rest, and would bring 200 francs. 
Why did you not take them along with your plates?" 
Jean Valjean opened his eyes and looked at the bishop with 
an expression no human tongue could describe. 
"Monseigneur," said the brigadier, "then what this man 
said was true? We met him. He was going like a man who was 
running away and we arrested him in order to see. He had this 
silver." 
"And he told you," interrupted the bishop, with a smile, 
"that it had been given him by a good old priest with whom he 
had passed the night. I see it all. And you brought him back here? 
It is all a mistake." 
"If that is so," said the brigadier, "we can let him go." 
"Certainly," replied the bishop. 
The gendarmes released Jean Valjean, who shrank back. 
"Is it true that they let me go?" he said in a voice almost 
inarticulate, as if he were speaking in his sleep. 
"My friend," said the bishop, "before you go away here are 
your candlesticks; take them." 
Jean Valjean was trembling in every limb. He took the two 
candlesticks mechanically and with a wild appearance. 
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The bishop approached him and said, in a low voice: 
"Forget not, never forget that you have promised to use this silver 
to become an honest man." 
Jean Valjean, who had no recollection of this promise stood 
confounded. The bishop had laid much stress on these words as 
he had uttered them. 104 
The bishop's generosity of spirit is not wasted on the ex-convict; Valjean 
ultimately becomes a moral hero who renounces his criminal tendencies 
and, in emulating the bishop's character, devotes his life to serving the 
underprivileged. As a novel, Les Miserables contains all of the elements 
typical of narrative art that enable the reader to discern moral significance 
in characters, actions and situations. Moreover, as Cunningham argues, in 
its provision of 'detailed depictions of the complex inner life of fictional 
characters embroiled in the messy business of living,' literature furnishes 
an ideal corrective to the simplicity of traditional ethics and 'directs our 
attention to the subtleties and nuances of what should rightly command 
our attention: 105 In its portrayal of the bishop as someone who acts out of 
spontaneous goodness than in conscious and reflective accordance with 
moral duty, and is prepared to forsake material property and, in so doing 
endanger his own liberty, rather than condemn a man to a life of penal 
servitude, this passage is a particularly effective exemplification of a 
virtuous character. It shows that some morally approbatory actions are not 
reducible solely to either duty or utility, and that value attaches not only to 
the agent's virtue, but also, as evidenced in Jean Valjean's subsequent 
transformation, to the effect on the recipient of such kindness. Thus what is 
of ethical interest in Les Miserables is not just the illustration of the bishop's 
saintly character (which could be recounted in a fable, parable or short 
sketch), but is in the way that the story plays out in the development of 
Valjean's ethical character. While this episode contains a valuable 
representation virtuous action, a key aspect of the novel's plot is that it 
organises the causal and valuational relations between the bishop's 
104 Victor Hugo, Les Miserables (1863), reprinted in Pojman, ibid., p. 387 
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engagement with Valjean, and Valjean's subsequent development as a 
virtuous agent. 
One important question remains: of all the means by which 
reflection can enrich the content of ethics and articulate a clear vision of the 
best ways of life and forms of character, why choose imaginative literature? 
Cannot these illustrations, tests, reminders, definitions and concepts be 
gleaned from lived experience? Or from imaginative thought experiments? 
Can other forms of literature, such a biography or history, be equally 
rewarding here? 
105 ibid., p. 4 
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4 
THE SCOPE OF FICTION AND THE 
ASCENDANCY OF THE NOVEL 
One obvious answer [to the question Why consult 
literature] was already suggested by Aristotle: 
we have never lived enough. 
Martha Nussbauml 
The Holiness of Minute Particulars. 
William Blake2 
Something is always lost in generalisation. A 
railway leaves out all the gaps of dirt between. 
Generalisations are only a means of getting about. 
T. E. Hulme3 
The Utility of Fact and the Utility of Fiction 
As noted previously, writers of imaginative literature are not bound by the 
same formal constraints that confine traditional philosophical discourse. 
The scope of this freedom emerges in Beardsmore's contention that the 
author of creative fiction is 'likely to furnish us with a wider range of 
problems, situations, possibilities with which to illustrate and test our 
philosophical theories' 4 than those which can be portrayed in traditional 
philosophical argument alone. An analogous freedom exists for the reader 
of imaginative literature. As argued earlier, traditional philosophical 
argument fails adequately to accommodate the complexities of real-life 
1- Nussbaum (1990), op. cit., p. 47 
2 William Blake, Jerusalem 
3 T. E. Hulme, Speculations, p. 230; cited in Renford Bambrough, op. cit., p.276 












ethical judgements and, hence, also fails to address crucial aspects of the 
agent's own moral understanding. With imaginative literature, on the other 
hand, readers are free of the rational constraints imposed by abstract ethical 
argument. Characters in fiction may act inconsistently, and their actions 
may merely follow chronologically rather than reasonably. The writer of 
fiction is not compelled to create characters whose actions reflect rational 
norms. These are not failings in literature, but rather are features of its 
ability to represent what Nussbaum regards as the world's complexity, 
mysteriousness and 'flawed and imperfect beauty' 5 Moreover, readers of 
imaginative literature are free of the practical constraints that limit their 
ability to experience a sufficiently wide range of ethical situations required 
to adequately assess the implications of consistently acting on the precepts 
of an ethical theory. However, to be of value, how closely must a work of 
imaginative literature resemble the world it represents? 
In Freedom and Reason, Hare only tentatively agrees that imaginative 
literature offers these practical advantages to moral reflection when, he 
says, literature is employed '...as an adjunct to moral thought.' 6 While he 
accepts that the sympathetic imagination plays an important role in moral 
reflection and that literature can contribute here, he argues against the 
practice of taking all the examples of our moral thinking from fiction, 'as 
the young and those who have led sheltered lives are apt to do.' 7 While the 
propositional account does not propose that we derive all examples for 
moral thinking from literature, it does hold that literature can provide 
valuable moral material that may be unavailable through other means, and 
that certainly is unavailable through traditional philosophical reflection 
alone. However, insofar as it represents a more general objection to the use 
of literary examples in ethical reflection, as well as a limitation on the 
conditions in which literature might be valuable as a source of examples, 
5 Nussbaum (1989), op. cit., p. 3 
6 Hare (1963), op. cit., p. 183 
7 ibid. 
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Hare's position merits closer examination for the issues it raises for the 
general relation between philosophical reflection and imaginative 
literature. If Hare's argument against taking all examples of our moral 
reasoning from literature implies that there is some general flaw in 
literature that limits its application to ethical reflection, then we must ask 
why we should take any examples from literature. What is the nature of this 
flaw and how relevant is it to moral thought? If some examples are valuable 
adjuncts to moral thought, then what do the examples that are not valuable 
lack? The question is thus: What makes a work of literature valuable as a 
source of examples for moral thought? Conversely, what excludes a work 
of literature as a source of morally relevant examples? Hare makes two 
claims here: the first concerns the relevance to ethical reflection of literature 
and literary situations generally; the second concerns the incomparable 
value of direct experience. 
In the first claim, Hare acknowledges that literary situations are not 
represented as actual historical fact; but, he says, 'they are claimed to be 
like situations which do occur - otherwise their relevance to moral thought 
would be small.' 8 As he presents it, this criterion for the relevance and, 
hence, the value of imaginative literature to moral thought appears 
straightforward and uncontroversial. The criterion which excludes some 
works of literature from moral thought is easy to identify: if a literary 
situation is so implausible that we cannot make imaginative sense of its 
relation to life, then it lacks relevance to our moral thinking. But how 
plausible, how realistic must a story be for us profitably to use it as a 
supplement to ethical reflection? Hare qualifies his argument with two 
conditions that must obtain for a story to have value as a supplement to 
moral reflection: 'If therefore the reader senses that the descriptions lack 
verisimilitude, or that in an actual situation there would be morally 
relevant features which are suppressed in the story, the influence of the 
8 ibid. 
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story on his moral thinking will be, rightly, diminished thereby.' 9 Hare's 
conditions have a direct bearing on the argument here that literature 
furnishes additional scope to ethical reflection, and that its connection with 
moral philosophy is valuable thereby. Indeed, Hare's first condition implies 
that a story's ability to 'influence' our ethical reflection turns on its 
verisimilitude, on how true or real it appears; that is to say, on how closely 
it resembles reality. 
On the surface, this condition poses no special problems for the texts 
considered earlier: readers of Conrad, Achebe and Joyce will have little 
trouble accepting that the situations of moral seriousness represented in 
their works are realistic, that they are plausible depictions of how things 
might be for the characters immersed in situations so depicted, that they 
represent possible factual situations that, conceivably, do occur. Moreover, 
the extent to which these stories correspond to factual situations can be 
readily determined. Reliable history shows that the Belgian government 
actually sanctioned the exploitation of the Congo's indigenous workers. As 
an officer of the merchant marine himself, Conrad personally witnessed the 
effects of this exploitation and, by his own admission, communicating these 
to the reading public was a part of his aim in writing Heart of Darkness. The 
Biafran War is an historical event, and Chinua Achebe personally 
experienced the war and its effects on the innocent; his role in it, as well as 
his engagement with Biafran refugees, is well documented. It is accepted 
that Stephen Dedalus' fictional experiences are modelled on the early life 
experiences of his creator Joyce - certainly there are sufficient parallels in 
their stories, one real the other fictional, to lend credence to such a claim. 
While Styron's Sophie's Choice clearly meets the requirement for realism, the 
verisimilitude criterion appears problematic for Ivan's challenge. It is 
highly unlikely that we shall ever find a situation in reality which 
corresponds to the extreme dilemma it represents. However, a closer 
examination of the context in which Ivan's challenge is presented may yield 
a more favourable verdict. Insofar as it occurs as an episode of a wider, 
9 ibid. 
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more realistic story, Ivan's challenge may well meet the verisimilitude 
criterion. Real life is full of people - not just philosophers - posing 
questions that are difficult or impossible to answer. The Brothers Karamazov 
is no less realistic because it has Ivan posing a question that Alyosha finds 
difficult or impossible to answer. Thus, while the terms of the hypothetical 
challenge may fall outside the bounds of reality, the realism of the novel 
itself is not adversely affected by the unusual situation presented for 
contemplation by Ivan. Moreover, as shown by Sophie's Choice, not all 
fictional dilemmas that offer extreme, horrid alternatives fall outside the 
bounds of possible reality. 
If probative value attaches only to works of imaginative literature 
that closely resemble factual situations, then the situations represented in 
these texts clearly meet Hare's criterion for moral relevance. While they do 
not directly represent events that actually occurred, we are expected to 
accept, and have little trouble doing so, that they are much like situations 
that do actually occur, or might actually have occurred, and, hence, 
constitute relevant and valuable representations of ethical situations. 
Undoubtedly, Hare means to ascribe value to the close proximity between 
fact and fiction. His argument for the role of imagination in moral thought 
is centred on how we employ imagination to confront the facts of a situation 
of moral seriousness. He writes, 'and it makes a difference, as always, that 
they should really be facts.' 10 In this respect, Hare's criterion resembles the 
demand made by Thomas Gradgrind in Dickens' Hard Times, a pre-eminent 
stickler for the facts: 
'Now what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but 
Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root 
out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning 
animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to 
them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, 
and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick 
to Facts, Siell 
10 Hare, /oc. cit. 
11 Charles Dickens, Hard Times, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 1 
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But this condition is problematic in the context of imaginative literature's 
relevance to moral thought. Just as Gradgrind's view of the worthwhile life 
as a series of colourless arithmetic calculations limits his ability to 
experience life in all its colourful uncertainty, Hare's caveat that morally 
relevant literature must represent situations that are like those that do occur 
seriously limits its ability to furnish imaginative ethical possibilities that fall 
outside the scope of its reader's experience of reality. In so doing, given the 
essential nature of the literary enterprise, it virtually denies the value of 
creative fiction to ethical reflection. However, if it is true that a key aspect 
of literature's contribution to ethical reflection is its ability to propose to the 
imagination situations that induce readers to look at things in new ways, 
and if Hare is to accommodate literature as an aid to ethical reflection, then 
he needs to qualify his proviso that imaginative situations must closely 
resemble situations that do occur. How closely must a literary situation 
represent reality in order to be relevant to moral thought? How does Hare's 
criterion apply in judging when a work of literature qualifies as a valuable 
adjunct to philosophical reflection? Hare's argument must address these 
questions, lest it restrict the range of eligible literature to those works that 
furnish what has been called a 'pure representation' of reality and, in so 
doing, virtually deny the value of creative fiction altogether. 12 
As Sleinis describes it, the pure representation theory of art holds 
that 'the function of art is to represent, copy, imitate, reveal or describe 
some segment of reality as accurately and completely as possible.' 13 He 
notes that this construal of art's function implies a 'strong criterion of 
aesthetic merit,' one that reveals a convergence between pure 
representation theory and Hare's account of the relevance and value of 
literature to moral thought: 'The more an artwork resembles the real thing - 
indeed, the more it can be mistaken for the real thing - the better it is as an 
artwork.' 14 Thus the pure representation theory of art has serious 
12 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 23ff. 
13 ibid., p. 23 
14 ibid. 
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implications for ascribing aesthetic value to works of literature, and to art 
generally. According to Sleinis, 'it implies that such uninspired things as 
wax fruit, plastic flowers, and full-scale models of battle scenes are 
aesthetically superior to paintings of fruit, flowers, or battles simply by 
being more accurate representations.' 15 On this account, paradigms of 
valuable art include things like undistorted photographs taken at exposures 
that most closely resemble ambient light, realistic sculptures, and other 
such life-like representations. Consider the implications of this criterion for 
the role and value of creative literature in ethical reflection. Is an accurate 
description of an actual situation of ethical seriousness necessarily more 
valuable than an imaginative account of a possible ethical situation, one 
which specifically highlights certain ethical concepts? If this is so, then 
Hare's argument for the relevance of imaginative literature is misplaced 
and self-defeating. He stipulates a condition for the inclusion of fiction in 
moral thought that all but excludes fiction from his account of its value. 
Two main problems render the verisimilitude criterion especially 
troublesome both for Hare's argument and for the connection between 
literature and ethical reflection, and more generally for the pure 
representation theory itself. The first derives from an inherent difficulty in 
the pure representation theory of art. The second concerns literature's 
ability to furnish new perspectives on the world. Both problems have 
serious negative implications for Hare's account of the value of literature to 
ethical reflection. 
First, Hare's position implies that, all else being equal, the closer a 
situation depicted in a work of literature resembles the real world, the more 
valuable it is to moral thought. Therefore, maximum value attaches to 
literary works that accurately represent factual situations and whose 
stories, characters and plots closely correspond to these factual situations; 
that is to say, works of extreme realism. In this respect, Hare's 
verisimilitude criterion corresponds to the criterion of aesthetic merit 
15 ibid., p. 28 
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implicit in the pure representation theory of art. On this criterion, the most 
valuable work of fiction is thus hardly fictional at all - or perhaps a 
fictionalised yet factually accurate re-construction of an actual event, with 
only the characters' names changed to protect their true identities. 
However, the authority of the verisimilitude criterion is undermined 
by a number of objections that stand against the pure representation theory 
of art. In The Principles of Art, for instance, R. G. Collingwood decisively 
rejects verisimilitude as the supreme measure of an artwork's value: 
A portrait...is a work of representation. What the patron demands 
is a good likeness; and that is what the painter aims, and 
successfully, if he is a competent painter, at producing. It is not a 
difficult thing to do; and we may reasonably assume that in 
portraits by great painters such as Raphael, Titian, Velazquez, or 
Rembrandt is has been done. But, however reasonable the 
assumption may be, it is an assumption and nothing more. The 
sitters are dead and gone, and we cannot check the likeness for 
ourselves. If, therefore, the only kind of merit a portrait could 
have were its likeness to the sitter, we could not possibly 
distinguish, except where the sitter is still alive and unchanged, 
between a good portrait and a bad.16 
Graham regards Collingwood's argument as a 'conclusive refutation of the 
idea that what is valuable in portraiture is ... its capacity for producing a 
convincing resemblance.' 17 The verisimilitude criterion is further 
undermined, and with it the pure representation theory, when we consider 
the converse of Collingwood's argument: if we cannot judge an artwork's 
value without a direct comparison with its subject, what of works produced 
by artists who themselves had no direct access to their subjects? As Sleinis 
observes, the verisimilitude criterion for the value of art is inapplicable to 
many significant artworks that are generally considered to be 
representational: 
Botticelli's The Birth of Venus, Leonardo's The Last Supper, and 
Michelangelo's The Last Judgement cannot be pure representations. 
Botticelli was not present at the birth of Venus, Leonardo was not 
present at the last supper, and Michelangelo was not present at 
the last judgement. None of these are pure representations of 
16 R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 44 
17 Graham (1997), op. cit., p. 55 
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events witnessed by the artist. Far from being pure 
representations, they are more nearly works of pure imagination. 18 
Graham maintains that aesthetic value does not turn solely on 
verisimilitude and agrees that we can discern good portraiture without 
direct access to the sitter's appearance. It follows, he says, 'that what 
matters is not faithful copying of the original.' 19 While Collingwood's 
argument specifically refers to portraiture, its implications are for art more 
generally. As Graham writes, 'we can profitably read Tolstoy's War and 
Peace without knowing whether he has accurately represented the history 
of the Napoleonic Wars, we can watch Eisenstein's Oktober without 
worrying about the actual course of the Russian Revolution.' 20 If Graham is 
right, then value attaches to art independently of verisimilitude. 
But these issues principally concern aesthetic value; how do they 
bear on Hare's account of literature's value to moral thought? The simple 
answer is that the same problems that confront the pure representation 
theory's criterion for aesthetic merit also confront any theory for the value 
of literature to moral thought that turns on the same criterion. That is, if 
Hare's argument that the more closely a literary example resembles reality 
the more relevant it is to moral thought is to apply to the role for literature 
in ethical reflection, then this criterion for relevance meets a major practical 
obstacle, the same obstacle that undermines the pure representation theory. 
Without direct access to the reality, to all the 'facts' that a literary situation 
is supposed to represent, how can the reader assess verisimilitude and 
hence, relevance? 
The common point in Sleinis', Graham's and Collingwood's 
arguments is that we cannot judge a work's aesthetic value by its historical 
accuracy, or by how closely it resembles the 'facts' that it might be said to 
represent. The same argument applies to a work's relevance to ethical 
reflection. We cart profitably reflect on the ethical significance of Conrad's 
18 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 28 
19 Graham, /oc. cit. 
20 ibid. 
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Heart of Darkness without knowing how closely his novel corresponds with 
his own experience of the Congo. In reading A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man, we gain valuable insight into the conflict between duty and 
impulse without worrying about how strictly autobiographical Joyce's 
story is. We can be moved by the fate of Achebe's refugee mother and child 
without having to believe that they are real victims of war. The point is that 
imaginative literature can explore ethical concepts with a freedom that is 
unavailable through other means. Arguments that make value depend on 
the proximity of fiction to the facts that it is intended to represent miss this 
point. As Graham writes: 'War and Peace is wrongly regarded as a record of 
the impact the Napoleonic Wars had on Russia, but not wrongly regarded 
as in part an image of the impact of war in general.' 21 This is precisely how 
value attaches to Conrad's, Achebe's and Joyce's works and not by 
fulfilling the verisimilitude criterion of pure representation. Thus it would 
be wrong to regard Heart of Darkness as a record of the specific effects of 
exploitation on the workers encountered by Marlow, but not wrong to 
regard it as an image of commercial exploitation in general. It would be 
wrong to regard Refugee Mother and Child as a record of the suffering 
inflicted on the mother and her dying son as actual persons, but not wrong 
to regard it as an image of the suffering inflicted by war in general. It 
would be wrong to regard Portrait of the Artist as a Yong Man as a record of 
an actual Dedalus' adolescent vicissitudes, but not wrong to regard it as in 
part an image of the conflicts and moral tensions of adolescence in general. 
It would be wrong to regard Ivan's challenge as closely representing the 
kind of choice we may be forced to make in real life, but not wrong to 
regard it as an example of the kind of dilemmas invoked to challenge 
someone's moral presuppositions or to test a moral theory. It would be 
wrong to regard Sophie's Choice as a record of a specific act of cruelty 
inflicted on a concrete individual, but not wrong to regard it as a vivid 
image of the cruelty often inflicted on innocent persons by Nazi officials 
during the Second World War. Graham's argument here has genuine merit: 
21 Graham, loc. cit. 
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we can employ the fictional lives of individuals in literature to examine the 
ramifications of moral concepts and their implications for ethics and ethical 
theory. 
Further, Hare's position implies that besides the content of literary 
stories, what is represented, a work's stylistic aspects, how it is represented, 
also matters. As already argued, the integrity of a work of literature 
consists in the unity of its form and content, in the melding of its story and 
its narrative devices. It is difficult to separate what is told from how it is 
told, but, insofar as it can have bearing on the meaning and ethical 
significance of a literary depiction, the 'how' matters. Yet in a pure 
representation, such devices only detract from its value to moral thought. 
Indeed, if employed beyond the mere necessity of efficient description, they 
would disqualify the work as one of pure representation. According to the 
pure representation theory, devices such as metaphor, irony, synechdote, 
hyperbole and others are mere embellishments to a work's content, a haze 
of words and images through which the reader must peer in order to gain 
clear sight of the reality represented in the work. Indeed, the better the 
representation, the more accurately it mimics reality, the more literal the 
language and the fewer the stylistic devices, and vice versa: the greater the 
stylistic devices, the more imaginative the language, the less directly a 
work mimics reality and, hence, the less relevant it is to moral thought. In 
D. H. Lawrence's The Fox, for instance, all the allusions, images, motifs, and 
metaphors are merely stylistic devices that cloud our view of the all 
important fact that young Henry Grenfell deliberately felled a tree to land 
on and kill Jill Banford as part of his plan to win Nellie March and, with 
her, control of Bailey Farm. 22 In Heart of Darkness the indigenous workers 
ought not to be 'black bones' and 'moribund shadows of disease and 
starvation,' but Congolese nationals who unwittingly signed up for hard 
labour in unexpectedly harsh conditions. However, as already argued, 
manner of presentation bears heavily on a literary representation's value, 
and on what it can reveal about the ethical situation and its implications for 
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ethical issues. If this argument is sound, then literary devices such as simile 
and metaphor play a pivotal role in literature's contribution to ethical 
reflection and ipso facto serve further to undermine the verisimilitude 
criterion. 
The second major difficulty in applying the verisimilitude criterion 
to literature's use in ethical reflection concerns the perspectives furnished 
by imaginative literature. According to the propositional account, literature 
can present to the imagination new ways of looking at ethical situations 
and, hence, illustrate, reveal, elucidate or remind us of some ethical fact or 
possibility and thereby contribute positively to moral thought, in a way not 
available through other means. It is the new perspectives offered only 
through literary art that, at least in part, render valuable the connection 
between literature and moral philosophy. But, for reasons shown above, 
the verisimilitude criterion entailed in the pure representation theory of art 
is inapplicable to a range of ethically valuable literature and, as such, 
excludes valuable perspectives from which to reflect on ethical significance. 
As Sleinis argues, 'the theory fails to accommodate the pretheoretically 
inchoate sense that art furnishes what we cannot obtain elsewhere and thus 
threatens to trivialize art.' 23 Hare's argument seems to embody the pure 
representation theory, but when applied to literature's relevance to moral 
thought, it severely limits new perspectives that could be furnished by less 
directly representational literature. According to Sleinis: 
Even when original sources of rewarding experiences are absent, 
those rewarding experiences remain available through 
representation of their sources. So even in the pure representation 
theory, art has a significant capacity to increase value, but notably 
it fails to deliver any essentially new experiences or new values. 24 
If, as Hare enjoins, we need to gauge a work's value on how closely it 
resembles reality, and if our conception of reality is best formed by our 
direct experience of it, then valuable literature can only be literature that 
22 D. H. Lawrence, The Fox, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994) 
23 Sleinis, op. cit., pp. 28-30 
24 ibid. 
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represents or confirms or fits our prior perspectives on the world. 
However, if the point of incorporating literature into ethical reflection is 
that it delivers new ethical experiences, values and viewpoints, then Hare's 
stipulation is counterproductive and undermines literature's ability to 
make this contribution, limiting its role to providing close representations 
of reality that only embody narrow empirically grounded perspectives. 
Sleinis questions the qualitative value of this contribution: 
Apart from representations freeing us from practical action in 
relation to objects of awareness, representations multiply old 
values rather than creating new ones. Here the increase in value 
furnished by art is quantitative rather than qualitative. 25 
Kearney cites Aristotle's Poetics in his argument supporting the ethical 
value of less 'pure' literary representation: 'Mimesis is not about idealist 
escapism or servile realism. It is a pathway to the disclosure of the inherent 
"universals" of existence that make up human truth.' 26 The argument here 
is that access to certain ethical truths is unavailable through conventional 
perspectives, the implicit argument is that the quantitative contribution of 
pure representation, while valuable in some respects, falls short of the 
qualitative contribution furnished by the freer representations of reality 
that Hare seems to reject: 'Far from being a passive copy of reality, mimesis 
re-enacts the real world of action by magnifying its essential traits. It 
remakes the world, so to speak, in light of its potential truths.' 27 Sleinis 
agrees, and observes that, at least for literary works considered in relation 
to representation theory, '... the essential aim is in some sense to tell the 
truth about the world or some aspect of it.' 28 As argued earlier, truths 
about some aspects of the world may not be accessible through 
conventional perspectives or by direct access to the facts of a situation; 
some may only be apprehended via the faculty of imagination. 
Comprehension and, hence, ethical understanding, of Henry Grenfell's 
motives for killing Banford in Lawrence's The Fox is not mediated by a pure 
25 ibid. 
26 Kearney, op. cit., p. 131 
27 ibid. 
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representation of the possible facts of the situation, but through entering 
the minds of the characters and apprehending their reasons for action. Here 
plausibility is not entirely dependent on realism, as Hare's position implies, 
but depends on imaginative engagement with the story. The story is 
fictional, a product of the writer's imagination, and, insofar as it tends 
towards its own elucidation, there are no corresponding 'facts' against 
which to check its verisimilitude. The reader cannot interview the 'real' 
Henry Grenfell to discuss his true motives for killing Banford. That envy 
and lust number among the 'universals' of human existence and lead to 
unethical acts is a given, but in the absence of direct access to these 
emotions and their effects, arguably the closest one comes to apprehending 
their impact is via the imaginative faculty. 
Hare's limitation on the range of ethically valuable literature 
excludes from serious consideration less directly representational material, 
reflection on which could fruitfully yield valuable moral insights. What of 
less plausible depictions in which fancy, rather than fact, plays an especially 
important role, and in which certain less straightforward demands are 
placed on the reader's imaginative faculty? For example, I am confident 
that I shall never wake up and find myself in the body of a cockroach, with 
a cockroach's-eye view of the world; but with only slight effort of 
imagination I can envisage reality as seen through the eyes of such a 
creature and apprehend its moral possibilities from that new perspective by 
reflecting on Franz Kafka's The Metamorphosis. While J. L. Austin was lost 
for words to describe the predicament imagined in Kafka's novel - 
'transmogrification' is perhaps the most apt - he had, and the intelligent 
reader shares this ability, little trouble grasping the scenario it entails and 
envisioning its moral significance. 29 Nor can I actually enter the mind and 
body of a wild wolf; but reflecting on Jack London's White Fang furnishes a 
new and wholly plausible perspective on the moral relationship between 
28 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 49 
29 Isaiah Berlin, "Oxford and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy" in Essays on J. L. 
Austin, cited in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 6th Edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
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humankind and the other sentient creatures with which we share a 
common environment. Such perspectives clearly are unavailable in reality, 
but the fact that a reader can make imaginative sense of the moral 
possibilities they entail, and may develop ethical insights thereby, qualifies 
them as relevant and valuable adjuncts to moral thought. 
Charges of implausibility are not limited to the seemingly more 
outlandish scenarios presented in creative literature. For example, not only 
have Hardy's narratives been accused of possessing unnecessarily 
complicated plots, the plots themselves are often considered implausible in 
the degree of chance and coincidence that dictates relations between 
characters and events. As Tanner observes in his discussion of Tess of the 
D'Urbervilles: 
In the vast empty landscapes of Hardy's world, people's paths 
cross according to some mysterious logic - that same 
imponderable structuring of things in time which brought the 
Titanic and the iceberg together at one point in the trackless night 
sea.30 
He argues, 'on the level of everyday plausibility and probability' many of 
the causally significant events described in the novel are the products of 
'too freakish a chance.' 31 Were it not so tragic, the chain of events that 
included Tess' seduction and rape, the birth and death of her child, her 
meeting and falling in love with Clare, her failed attempts at informing him 
of her past, the circumstances of her ultimate revelation and his response, 
the missed communiqués and misunderstandings that led her back to Alec, 
her murdering him on Clare's return and forgiveness, and her subsequent 
capture and execution would constitute an improbable comedy of errors 
the mysterious logic of which only Hardy, as its progenitor, would be able 
to divine. But mere improbability does not necessarily render the causal 
relations between events in Tess' story implausible or nonsensical. The 
Titanic did, after all, meet the iceberg at that point in the vast and trackless 
30 Tony Tanner, 'Colour and Movement in Hardy's Tess of the D'Urbervilles,' in I. Watt, ed., 
The Victorian Novel: Modern Essays in Criticism, (London: OUP, 1971), p. 407 
31 ibid. 
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Atlantic. And Hardy does furnish sufficient data for the reader to discern 
the moral significance of the chain of events that led to Tess' fall and 
ultimate demise. He even nominates the phases of the story and, in so 
doing, illuminates their Causal relations. As Tanner notes of the plot 
sequence: 
we see at once that the overall architecture of the novel is blocked 
out with massive simplicity in a series of balancing phases - The 
Maiden, Maiden No More; The Rally, The Consequence; and so 
on.32 
While this leads Tanner to concede that Hardy's art is 'not subtle in the way 
that James and many subsequent writers are subtle,' 33 there is nevertheless 
value in the bold structure and complexity of Hardy's plot. 'I think it is 
clear,' he writes, 'that Hardy derives his great power from that very 
"crudity" which, in its impersonal indifference to plausibility and rational 
cause and effect, enhances the visibility of the most basic lineaments of the 
tale.'34 And it is this vivification of its distinctive features that allows the 
reader to discern as an object for ethical reflection the novel's central theme, 
what Dorothy van Ghent terms 'the precariousness of moral consciousness 
in its brute instinctual and physical circumstances.' 35 
Reality and the Free Scope of Fiction 
While the perspectives furnished by The Metamorphosis and White Fang are 
clearly unavailable via pure representations of reality, and the chain of 
events that precipitates Tess' fall may strike one as inherently improbable, 
they nonetheless appear as representations of possible states of affairs to 
which ethical significance attaches and may thus offer access to ethical 
insights that are unavailable via other means. It is the possibilities they 
furnish for mimetic hypothesis that makes them valuable in this regard. 
Consider some questions that may be addressed to Tess of the D'Urbervilles. 
32 ibid., p. 409 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 Dorothy van Ghent, On Tess of the D'Urbervilles, in M. Schroder, ed., Modern British 
Fiction, (Oxford: OUP, 1961), P.  30 
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It is unlikely that I will be beset by the events that trouble Tess, but if I were, 
how would I act? What would Kantian ethics require me to do here? Is the 
imbalance between will, action and consequence really as severe as it is 
portrayed in the novel? How would utilitarianism evaluate Tess' situation? 
Whose happiness is or will be affected by her choices? Does either theory 
offer an adequate perspective from which to appraise Tess' actions and 
character? If not, what features of her situation are not accommodated? 
What if I were in Angel Clare's shoes? How would I react at the news of my 
betrothed's past? Given the convolution of causal factors presented, 
however improbable, and given her ultimate detachment from reality 
which led her to kill Alec, is Tess nonetheless a virtuous person? Is Angel 
Clare? Is Alec D'Urberville truly the vicious character he seems? While one 
may doubt the everyday plausibility and probability of the situation in Tess 
of the D'Urberoilles, one can make imaginative sense of it. Moreover, unlike 
many schematised hypothetical examples (as discussed later in this 
chapter), the novel contains sufficient data to formulate meaningful 
responses to these questions. But arguing that the verisimilitude criterion is 
misguided, and, hence, that Hare's account of literature's contribution to 
ethical reflection is wrong, merely addresses one kind of objection to the 
positive relation between ethics and literature. It does not deal with the 
issues raised earlier about the value of direct experience entailed in the 
questions: 'Why consult literature? Why not consult the world directly for 
the truths we seek?'36 
In addressing these questions, Hare's position seems more 
compelling. Indeed, he places special emphasis on the role for direct 
experience in moral thought: 
A few months spent as a coolie building the Burma railway is 
worth more to one's moral thinking than the reading of a great 
many novels or even factual reports about underdeveloped 
countries.37 
36 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 49 
37 Hare, /oc. cit. 
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To a certain extent, Hare has a point. It is unlikely that any fictional account 
of a situation of moral seriousness can furnish an understanding or 
appreciation of its moral significance in quite the same way as can a real-
life situation in which one is immersed or with which one has had direct 
experience. But does direct experience always lead to more valuable moral 
thinking? A practical barrier exists to moral thought informed by direct 
experience. Without diminishing the value of the experiences of those who 
are actually immersed in situations of moral seriousness, it is highly 
unlikely that many persons engaged in ethical reflection can choose to 
serve time as a coolie on some contemporary equivalent to the Burma 
railway. While Hare's point that 'some experience of actual moral 
perplexities, and of the actual consequences of certain moral choices/ 38 is 
necessary to the formation of sound, mature moral judgements has merit, 
most people simply lack the opportunity to directly experience a 
sufficiently wide range of ethical situations to make informed judgements 
concerning the applications and implications of a moral theory. Thus, as 
argued earlier, in the absence of direct experience from which to evaluate 
our own subjective response to moral situations and hence contribute to 
our self-understanding, literature can provide vicarious experiential 
possibilities that are not available through abstract reasoning. For 
inferences concerning the truth or plausibility of ethical propositions to be 
persuasive, inductive conclusions need to be drawn from as many instances 
of ethical behaviour as possible. To be sure, I can garner some from direct 
experience, more still from the accounts of others' experiences, but there are 
severe practical limitations on my ability to access ethical data by these 
means. On the other hand, there are countless fictional instantiations of 
possibilities of ethical seriousness, any number of which I can access 
without practical barrier. 
Moreover, it is not always true that direct experience can furnish 
more valuable possibilities for moral reflection than can be derived from 
other means. While it is true that my experience of the heat, dust, pain and 
38 ibid. 
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degradation of forced labour will endow me with art incomparably clear 
impression of the heat, dust, pain and degradation of forced labour, it does 
not follow that I will derive an incomparably clear view of the ethical 
significance and implications of my situation, especially not while I am 
trying to cope with the heat, dust, pain and degradation of forced labour. In 
Art and Freedom, Sleinis proposes that not only are contemplators of 
literature freed from the physical constraints of reality that limit the agent's 
capacity to experience and reflect on ethical considerations, but that they 
are also liberated from the need to act on emotional responses to literary 
situations as they would when confronted by such situations in reality. As 
he writes: 
The fear generated by an approaching wild tiger is unsuitable for 
exclusive introspection; the circumstances demand attention to 
urgent tasks such as accurate assessment of danger and execution 
of appropriate courses of action.39 
J. R. R. Tolkien endorses the point in his description of his own childhood 
passion for fiction: 
Fantasy, the making or glimpsing of Other-worlds, was the heart 
of the desire of Faerie. I desired dragons with a profound desire. 
Of course, I in my timid body did not wish to have them in the 
neighbourhood, intruding into my relatively safe world, in which 
it was, for instance, possible to read stories in peace of mind, free 
from fear. 40 
This severance between real-life and literary presentations of life-like 
situations furnishes the reader with opportunities for making reflective 
judgements about a situation that are simply not available in an agent's 
real-life deliberative field. Take Heart of Darkness. Confronted by a scene of 
utter degradation, Marlow is immersed in a situation in- which noise, dust, 
heat, and the disorientation experienced in a new environment prevents 
him from focussing exclusively on the ethical dimension of the situation. 
This leads him to respond intuitively rather than to reflect on the moral 
39 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 9 
Tolkien, 'On Fairy Stories' in The Tolkien Reader, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), p. 65. 
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seriousness of the scene and contemplate his duty concerning interaction 
with the indigenous workers and their employer. In 'real time' his exposure 
to the workers' suffering would endure at the longest a few moments, 
during which he must also attend to the pressing tasks of gaining his 
bearings and ensuring his continuing safety in what must be rather hostile 
circumstances for a person just arrived from a less challenging European 
environment. However, readers are not under the same environmental 
pressures to act as Marlow is, and, as such, are free to contemplate the 
scene and reflect with equanimity on its moral significance. As Sleinis 
maintains: 
Literary presentations typically generate lifelike situations to 
which the behaviour appropriate and possible when generated by 
the actual life situations is either impossible or inappropriate. 41 
In real life, when immersed in such a situation as Marlow's, it would be 
inappropriate and virtually impossible to engage in the kind of sustained 
contemplation of the implications of following through a particular ethical 
theory that characterises the preceding discussion. 
Further, in real life there is a strong connection between thinking 
and acting. In many real situations, the agent cannot afford the luxury of 
hesitation. Consider the cases of the inquiring murderer or another life-
threatening situation, or that of a drowning child in which a potential 
rescuer's only means of saving the child's life is an almost instantaneous 
response. In contemplating a literary scene, on the other hand, Sleinis 
writes, 'actions and responses have nowhere to go' and that, because of 
this, 'internal states attain an intensity that they lack where the aroused 
states discharge themselves in direct action and response.' 42 Where Marlow 
discharges his aroused pity by direct action (his gesture with the biscuit), 
the reader's emotional response to the scene has no such outlet and, thus, 
intensifies. The argument here is that the reader's enhanced apprehension 
of the worker's plight accentuates his or her take on the ethical seriousness 
41 Sleinis, /oc. cit. 
42 ibid . 
159 
of their situation, one that is not available from a mere rational estimation 
of duty or clinical calculation of overall utility. The same applies to the 
reader's apprehension of the refugee mother and her child in Achebe's 
poem: the scene's pathos generates a sense of pity that is at odds with the 
just-war arguments used to justify their situation, and the intensity of the 
response results in an enhanced apprehension of the ethical significance of 
their predicament. Sleinis accepts that this conflicts with Aristotle's notion 
of catharsis, in which a spectator's fear and pity are discharged by exposure 
to dramatic presentations that arouse these feelings; however, he suggests 
that Nietzsche's claim that the contemplation of these situations 'is more 
likely to make spectators more fearful and pitying' is more probably 
correct.43 As Kearney argues, 'The narrated action of a drama ...solicits a 
mode of sympathy more extensive and resonant than that experienced in 
everyday life.' 44 In a claim that closely corresponds to the attitudinal 
account, he writes that in extending our moral experience, albeit vicarious, 
literature provides opportunities for the development of ethical sensitivity 
that are wider than those available via direct experience: 
And it does so not simply because it enjoys the poetic licence to 
suspend our normal protective reflexes (which guard us from 
pain) but because it amplifies the range of those we might 
empathise with - reaching beyond family, friends and familiars to 
all kinds of foreigners. If we read Oedipus Rex, we experience what 
it is like to be a Greek who murders his father and marries his 
mother. If we read Anna Karenina, we experience the tragic fate of 
a passionate woman in nineteenth-century Russia. If we read 
Scarlet and Black, we relive the life of an erratic, wilful youth in 
Napoleonic France.45 
To be sure, these narratives only show us what it might be like to experience 
the world from the perspectives furnished, but genuinely and 
imaginatively engaging with the texts can nevertheless arouse feelings that 
are unavailable via abstract discourse. If this is so, then the arousal of 
43 Sleinis, op. cit., p. 10 (Nietzsche The Will to Power, §851) 
44 Kearney, op. cit., p. 138 
45 ibid., pp. 138-139 
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intense feelings presents clear opportunities for moral agents to assess their 
own emotional responses to a theory's implications. 
Moreover, if one is under no obligation to act, then the response is 
purer. That is, it is free of the burden of having to act and, as such, gives a 
clearer idea of the implications of making and acting on moral judgements. 
In reflecting on their enhanced responses to situations of moral seriousness, 
readers of literature can glean important data about their own moral 
understanding that is unavailable either in real-life, or from a mere rational 
engagement with the traditional discourse of moral philosophy. 
Cunningham argues that literature can function both as a 'kind of ethical 
filter' and a 'powerful diagnostic tool.'46 He writes: 
Literature can filter moral experience by heightening our attention 
to what should be morally salient and by directing us away from 
less crucial elements that can distract us from more important 
things. And literature can help us to diagnose by taking us places 
that are difficult and even impossible for us to visit, much less 
understand, in actual experience.47 
He proceeds, 'Literature's picture of human character can often be clearer 
than we can reasonably expect from lived experience, and in some cases the 
vicarious experience may be the only kind available to us.' 48 His argument 
here clearly fits with Sleinis' position and also supports Ducasse's claim 
that the ethical value of 'literary' experience is grounded in the reader's 
ability to enter imaginatively into situations for which opportunities for 
engagement or performance do not occur in real life. 49 
The psychological complexity relevant to ethical judgements can be 
revealed by employing literature as a tool for imaginative engagement and 
diagnosis, and further reflection can reveal how such complexities can be 
accommodated in an ethical theory, or else how moral prescriptions can be 
acted on in light of this complexity. For instance, could the reader of 
Sophie's Choice, if placed in Sophie's position, reconcile his or her natural 
46 Cunningham, op. cit., p.84 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid . 
49 Ducasse, /oc. cit. 
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and powerful emotional response to the dilemma with Mill's impartiality 
requirement? As Cunningham argues, 'knowing how to live and what sort 
of person to be is integrally connected with feeling.' 5° He believes that 
'Good character involves seeing the world in particular ways; 51 and that 
fine literary depictions 'can help us see by helping us to feel the right things 
at the right times, to the right degree, toward the right objects.' 52 By thus 
sharpening the agent's ability to perceive the nuances and subtleties of 
ethical judgements, examining these feelings helps to develop the kind of 
moral capacities deemed necessary by Nussbaum for making reality out of 
worthwhile ethical prescriptions. 
The claims above conflict with what Peter Winch considers is a 'fairly well-
established ... tradition in recent Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy;' namely, 
the use of simplified examples to illustrate and test moral perspectives. 53 
According to Phillips, 'the rationale of this view is that such examples do 
not generate the emotion which is liable to surround more serious cases 
and thus enable us to look more coolly at the logical issues involved.' 54 But 
moral philosophy is about more than the examination of moral concepts 
and their logical relations and, as has been argued, an adequate account of 
ethics must accommodate the emotional dimension of human life. As 
Phillips sees it, this simplification of the ethical can impose boundaries that 
are too narrow to accommodate the complexity of moral judgements. The 
simple examples employed to illustrate or challenge a moral perspective 
omit too much crucial information to be effective, and can all too easily 
collapse into mere caricature. 
5° ibid., p.5 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 Peter Winch, "The Universalisability of Moral Judgements," in Ethics and Action, p. 154 
54 Phillips, op. cit., p. 9 
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Historical Facts and the Freedom of Fiction 
McGirm argues that fiction is of particular diagnostic value when testing a 
moral theory and its implications: 
The strength of an ethical idea lies in its applications, in how it 
plays out. In fiction, we can put an ethical idea through its paces, 
testing its ability to command our assent. We can also explore its 
alignments, limitations, repercussions. We can face moral reality 
in all its complexity and drama. 55 
He argues that in reading fiction we are not subject to the opacity that 
affects us when engaging with people in real life, and that we are 
unencumbered by 'the problem of what really happened, of what 
somebody's motivation really was.' 56 He observes that the creative writer 
simply tells the reader what is true of the characters and the situations in 
which they are immersed, and that this furnishes the reader with all the 
information needed to ground a moral assessment of the situation 
presented in the work. Graham suggests that the distinction between fact 
and fiction highlights the advantage of using fiction in ethical reflection 
rather than the accounts of actual events and situations recorded in 
historical narratives. While the historian and his or her readers are 
burdened by the problem of what really happened, the creative writer is 
encumbered by no such obligation. He argues that the significance of 
fiction can be revealed by a comparison between the hindsight of the 
historian and the denouement of the writer of imaginative literature: 
While the historian, with the benefit of hindsight discovers events 
to be significantly related and assembles evidence to persuade us 
of his conclusion, the novelist with imagination makes the events 
relevant, and uses denouement to direct the mind of the reader 
into seeing a special relation between them. 57 
Graham argues, 'an author can construct a story that obliges us to attribute 
certain significance to the events related.' 58 As has been shown, the 
structuring of a story in terms of the relations between events is a function 
55 McGinn, op. cit., p. 176 
56 ibid. p.177 
57 Graham (1997), p.124 
58 ibid. 
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of its plot, and it is this very feature that makes certain extended narratives 
valuable to ethical reflection. 
Nussbaum draws on Aristotle's account of art in the Poetics to 
describe an additional advantage of imaginative literature over historical 
narrative. She argues that, in showing us things that might happen in a 
human life, rather than simply furnishing a record of occurrences, 
imaginative literature can represent general possibilities for human lives: 
'Literature focuses on the possible, inviting its readers to wonder about 
themselves.' 59 Her position tallies with Ducasse's inasmuch as she 
emphasises the value of vicarious experiences garnered through reading. 
She makes the point that, unlike most histories, 'literary works typically 
invite their readers to put themselves in the place of people of many 
different kinds and to take on their experiences: 60 For Nussbaum, the way 
a literary work addresses its audience conveys a sense 'that there are links 
of possibility, at least on a very general level, between the characters and 
the reader.' 61 This possible connection, she says, arouses the reader's 
imagination and results in a heightening of emotions concerning the moral 
aspects of the story. She suggests that good literature 'is disturbing in a 
way that history and social science writing frequently are not,' 62 and that 
this furnishes opportunities for imaginative engagement with ethical issues 
that are unavailable except by reflection on our emotional responses. She 
further argues, 'Because it summons powerful emotions, it disconcerts and 
puzzles.' 63 However, the intensity of this disconcertion and puzzlement can 
be harnessed to help fulfil the dual function of the connection between 
literature and philosophical ethics envisaged in this thesis. 
For instance, while the brutality and pure horror of the Holocaust is 
almost incomprehensible, the genocide it describes is itself a concept of 
scale. It is almost too large and, in its largeness, almost too horrific to 






imagine. The idea of six million deaths, deliberately caused, and for no 
reason other than to satisfy a small number of people's desire for 
groundless ethnic supremacy, is beyond the capacity of most people to 
visualise. The number is too big, the systematic destruction of human life 
too comprehensive and too vast. Moreover, the historical record of six 
million deaths between nineteen thirty six and nineteen forty five seems 
unable adequately to accommodate the sheer paradigm-shifting moral 
significance of the bewildering reality of genocide. Dates and numbers, no 
matter how big, fail to convey the real cost to humanity and, as such, fail to 
do justice to individuals as unique perspectives on the world. As Judith 
Miller writes, 'We must remind ourselves that the Holocaust was not six 
million, it was one plus one plus one plus one.' 64 By furnishing a view of 
history via the individual victim's perspective, however, narrative can 
make the incomprehensible intelligible, and give ethical meaning to the 
historical statistics of genocide. Kearney argues that, in this context, 'Stories 
bring the horror home to us. They singularise suffering against the 
anonymity of evil.'65 But whereas the historical record fails to do justice to 
the horror of a situation, actual accounts from individuals may be too 
horrific to recount, and too horrific for the reader to contemplate: the 
testimony is too immediate, we are blinded by the experience.' 66 Kearney 
suggests, 'sometimes an ethics of memory is obliged to resort to an 
aesthetics of storytelling.' 67 He cites Ricoeur's notion that 'fiction gives eyes 
to the horrified narrator ... eyes to see and to weep .... One counts the 
cadavers or one tells the story of the victims: 65 Kearney claims that a key 
function of narrative is to elicit empathy, and that the development of what 
he terms 'narrative sympathy' allows the reader to see the world though he 
eyes of the character and, to a certain valuable degree, to feel what they 
must feel. He writes: 
64 Judith Miller, One, By One, by One: facing the Holocaust, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1990), p. 287 
65 Kearney, op. cit., p. 62 
66 ibid. p. 60 
67 ibid., p. 62 
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It is, as Kant noted in his account of 'representative thinking' in 
the Third Critique, a way of identifying with as many fellow 
humans as possible - actors and sufferers alike - in order to 
participate in a common moral sense (sesus communis). 69 
This is brought out powerfully by the example of Sophie's Choice. Like 
Bennett, we may comprehend Himmler's anguish over fulfilling his 
perceived duty to order the deaths of millions of innocent people. And 
when we count the cadavers he accumulated, we are appalled at the 
number. But, Kearney argues, readers need more than to become 
intellectually aware of history's horrors, 'they also need to experience the 
horror of that suffering as if they were actually there.' 70 Thus, in light of 
Himmler's admission, we may identify with him as an actor and grasp his 
moral turmoil and remorse; but when we consider his actions in terms of 
the death, pain and utter degradation experienced by individual persons at 
the hands of his subordinates, such as is depicted in the crushing dilemma 
in Sophie's Choice, we can never sympathise with him. And we can never 
applaud his adherence to the ethical principles he chose to embrace at the 
cost of his humanity. Moreover, 'seeing' the Holocaust through the eyes of 
one of its minute particulars allows the reader not only to reflect on the 
powerful and often puzzling emotions generated by this experience, it also 
reveals the individual nature of horror. Experiencing Sophie's turmoil as if 
one were there, indeed, as if one were Sophie, generates a perspective from 
which one could never condone the doctor's sadism, and never accept the 
legitimacy of the regime, and the moral system it embraced. But we are not 
blinded by the experience. Knowing that Sophie's situation is fictional, no 
matter how representational it is of the kind of horror inflicted by the Nazi 
regime, affords us a degree of critical distance, but not disinterest, from 
which to appraise the situation and evaluate our responses to it. 71 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid., p. 63 
78 ibid. 
71- To a degree, this kind of distance corresponds with the first kind identified by Oswald 
Hanfling, distance from the 'practical side of things,' in his article 'Five Kinds of Distance,' 
in The British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 40, no. 1 (January 2000). For the arguments to which 
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If Nussbaum's, Sleinis' and Kearney's accounts of the value of 
emotional responses to literary situations are correct, and if these empathic 
responses are typically not aroused by reading conventional histories and 
biographies, then the advantage of imaginative literature over these forms 
of narrative becomes evident. These arguments reveal that such 
engagement significantly enhances the benefits to ethical reflection of 
imaginative literature not only to illuminate and test an ethical theory's 
specific implications, but also to reveal and clarify our emotional responses 
and, thus, uncover the extent to which that theory conflicts with the deeper 
values that underlie our own moral convictions. Moreover, if empathy is 
held to be a valuable capacity that assists us to evaluate our ethical 
principles, then literature's ability to elicit narrative sympathy must surely 
afford it a high place as a supplement to ethical reflection. 
There is a further advantage to fictional narratives over factual accounts of 
actual events and situations. Moral judgements made in respect of fictional 
situations free the reader from a number of implications that would follow 
if such judgements were made in real life. McGinn argues that using 
literature to examine an ethical perspective has the additional advantage 
'that no real person's fate turns upon what you judge, so you feel freer to 
explore and condemn what is presented.' 72 He argues: 
The fictional world is really the ideal world in which to go on 
ethical expeditions: it is safe, convenient, inconsequential, and 
expressly designed for our exploration and delight. 73 
As a thought experiment, reflecting on Ivan's challenge is as safe, 
convenient and inconsequential as McGinn suggests. In exploring the 
ethical implications of acting in one way or the other, no actual 'little child 
that beats its breast with its little fists' will suffer torture unto death, and no 
'edifice of human fortune' will be founded 'on its unavenged tears.' Nor 
Oswald's paper is in part a response, see Edward Bullough, '"Psychical Distance" as a 
Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle,' British Journal of Psychology, vol. V (1912). 
72 McGinn, op. Cit. 
73 ibid. 
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does the happiness and contentment of humanity turn on whether she is 
tortured to death or spared. Moreover, in what constitutes a form of meta-
narrative, in the novel itself, Alyosha is free to deliberate on his reply to 
Ivan, and the novel's reader can explore with equanimity both the scenario, 
which yields valuable data with which to consider an ethical perspective, as 
well as Alyosha's response to it, which provides insight into his character 
and raw material for concrete, particular deliberation. 
However, even if these thought experiments are useful in drawing 
out the implications of an ethical perspective, and however valuable the 
fictional accounts of Marlow's encounter with the indigenous workers, 
Dedalus' moral anguish, the plight of the Biafran mother and child, and the 
dilemma presented by Ivan's challenge may be, and whatever the 
advantages are of fictional accounts over other forms of narrative, it 
remains to ask: why do we need imaginative literature of the forms 
discussed here when, with imagination and creative thought, we can 
construct realistic and thought-provoking scenarios that can arguably 
equally well illuminate aspects of the ethical theories that we are 
examining? To obtain a reasonable idea of what it means to be confronted 
by a moral dilemma or of how the application of a theory's prescriptions 
can help us to make an ethical choice, why not just refer to a creative 
scenario or hypothetical example? I will argue that the complexity of ethical 
judgements generally precludes being adequately dealt with by the kind of 
simplified thought experiments that have traditionally been employed to 
supplement philosophical inquiry. I will further argue that if value attaches 
to literary supplements that do accommodate complexity, then the novel 
emerges as the ascendant narrative form. 
The Role of Schematic Thought Experiments 
In investigating a moral theory, philosophers often construct hypothetical 
examples or thought experiments to amplify their arguments. We have 
already encountered Kant's Inquiring Murderer and his hypothetical 
prosperous but miserly individual who withholds his charity and, thus, 
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acts as though he wills that the principle of miserliness become a universal 
law. However, while to a degree illuminating, these 'hypotheticals' provide 
only simplified situations of moral seriousness. They are often created 
within the same narrow boundaries as the theory itself and, as a result, 
remain in the same abstract realm as the principle they are intended to 
illustrate, test, or instantiate. While simple hypothetical situations may 
effectively illustrate a philosopher's argument, they do not significantly 
contribute to our subjective understanding of the human issues that lie at 
the foundation of morality, nor do they adequately accommodate the 
psychological complexities that inhere in unique moral situations. Other 
issues arise directly from the examples themselves. What of the scenarios 
presented in these hypotheticals, are they realistic enough to provoke a 
meaningful response? What of the issues or solutions they are said to 
illustrate - are they plausible? Realistic? Are they consistent with a wider 
context? What practical wisdom can be gleaned from such examples? 
Moreover, just how important are these issues? While Williams himself 
employs a number of these thought experiments in his critique of 
utilitarianism, he acknowledges the shortcomings of such schematised 
examples. He argues: 
There are two ways in particular in which examples in moral 
philosophy tend to beg important questions. One is that, as 
presented, they arbitrarily cut off and restrict the range of 
alternative courses of action [.. 1. The second is that they 
inevitably present one with the situation as a going concern, and 
cut off questions about how the agent got into it, and 
correspondingly about moral considerations which might flow 
from that.74 
To examine Williams' concern, consider the following thought experiment, 
well known to moral philosophers, and given, in its present form, by Kai 
Nielsen as an 'exemplary tale' of moral seriousness. Nielsen invokes this 
story to illustrate his argument against the moral conservatism that informs 
'our normal, immediate and rather absolutistic moral reactions'm to 
74 Williams (1973), op. cit., pp. 96-97 
75 Kai Nielsen, "Against Moral Conservatism," in Pojman, op. cit., p. 194 
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situations such as the one presented, and to question the principle that 'the 
direct intention of the death of an innocent person is never justifiable.' 76 As 
Nielsen calls it, The Case of the Innocent Fat Man, which concerns a fat man 
stuck in the mouth of a cave on the coast, proceeds thus: 
He was leading a group of people out of the cave when he got 
stuck in the mouth of the cave and in a very 'short time high tide 
will be upon them, and unless he is promptly unstuck, they all 
will be drowned except the fat man, whose head is out of the cave. 
But, fortunately, or unfortunately, someone has a stick of 
dynamite. The short of the matter is, either they use the dynamite 
and blast the poor innocent fat man out of the mouth of the cave 
or everyone else drowns. Either one life or many7' 
Does this scenario beg important questions in the ways identified by 
Williams? In one sense, it is true that Nielsen's case restricts the range of 
alternative actions. As presented, it seems that there are only two actions 
available to the moral agent. However, if it is intended to exemplify a moral 
dilemma, and thus entails a difficult choice between two ethically 
repugnant acts, then, arguably, Nielsen's example is of no less illustrative 
value than Ivan's challenge. If restricting the range of alternative courses of 
action is a failing, then Ivan's challenge too must be considered inadequate 
to the task it is intended to fulfil. However, as argued previously, if we use 
a scenario as a heuristic device to reveal and clarify the implications of a 
moral theory, then we must respect its content, no matter how apparently 
restricted the range of options it accommodates. It could further be argued 
against Williams that, while these examples restrict the range of alternative 
actions, the very idea of an ethical dilemma entails confrontation with 
difficult ethical choices between conflicting obligations. To argue that a 
hypothetical dilemma begs certain questions concerning the nature of 
dilemma because it restricts the range of alternative actions is, without 
warrant, to empty the very concept 'dilemma' of substantive content. 
A further issue concerns the scenario's plausibility. While the 




ability to make imaginative sense of what we are told about the fat man's 
predicament, it falls short of being plausible - not implausible because it 
fails to fulfil Hare's verisimilitude criterion, but because it furnishes too 
sparse a schema on which to base an informed practical decision. Plausible 
though the actual entrapment may be, can one really take seriously a 
hypothetical situation in which one just happens to have a stick of 
dynamite tucked into one's swimming costume? How is the dynamite to be 
detonated? Is there a fuse? Is the fuse dry? Are there matches? Are they 
dry? Is there sufficient explosives expertise to ensure that the passage will 
be clear after the explosion? Can such an assessment be made even by an 
expert in the time available? However, if plausibility were a genuine 
concern here, then Ivan's challenge, with its monstrous and barely 
imaginable extremes, and almost barren sparseness, is open to the same 
criticism. Moreover, as argued in the previous chapter, if one has no trouble 
imagining the world through the eyes of a cockroach or wild wolf, then 
surely it requires no great leap to imagine oneself trapped in a cave with a 
fat man blocking the entrance and a stick of dynamite in one's hand. 
Therefore, provided that we can make imaginative sense of what we are 
told, and that the issue under investigation is at least basically intelligible in 
the scenario, then it could be argued that the plausibility of an example's 
particulars is not so important. By setting aside concern with rigid 
verisimilitude, we have seen how valuable examining the dilemma 
exemplified in Ivan's challenge can be in eliciting and testing the 
implications of certain moral perspectives. Why should Nielsen's case of 
the innocent fat man be excluded from reflection on this basis? 
However, the most pressing concern over the value of schematised 
examples relates to the second way in which Williams argues that they beg 
important questions. The argument is that hypothetical examples such as 
Nielsen's fail to account for too many pertinent aspects of a genuine 
situation of moral seriousness. Williams wants to ask 'questions about how 
the agent got into it, and correspondingly about moral considerations 
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which might flow from that.' 78 A cogent and humane response to the 
questions raised by this example would require a great deal more 
information than is presented. It may be that the information that we lack 
in order to pose Williams' questions may not be vital to the point that 
Nielsen wants to make about moral conservatism. However, insofar as his 
intention is to engage his audience's imagination and induce genuine 
reflection on his argument, the case of the innocent fat man lacks sufficient 
data to make an informed ethical decision. While, as Harrison argues, 'the 
sparseness [of such thought experiments] frames, narrows, focuses how we 
may in various ways attend to the world we have or think we have,' 79 the 
very sparseness that endows them with value may also lead to the danger 
that many schematised examples fail to effectively represent possible 
aspects of lived experience and collapse into caricature. As a hypothetical 
case presented to provoke a considered response, Nielsen's tale omits too 
much information. When placed in the kind of hypothetical predicament 
described in Nielsen's example and then asked: 'What would you do in 
such a situation?' it is perfectly intelligible to reply with: 'Well, that 
depends on...' This reply is intelligible simply because it reflects and is 
consistent with lived experience. Our responses to being faced with moral 
situations depend on a complex ensemble of factors that precludes a simple 
choice between two alternatives. A simple thought experiment such as 
Nielsen's implies a form of disembodied rationality, one which offers a 
simple response but ignores the nuanced complexity that characterises real-
life ethical judgements. We would need to know who the fat man is, and 
how he is related to us. It is not implausible that we should know these 
details were we members of the party trapped in the cave. What can such a 
brief example reveal about the consideration of intimate attachments which 
are often overlooked or poorly treated in theoretical ethics? It would surely 
be a far more difficult decision to blow him up if he were our father, for 
instance, or a spouse, brother, or much loved uncle, rather than a perfect 
78 Williams, op. cit., p. 97t. 
79 Harrison, op. cit., p. 172 
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stranger. Compare the disembodied rationality embodied in Nielsen's 
thought experiment to the deeply immersed personal situation represented 
in Sophie's Choice, in which consideration of intimate attachments furnishes 
the sole criteria for choice. Our decision to act will also be influenced by the 
identity of the others in the cave. What if one of the trapped is a brother, a 
spouse, a child? What if all the trapped persons were members of the same 
family and the fat man was the only stranger among them? How would 
that lead us to view the fat man's claim on life? What if they are all 
intimately related to the fat man? Moreover, are they to be given the 
opportunity to contribute to the decision making process? What about the 
fat man, does he have a say, even if only to take the opportunity to 
selflessly offer the ultimate sacrifice? Then there is the issue of desert. 
Different theories treat this issue differently, but in deciding how to act, the 
agent immersed in his or her deliberative field will want to know more 
than is given about the character and history of the fat man. Is he an 
escaped convict, a mass murderer on the run? What if he is a great altruist, 
and the others in the cave are notorious criminals? What if the fat man is 
young, say thirty, and the others in the cave are all in their seventies? What 
if the fat man is the only one in the cave not suffering from AIDS? From the 
birds-eye view of the situation furnished in this tale, these issues are all 
relevant considerations in making an ethical judgement. 
Arguably, a lack of information here renders the limited range of 
alternatives to which Williams objects more serious in the case of the 
innocent fat man than in Ivan's challenge. Ivan's challenge presents a self-
contained scenario consisting in two alternatives - it consists in a straight 
choice between only two available courses of action, and no further 
information is required for the dilemma to hold. In the case of the innocent 
fat man, however, there are more alternative courses of action implied in 
the story, and yet these are omitted from the example. At the very least, 
because there are several more people in the cave who might be willing to 
base an ethical decision on the considerations offered, the agent may choose 
not to participate; or he or she may choose to put it to the vote and allow 
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democratic process to decide the fate of the fat man and his companions. 
These options are not available to Alyosha as a would-be torturer. The 
point here is not that the case of the innocent fat man is without any 
defences against Williams' criticism that examples such as Nielsen's 
arbitrarily restrict the range of alternative courses of action; nor is it that 
open-endedness renders Nielsen's example superior to Ivan's challenge, it 
does not. Indeed, it attenuates the scenario's authority as an example of a 
dilemma. The point is that the example omits a range of facts that are 
crucial to the decision to act in one way or another. This information is 
relevant if one were to employ the case to elicit, clarify and test the 
implications of a certain ethical perspective. 
Thus, unlike Ivan's challenge, the fat man's plight is presented in a 
story that does not tend towards its own elucidation. Beyond its value as a 
snapshot exemplar of an ethical dilemma, Ivan's challenge is presented in 
the broader context of a novel's story, the elements of which are structured 
so as to lend intelligibility to Alyosha's decision not to torture the child to 
death, and his rejection that the people whose happiness turned on the 
torture would agree to the conditions of Ivan's hypothetical bargain. The 
argument here is that, because of their brevity and their schematic 
character, such examples often cannot communicate, at least not as 
effectively as an extended narrative can, the rich and complex nature of 
lived experience, nor elicit a useful identification with the characters and 
their predicament. Consequently, such examples lack the power to arouse 
the sort of reflective response that they are designed to elicit and, hence, 
risk provoking an equally schematised result. Nielsen invokes the case to 
demonstrate the fallibility of certain 'conservative' moral principles, such as 
'it is always wrong to kill the innocent.' To be sure, one might be tempted 
say, one life for many? Of course I'd blow up the fat man. This is the response 
that Nielsen's thought experiment is intended to elicit. Faced with the type 
of dilemma illustrated, the agent is left with no option but to reconsider his 
or her fealty to certain principles embodied in an ethical perspective. As 
Nielsen argues, 'If there really is no other way of unsticking our fat man 
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and if plainly, without blasting him out, everyone in he cave will drown, 
then, innocent or not, he should be blasted out.' 80 While he admits that 
killing the fat man 'is something which is undertaken with the greatest 
reluctance,' 81 he justifies his conclusion that the fat man must be blown up 
in terms of the Greatest Happiness Principle: 'if such extreme action is not 
taken, many lives will be lost and far greater misery will obtain.' 82 The 
point here is not that Nielsen's conclusions cannot be sustained; it is that all 
that can reasonably be gleaned from examining an ethical perspective in 
light of the case of the innocent fat man is a prima facie case against the strict 
adherence to the principle that it is always wrong to kill innocent persons, 
with a ceteris paribus clause firmly attached - all other things being equal, 
less unhappiness will result from the death of one man than the death of 
more. On the information given, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that a 
certain principle may not hold in all cases, and that this example may well 
represent such a case. However, Nielsen's 'exemplary tale' fails to 
accommodate the psychological and practical complexity of acting on such 
an ethical judgement. 
This is not to say that examples like Nielsen's have no illustrative 
value; they do, and have often been used with great effect to support and 
illuminate a number of ethical arguments. Whatever its failings, like Ivan's 
challenge, the case of the innocent fat man serves as a 'snapshot' of a 
morally significant situation and is an exemplar of a difficult moral choice. 
Against his own account of the problematic nature of schematised 
examples, Williams offers a defence of their use which turns on the role that 
such examples might play in moral discussion: 
These difficulties, however, just have to be accepted, and if anyone 
finds ... examples ... cripplingly defective in this sort of respect, 
then he must in his own thought rework them in a richer and less 
question-begging form. 83 
88 Nielsen, op. cit., p. 197 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid. 
83 Williams, /oc. cit. 
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He ascribes value to the role of the imagination in working through the 
nuances and implications of ethical perspectives and, pace Hare, casts doubt 
on the person who steadfastly refuses to accept that imaginary examples 
can play such a valuable role: 
If he feels that no presentation of any imagined situation can ever 
be other than misleading in morality, and that there can never be 
any substitute for the concrete experienced complexity of actual 
moral situations, then this discussion with him must certainly 
grind to a halt: but then one may legitimately wonder whether 
every discussion with him about conduct will not grind to a halt, 
including any discussion about the actual situations, since 
discussion about how one would think and feel about situations 
somewhat different from the actual (that is to say, situations to an 
extent imaginary) plays an important role in discussion of the 
actual.84 
Two points are implicit in Williams' argument. First, imaginary examples 
can play a role in ethical discourse and make a valuable contribution to 
reflection on ethical perspectives. Second, even if simple examples are 
typically too schematised or impoverished, they can be of at least some 
illustrative or even probative value. Moreover, his suggestion that to render 
them more valuable to ethical discussion we must 'rework them in a richer 
and less question-begging form' implies that the richer the example, the 
more detailed, more finely grained, in short, more reflective of the 
complexity of lived experience, the more valuable it is to ethical discourse. 
To agree with Williams' assessment of the value of rich imaginary 
examples is to agree that generally the richer the example, the more 
valuable it is to ethical discourse. Ultimately, if we accept these conclusions, 
then we must accept that the richest form of imaginary example is the most 
valuable in this regard, even while allowing that excessive richness could 
be counterproductive. Given these arguments, the form of the most 
valuable imaginary supplement to ethical discourse is the novel, the ne plus 
ultra of richly detailed, extended, imaginary narratives. 
84 ibid. 
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The Novel's Ascendancy in Morally Relevant Exemplification 
This is not to suggest that other forms of fictional narrative cannot both 
sustain and reward contemplation, while at the same time furnishing 
material of great value to ethical reflection. Indeed, many examples of 
ethically relevant and valuable literature exist throughout the history of the 
corpus, and one must not denigrate the role able to be played by these in 
ethical reflection. A great number of plays, for instance (lbsen's Brand and 
Shakespeare's King Lear, Hamlet, Macbeth and Othello have already been 
mentioned), possess an often systematically pursued and layered moral 
content reflection on which may be of undeniable and substantive value to 
philosophical ethics. The same may be said of many of the Greek - and 
more contemporary - tragedies, as well as the poetry and dramatic works 
of writers already mentioned and others such as Marlow, Goethe and 
Beckett. As such these works, alongside a vast range of attendant critical 
literature, must not be excluded from possible incorporation into ethical 
reflection. 
But if it is true that one of literature's key virtues is its ability to 
furnish a richness of detail that is ill-accommodated in traditional forms of 
ethical reflection, and which presents for contemplation features of the 
ethical life that are overlooked or receive too little attention in the sparser 
accounts of morals and morality, then it must also be accepted that the 
novel does in fact represent the apotheosis of literary supplements to this 
(narrowly circumscribed) activity. The argument here is that the novel is 
typically unrestricted in length and detail by the factors that constrain other 
forms of narrative and, as such, can accommodate a richness unattainable 
in these other forms, however valuable they might otherwise be. Plays, for 
instance, are typically constrained not only temporally - by time limits 
imposed by, among other things, their audiences' spans of attention and 
their practical timetables - but also by the amount of detail that can be 
presented in the time (and space) available. It is true that plays may offer 
glimpses of their characters' deep inner workings, manifest in action and 
attitude, and communicated via devices such as the soliloquy and the 
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chorus. But these features, however well executed, are scarcely able to 
accommodate the finely enmeshed webs of detail possible (at least 
quantitatively) to be represented in the novel and exemplified not just in 
Molly Bloom's aforementioned interior monologue in Ulysses, but also in 
the deep psychological insights apprehended in the novels of Gogol, 
Dostoevsky, James, Tolstoy, Lawrence, Hardy and others. Given the 
practical constraints imposed on other forms of narrative, it is thus 
unreasonable (and wholly unrealistic) to expect from drama the vast 
quantity of detail possible in the novel. Suffice to say, using the texts alone 
as our sole sources of data for reflection, we can never know as much about 
the multiplicity of moral facets of Ibsen's Brand as we can about 
Dostoyevsky's Alyosha Karamazov. To expect otherwise is to commit a 
category error which ignores a number of relevant distinctions between the 
literary modes. Thus other forms of literature and narrative (one cannot 
discount the potential contribution of narratives presented via modes such 
as pantomime, opera and operetta, marionette performance, and 'new' 
media such as film, animation, radio, etc), while undeniably valuable, are 
simply incapable of furnishing the richness of 'factual' data that may be 
presented in a novel. 
Apprehension of the multiplicity of facets of a situation of moral 
seriousness, as well as its history, is important in making informed ethical 
judgements. According to Norris: 
An important factor in knowing how to act is to have some 
appreciation and understanding of both the context and history of 
any situation in which a moral agent has to act. In order to 
understand a person's decisions we need to get a grasp on as 
many aspects of their life as we can, for in so doing we gain a 
deeper appreciation of the factors that are to be taken into account 
and the weight that should be placed upon them. 85 
In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume distinguishes between mistakes of fact 
and those of right.86 By 'mistake of fact' he means that the agent has 
85 Norris, op. cit., p. 19 
86 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), III, I, I, p. 460 
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wrongly perceived the facts of a situation of moral seriousness; by 'mistake 
of right' he means that the agent has erred in his or her ascription of moral 
value to an act or situation and has formed an incorrect judgement. In 
developing his subjectivist account of moral value, he argues that a mistake 
of right can never be a basic 'source of immorality' because there must be 
some antecedent fact the perception of which induced the mistaken 
judgement, and that questions of fact are fundamentally important in 
forming appropriate moral judgements. He argues that a person's actions 
may give rise to 'false conclusions in others,' citing the example of a person, 
'who thro' a window sees lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour's 
wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own' 87 and thus 
forms the mistaken judgement, the 'mistake of right,' that the behaviour is, 
at least on the face of it, morally insignificant when in fact it is not. For the 
reasons given, simple and merely schematic examples contain insufficient 
data concerning a situation's context and history to ground an informed 
ethical judgement. A 'good story,' on the other hand, particularly in the 
form of the novel, furnishes substantially more ethically relevant 
information than can be communicated in these examples and can, 
accordingly, help us to address the sorts of questions we need to ask. While 
a novel may not furnish definitive answers to all the questions raised 
during the course of the narrative, the elements of its story can at least 
provide the raw material from which to contemplate a range of intelligible 
responses. As Graham observes, 'Fiction and poetry put both mind and 
action equally on view; characters and events can be seen entire.' 88 He 
argues that literature puts on view the internal and external aspects of 
human relationships, and that its power to present for exploration complex 
images of the social and moral life gives it pre-eminence among the arts: 
Novels and poems supply patterns of human relationship, its 
fulfilment, destruction, or corruption, and these can enter directly 
into the moral experience of those who are reflection upon how 
87 ibid., p. 461 
88 Graham (1997), op. cit., p. 129 
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best to live, because the devices of art reveal to us the internal 
'how it feels' as well as the external 'how it is.' 89 
The reader's answers to ethical questions put to the narrative may 
transcend the text itself, but searching for and reflecting on these answers 
are appropriate and valuable aspects of the reading process. Indeed, Peter 
Kivy argues that they are essential to the reading process.90 
It may seem obvious to say that a novel can represent lived 
experience more effectively than a simple schematised example, but the 
foregoing discussion is directed against the claim that these simple 
examples are sufficient to fully illustrate and test moral positions and make 
them comprehensive. The contention is that no ethical theory is 
comprehensive unless it embraces the richness of human experience and 
the complexity of actual ethical judgements. Linguistic limitations aside, it 
cannot do this by abstract argument and impersonal discussion alone. Nor, 
as shown, can simple hypothetical examples alone fill this gap. 
Philosophical reflection, therefore, needs to be supplemented by something 
closer to and more sympathetic with a genuine sense of life. In the absence 
of direct experience, stories provide such a supplement. While the 
incorporation of many forms of creative literature, as well as other 
narrative forms including film, into philosophical reflection may be of 
value, because of its length and range of narrative devices, this task is best 
suited to the sort of extended, connected narrative of which the novel is the 
paradigm. As Norris observes: 
The novel is able to fill out a life and give us insight into characters 
and their situation, so that we are able to have an appreciation of 
the pertinent features to be considered. 91 
He argues that many of these features are situationally unique and, as such, 
do not 'fall within the ambit of some'clearly defined principle' 92 and cannot 
be accommodated in traditional philosophical discourse. This point also 
89 ibid. 




applies to schematised examples such as Nielsen's innocent fat man, the 
brevity and sparseness of which precludes consideration of many 
important details and thus fails to accommodate the complexity of moral 
judgements. 
In arguing that the novel is an ideal supplement to ethical reflection, 
Norris writes, 'the novelist ... is able to draw attention to aspects that easily 
become lost in philosophical prose or which receive too little emphasis.' 
Norris' point echoes Nussbaum on the value of literature's ability to furnish 
'good characters,' although it is free of the normative implications in her 
suggestion that we ought to live as they do. His position also embraces 
Cunningham's argument that the fictional lives of literary chapters 
'provide us with thick descriptions of ways of life and forms of character, 
thick enough to do justice to creatures like us.' 93 Cunningham maintains 
that fine works of literature may be treated as 'character portraits that can 
provide us with the right stuff for concrete, particular deliberation in all its 
ethical complexity:94 A major claim concerning the novel's value here is 
expressed by Graham in Philosophy of the Arts: 
... the novel can be used to create images which oblige us to view 
our experience in certain ways and thus illuminate aspects of it. It 
is this possibility, perhaps relatively rarely realised, that allows us 
to describe imaginative literature as a source of understanding 
and which entitles ug to attribute considerable importance to it.95 
As Cunningham writes, 'By drawing our attention to morally salient 
features of life and character, novels can sharpen our ability to perceive 
moral subtleties and nuances.' 96 While a range of literary devices may be 
employed to direct and sustain a reader's attention, the provision of the 
right stuff for concrete, particular deliberation in all its ethical complexity is 
essentially a function of character. McGinn argues that for philosophical 
reflection to more effectively accommodate the complexity of lived 
93 Cunningham, op. cit., p.5 
94 ibid. 
95 Graham (1997), op. cit., p. 127 
96 Cunningham, op. cit., p.5 
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experience, we 'need to mingle the general and specific in ways that are not 
typical of the orthodox ethical treatise.' 97 He writes: 
Above all, questions of character assume a far greater prominence 
when ethics is approached this way, since fictional works are all 
about the integration between character and conduct. The 
orthodox focus on moral norms and types of action will be an 
inadequate too1. 98 
He claims that our ethical knowledge is aesthetically mediated, that 'our 
moral understanding and the story form seem fitted for one another.'99 
McGinn believes that this is the way our moral faculty prefers to operate 
rather than learning principles by rote: 'It is almost effortless to take in a 
story, pleasant even, though the story may be replete with moral 
significance: 1w He argues that fictional narrative, particularly the novel, is 
the most effective literary form through which to explore ethical concerns 
because, he says, 'In fiction, character is the sine qua non. Character is to 
fiction what space and time are to physics.'m Cunningham agrees, and 
argues that at least part of literature's value to ethical reflection lies in how 
our engagement with and expectations of literature differ from our 
approaches to philosophical argument: 
We do not expect or want a novel to argue or analyze in the same 
way as traditional philosophical discourse. Part of the joy in 
reading a novel is in encountering a depiction of lives and 
character that invites a different kind of observation and thought. 
Philosophy, after all, demands great concentration and attention 
to often tedious details of argument and analysis. Stories, on the 
other hand, draw us into lives in a far less tedious way, and 
perhaps this accounts for the great appeal of stories. 102 
According to Cunningham, for ethical enquiry to have value, it must 
remain true to human life and its complexity. In his discussion of universal 
ethical duties he argues: 
97 McGinn, op. cit, p175 
98 ibid. 
99 ibid., p. 174 
18° ibid. 
nil ibid., p. 175 
102 Cunningham, op. cit., p85 
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... the importance of attending to the details of particular people 
in particular situations looms far larger than it does when we 
confine ourselves to judgements about what we can unequivocally 
demand of just anyone. And other than experiencing things for 
ourselves, the best way to appreciate the more complex, situated 
ethical demands is with a detailed story that can paint a big 
picture of character. 103 
He argues that the 'right' kind of novel for incorporation in ethical 
reflection is 'one with detailed character portraits of particular people 
embroiled in complex, meaningful situations.'lm 
Sustained attention to the detail of a character's complex life is 
typical of the Bildungsroman of the German literary tradition, and is 
particularly evident in the 'moral decision' novels of nineteenth century 
British literature. According to Pascal, the writer of these novels 'was 
concerned to show characters choosing between certain moral alternatives 
within an unquestioned socio-moral reality. ' 105 Novels in this genre include 
those by Jane Austen, Thomas Hardy, Emily Bronte, George Eliot and 
others. However, many other novels, including a large number of 
contemporary works, emerge from diverse literary traditions and feature 
the sustained, detailed and thought-provoking presentations of character 
that make them valuable in ethical reflection. Tolstoy's Anna Karenina and 
Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment continue to occupy the reflections of 
moral philosophers. From Africa, the works of Nadine Gordimer, Chinua 
Achebe, Bessie Head and others deal with characters immersed in 
situations requiring tough ethical decisions; Narayan's Bachelor of Arts 
explores character development and, as a fairly recent paradigm of the 
Bildungsroman, Hesse's Siddharta offers a detailed account of the vicissitudes 
of life and the values that stem from a variety of decisions and experiences. 
Contemporary philosophers who incorporate the study of novels in 
their ethical reflection include those whose arguments are considered in 
this investigation. In The Heart of What Matters, Cunningham contemplates 
103 ibid., p. 83 
104 ibid., p. 84 
105 Roy Pascal, The German Novel, (Toronto: University of Toronto press, 956), p. 3 
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Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day, Toni Morrison's Beloved, and two 
novels by Zora Neale Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God and Seraph on 
the Suwanee; and his argument for an emphasis on moral character is 
embedded in sustained investigation of the moral import of these novel's 
characters' actions and attitudes. In Love's Knowledge, Nussbaum selects 
James' The Golden Bowl to examine the relation between literary form and 
content; and in Poetic Justice she builds her argument against utilitarian 
justice policy around a detailed discussion of the main characters in Charles 
Dickens' Hard Times. In Ethics, Evil and Fiction, McGinn examines Wilde's 
The Picture of Dorian Gray and Shelley's Frankenstein to inform and illustrate 
his reflections on beauty, moral goodness and evil. Graham refers to a 
character from Anthony Trollope's The Eustace Diamonds to illustrate his 
argument that an overemphasis on moral duty can lead to an 'unattractive' 
life, and that the 'appalling picture of rectitude' presented in the character•
of Lady Linlithgow 'can hardly strike us as the model of the life we ought 
to lead.' 106 And in his article on the relation between philosophy and 
literature, Norris employs extracts from Singer's The Slave to illustrate 
significant aspects of the formal distinction between traditional 
philosophical discourse and the novel, and treats the main character's 
wrestle with the demands of duty as an illustration of the contrast between 
a prescription for the 'logical conditions for a moral judgement' contained 
in traditional ethical perspectives, and 'the psychological realities involved 
in acting on a moral judgement.' 107 
Against this use of literature in ethical reflection it might be argued 
that, if it is merely a matter of detail, then all that needs to be done to 
remedy traditional philosophy's 'inadequacy' is to make its theories more 
detailed, expanding them to accommodate more subtleties and nuances, 
and thus become more responsive to a greater range of ethical possibilities 
that speak to the heart of what matters in human life and character. 
However, the supplemental value of literature in this application cannot be 
106 Graham (1990), op. cit. p. 120 
107 Norris, op. cit., p. 18 
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depreciated by shoring up the methods of moral philosophy with the finer 
points of ethical living. This is not just a question of incorporating more 
detail into our ethical theories as might be found in the more thorough 
applied ethics textbooks, or of simply constructing more examples of how 
ethical principles may be applied. Cunningham argues that while the 
comprehensive detail contained in these texts are certainly valuable, 
'seldom will the details reach into the hearts and minds of the people 
involved.' 108 While Nielsen's innocent fat man is illuminating to a degree, 
the fat man's plight remains that of an abstract entity. He and his 
companions are not presented as particular characters replete with rich 
inner lives and a real stake in the decision, but as automatons whose fate is 
to be decided solely by reference to a statistical representation of aggregate 
happiness. However, as Cunningham points out: 
To do justice to particular people and their circumstances, we 
must paint the kinds of subtle, detailed pictures that can bring 
them to life in all their complexity, the kinds of pictures good 
literature can paint. 109 
What interests philosophers who contemplate literature in relation to an 
ethical perspective is not just the descriptive detail of its characters' lives; 
nor solely how literary language can be employed to elicit the moral 
significance of narrated events. They are interested in how ethical situations 
'play out' in terms of the characters' lives, in how their ethical attitudes are 
informed by their histories, in how their actions are motivated by these 
attitudes, in what can be gleaned about certain ethical theories from this 
kind of investigation, and in what these lives can reveal about ethics in 
general. Just as the novelist can harness the power of emplotrnent and 
literary devices such as perspective, metaphor and irony to direct the 
reader to view a situation in a certain way and to illuminate particular 
aspects of moral import that receive too little attention in the discourse of 
traditional philosophical ethics, so too is he or she able to present character 
108 Cunningham, op. cit., p.84 
189 ibid. 
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portraits that furnish enhanced data for concrete deliberation in all its 
ethical complexity. 
Moreover, as Graham observes, a distinguishing feature of the 
extended narrative is that it presents material in a particular order, and that 
'an author can construct a story that obliges us to attribute a certain 
significance to the events related.' 110 While we saw earlier how Conrad and 
Joyce employ language to emphasise important aspects of their stories, it 
was also shown how, in Tess of the D'Urbervilles, Hardy structures his story 
in such a way as to isolate, and thus vivify, the narrative's key incidents. 
The novel can elicit this compulsion to attribute significance to events in a 
way that the traditional ethical theories cannot accommodate. For instance, 
Kant focuses on the agent's will to act according to the categorical 
imperative and from this a universal judgement is derived. A particular 
agent's history, and the history of a situation, is morally redundant. A 
similar point applies to utilitarianism. In utilitarianism, all ethical 
considerations reduce to the consequences of an action. The complex 
motives that led to the act are redundant, displaced by concern for its 
outcome. In neither case is value placed on factors beyond duty or 
consequences. However, if an important factor in knowing how to act is to 
have some appreciation and understanding of both the context and history 
of any situation in which a moral agent has to act, then the extended and 
detailed narrative contained in novels can furnish a source of this 
understanding. A central claim of the propositional account is that 
imaginative literature can supplement philosophical enquiry by 
illustrating, revealing, elucidating, or reminding us of some ethical fact or 
possibility with the potential to make a substantive contribution to 
propositions or arguments in moral philosophy. In this way literature, 
particularly in the form of the novel, can be used to amplify theoretical 
conceptions of the good life that may be abstract, schematised or otherwise 
impoverished. Contemplating novels can facilitate a richer ethical 
understanding of lived experience than can be conveyed in abstract 
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argument alone and, as such, help in the development of the capacity to 
implement worthwhile ethical prescriptions. 
_ 
110 Graham (1997), op. cit., p. 124 
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5 
CAN LITERATURE BE PHILOSOPHY? 
The Devil whoops, as he whooped of old: 
'It's clever, but is it Art?' 
Rudyard Kipling' 
A novel is an impression, not an argument. 
Thomas Hardy2 
In the preface to The Moral Life, an anthology that connects moral 
philosophy and literature, Pojman argues, 'Good literature...makes the 
abstract concrete, brings it home to the heart, and forces us to think with 
innovative imagination.' 3 He states his aim in compiling the book, 'I have 
endeavoured to join forces, to unite literature and philosophy in the service 
of ethical understanding.' 4 Here, Pojman concurs with the thrust of the 
account of the role for literature in moral philosophy examined in previous 
chapters. However, implicit in the notion of 'unification' is a distinction 
between the two enterprises. Before there can be a unification, there must 
first exist distinct items. In line with the arguments examined earlier, 
Pojman does not propose literature as a substitute for systematic ethical 
1 Rudyard Kipling, The Conundrum of the Workshops (1892) 
2 Thomas Hardy, op. cit., p. 463 
3 Pojman (2000), op. cit., p. xiii 
reflection but regards it as a supplement to philosophical thought. In so 
doing, he preserves the role for traditional philosophical reflection, even 
when it is augmented by imaginative literature: 
One needs cool-headed philosophical analysis to play a sturdy 
role in sorting out the ambiguities and ambivalences in literature, 
to abstract from particulars and universalize principles, to 
generate wide-ranging intellectual theories. 5 
He echoes Kant when he writes, 'the passionate imagination of literature is 
blind without the cool head of philosophy, but the cool head of philosophy 
is sterile and as frigid as an iceberg without the passions of life, conveyed in 
literature.' 6 It has already been argued that an alliance between literature 
and philosophy can refine our understanding of ethical issues, and that the 
novel provides the most effective supplement in this regard. But precisely 
where are the boundaries in this alliance between the cool head of 
philosophy and the passionate imagination of literature, and how can the 
distinction between them be best exploited? 
The Four Possibilities 
As previously noted, in 'Can Literature be Moral Philosophy?' 7 Raphael 
examines four possible meanings of the thesis that there is a positive 
connection between literature and moral philosophy. He expresses these in 
the form of four propositions: first, a work of moral philosophy can also be 
a work of literature; second, a work of literature can also be a work of 
moral philosophy; third, moral philosophy can feed literature; and, fourth, 
literature can feed moral philosophy. Although to an extent they coincide, I 
shall examine them one by one. But because Raphael's second proposition 
is, by his estimate, the most crucial and, as will be shown, the most 
controversial, and because the outcomes of investigations into the other 
three will have serious implications for its validity, I will examine it last. 




The First Proposition: Moral Philosophy as Literature 
On the first proposition, that a work of moral philosophy can also be a 
work of literature, it was noted in chapter one that it is generally accepted 
that a number of works of philosophy possess literary merit without 
compromising their status as works of 'serious' philosophy. However, it 
was also noted that two important questions need to be addressed in 
relation to this proposition. First, by reference to what criteria may we 
ascribe literary merit? Second, does the mere fact that a work of philosophy 
possesses literary merit qualify it as a work of literature? Any response to 
this second question will need a viable definition of literature, one which 
either allows or excludes certain forms of discourse, including 
philosophical prose. If it is true, as I argue, that the significance to ethical 
reflection of the connection between literature and philosophy lies in the 
distinction between the two enterprises, then answers to these questions 
have a crucial bearing on how to account for the value of this relation, 
especially in light of Raphael's second proposition. For this reason, and 
because the conclusions from this examination and that of the third 
proposition will ground a critique of the second proposition, the first 
proposition warrants sustained critical attention here. 
What might it mean to say that a work of moral philosophy can also 
be a work of literature? Raphael himself offers two versions and, although 
they seem to have different meanings, he treats them interchangeably. He 
presents the first version thus: 'A work of moral philosophy can also be a 
work of literature.' 8 This is familiar as his 'first proposition' for the 
connection between philosophy and literature. Later in his article he 
presents the supposedly same idea in a different form. He opens his 
discussion of this first proposition by writing: 'The first [proposition] is 
straightforward enough. It is evident that a book which is primarily a work 
of philosophy (not only but including moral philosophy) can also have 
merit as a work of literature.' Thus it is apparent that, although Raphael 
7 Raphael, /oc. cit. 
8 Raphael (1983-1984), p. 1 
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does not explicitly acknowledge it, two distinct propositions seem to be 
involved. While the first asserts an identity between philosophy and 
literature (philosophy as literature), in specific cases, the second seems to 
assert a similarity or merit relation (philosophy as having literary merit, 
philosophy as being like literature), in specific cases. 
That a work of moral philosophy can also have merit as a work of literature 
implies that a work of moral philosophy ('philosophy' insofar as it contains 
a rational argument that supports some philosophical conclusion, or 
constitutes an exposition of a philosophical position) has qualities that 
qualify it as 'literary,' or as having 'literary merit.' I presurne here that to 
predicate a work with literariness is to say that it possesses some artistic 
merit, as opposed to the trivial meaning, merely that it appears in a body of 
writing - 'the literature' - on a particular subject. Thus, to argue that a work 
of philosophy has merit as a work of literature may be to argue that a work 
of philosophy uses certain stylistic devices to illustrate an argument, to 
emphasise or clarify a point, to capture the reader's attention, and so on. Or 
else it may mean that the argument itself is presented in a generally 
'literary' style, perhaps written in aesthetically appealing, non-technical 
language that somehow qualifies the work as having literary merit. It does 
not mean that all or even a substantial part of a work of philosophy is 
solely a product of the writer's creative imagination, or that the appeal to 
reason that characterises philosophical argument has been supplanted by a 
concern for aesthetic appeal. Nor does it mean that the work is intended as 
a fictional representation of some state of affairs, or that it is meant to be 
adjudged principally on its artistic merit. The ascription of literariness, or 
literary merit, to a work of philosophy is therefore principally a question of 
style. Given its particular subject matter, its 'reflective generality and a style 
of argument that claims to be rationally persuasive,' 9 all of which qualifies 
it as distinctly philosophical, a work of philosophy, even if unadorned with 
other stylistic devices common to works of imaginative literature, can thus 
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qualify as literary by reference to its language and the style in which its 
argument is presented. This position has no negative implications for 
arguments concerning the unity of form and content as, while style and 
substance are indivisible, they may be analysed and assessed separately. 
In English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy, James Seth is 
adamant that the writing style of many English language philosophers 
qualifies their work as distinctly literary. He writes: 'English philosophy is 
entitled to be called literature in a sense in which the philosophy of perhaps 
no other nation has the same right to the name.' 10 He argues that the works 
of a number of prominent philosophers qualify as possessing literary merit, 
and that they feature among the most highly regarded of non-fiction 
literature: 
Whether we think of Bacon and Hobbes in the seventeenth 
century, of Berkeley and Hume in the eighteenth, or of Coleridge 
and Ferrier in the nineteenth, we cannot but recognise qualities of 
style which entitle the writer to rank among the masters of English 
prose of the expository and controversial type with the best 
essayists of our country)- 1  
Seth holds that literary merit is a product of the choice of language 
employed by the writer. He contrasts philosophical works that possess 
literary merit with those that are written in a technical style which 
disqualifies them from artistic consideration: 
Even if we take a philosopher of lower literary merit, like Locke or 
Reid, we find that in comparison with the philosophers of the 
Continent, and especially of Germany, the style is characterised by 
the absence of severity and technicality; and while this may lead to 
a certain loss of precision which causes difficulty in the 
interpretation of the philosophy, the fact that the works are 
written in the vernacular adds to their literary value. 12 
For Seth, the choice of style is at least partly informed by the writer's 
background, culture or profession: 
9 Bernard Williams (1985), op. cit., p. 2 
10 James Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy, (London: J. M. Dent and Son, 




The untechnical, as well as the literary, quality of the style of 
English philosophy is doubtless in some measure due to the fact 
that its• chief representatives were not, like the great German 
idealists, university professors, but men of affairs, in close contact 
with the life of the nation. 13 
While Seth enumerates more substantive differences between English and 
Continental philosophy, these concern subject matter rather than method 
and style and, as such, they do not concern us here. However, it must be 
acknowledged that the divide between 'technical' and 'literary' styles of 
philosophy is not necessarily as geographical or culturally determinate as 
Seth contends. Indeed, Frederich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard are both 
continental philosophers ('continental' in the sense that Seth uses the term) 
many of whose philosophical works are of a distinctly, and intentionally, 
literary style. While not all of their works qualify as explicit works of moral 
philosophy, many of their works contain or constitute distinct moral 
arguments or positions that assure their status as such works. Yet 
throughout their respective corpora, both writers employ many stylistic 
devices to fortify, clarify, and emphasise their arguments. Fiction, allusion, 
allegory, irony, and metaphor are devices common to their works. 
Moreover, Nietzsche's academic vocation seems not to have affected the 
literary quality of his writings; and Kierkegaard, his life remote from that of 
a university professor, was himself a man of affairs whose writings 
contributed substantially to the cultural life of nineteenth century 
Copenhagen. 
Seth's criterion for literary quality is stylistic rather than substantive. 
If a work of philosophy is written in a manner warranting appreciation as 
'literary' as opposed to 'technical,' but which still relies on explicit 
argument for its rational force, then it qualifies as a work of literature while 
retaining its status as a work of philosophy. Thus it qualifies as 'literature' 
only insofar as it is 'literary' - that is, it possesses literary merit in virtue of 
the style in which it is written. Here, the claim that a work of moral 
philosophy can also have merit as a work of literature is uncontroversial. 
13 ibid. 
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Just as some works of imaginative literature are thought to be deeply 
philosophical (insofar as they delve into the traditional subject matter of 
philosophy or, more particularly, of philosophical ethics) without 
qualifying as genuine works of philosophy (insofar as they do not 
constitute rationally persuasive arguments), so can it be argued that, given 
a certain style, works of 'pure' philosophy may be thought of as literary. 
Further, if a philosophical work's literariness contributes to its ability to 
arrest its reader's attention, and thereby sustain reflective engagement, then 
literary merit can be said to contribute value. 
But suggesting that a work of philosophy has literary merit, or even 
making the stronger claim that a work of philosophy can have merit as a 
work of literature, is not the same as arguing that a work of moral 
philosophy can be a work of literature; that is, that it possesses sufficient of 
the properties common to works of literature to qualify as a work of 
literature in its own right while at the same time retaining the features that 
qualify it as a work of philosophy, and that its merit as a work of literature 
be adjudged against distinctly literary criteria that, despite some areas of 
overlap, are clearly different from the criteria against which a work of 
philosophy is evaluated. 14 This latter meaning, however, is implied in the 
first sense of Raphael's proposition that a work of moral philosophy can 
also be a work of literature. 
In his argument for the occurrence of this identity between moral 
philosophy and literature, Raphael nominates Plato's Phaedo as a 
paradigmatic example of a distinctive work of philosophy that not only 
possesses literary merit, but also qualifies as a work of literature per se. That 
is, Plato's dialogue qualifies as an example of the first meaning of the 
proposition that a work of moral philosophy can also be a work of 
literature; that it can be both without compromising its status as either. 
14 See chapter two of this thesis for an enumeration of the criteria against which works of 
philosophy are generally evaluated. See also the later discussion in this chapter for how 
these criteria cannot be applied to works of literature. 
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According to Raphael, the Phaedo is 'clearly a work of philosophy, seeking 
to prove by rational argument the immortality of the soul: 18 But he claims 
that it is also a work of literature in the non-trivial sense: 'the book depicts 
the character of Socrates and its effects on his friends with a dramatic 
intensity that could scarcely be bettered by any poet.' 16 For Raphael, then, 
the depiction of character coupled with 'dramatic intensity' endows the 
Phaedo with a poetic quality that qualifies it as a work of literature, without 
compromising its status as a work of serious philosophy. Raphael cites Sir 
Richard Livingstone's translation of Plato's Apology, Crito and the Phaedo17 
as an indication of the Phaedo's acceptance as a literary work. He writes that 
Livingstone presented the more 'strictly philosophical' arguments of the 
dialogue in smaller type so that, according to Livingstone, 'they can be 
either read or omitted: 18 Livingstone thought that the more literary aspects 
of the dialogue accounted for their 'immortal' value and, says Raphael, 
'evidently Plato's own arguments for immortality did not, in Livingstone's 
eyes, contribute to the immortality of the Phaedo.'19 However, Livingstone's 
assessment of the literary interest of Plato's argument has no bearing on its 
philosophical merit. Insofar as Socrates' argument for the immortality of 
the soul constitutes a significant thread connecting the entire narrative, and 
helping to make intelligible its more dramatic elements, the Phaedo remains 
unequivocally a work of philosophy. But this fact does not disqualify it 
from literary evaluation; indeed, in his introduction to The Last Days of 
Socrates, Harold Tarrant argues that, with very few exceptions, most of 
Plato's works, including the Phaedo, 'are fully philosophy and fully 
literature.' 28 Can a text be fully both? What features are required for a work 
of philosophy to qualify also as fully a work of literature? 
15 Raphael (1983-1984), op. cit., p. 2 
16 ibid. 
17published together under the title Portrait of Socrates (Oxford, 1938) 
18 Raphael, /oc. cit. 
19 ibid. pp. 2-3 
20 Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, trans. Hugh Treddennick and Harold Tarrant, 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1993), p. ix. 
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In assessing the ascription to the Phaedo of both philosophical and 
literary status, Raphael first examines Plato's aim in writing the dialogue. 
He notes that it was certainly not literary, 'if indeed there is such a thing as 
a bare literary aim.'21 He asks whether Plato's intention was to articulate a 
philosophical argument for the immortality of the soul or to elicit the 
reader's admiration for the character of Socrates, and concludes that it is 
both. Plato's dialogue is thus intended to constitute not just a philosophical 
argument to support a certain metaphysical position, but also a character 
portrait which illuminates certain traits that Plato considers desirable, and 
which readers, having been shown the example of Socrates, will endeavour 
to cultivate in themselves. According to Raphael, while the fulfilment of the 
first aim requires a compelling and explicit philosophical argument, 'the 
second of these two aims requires literary art if it is to succeed.' 22 Raphael 
writes of this second aim that, in itself, 'it is a didactic aim, to instill in 
readers an appreciation of the moral virtues of Socrates' character and a 
desire for self-improvement in emulation of him.' 23 The possession of the 
stylistic elements required to fulfil this second aim qualifies the Phaedo as 
support for a virtue ethic as discussed earlier. Just as Hugo's good bishop 
of Digne exemplifies the saintly character and embodies the virtues of 
benevolence and generosity of spirit, so in the Phaedo a virtuous character 
faces death with a noble, philosophic comportment deemed by Plato 
worthy of emulation. Thus the Phaedo has a philosophical aim, embodied in 
the metaphysical argument for the immortality of the soul, and a didactic, 
moral aim, to show the noble manner in which a philosopher faces death. 
But even if this is its didactic aim, and this aim is to be fulfilled via literary 
means, for Raphael's first proposition for the connection between literature 
and philosophy to hold, it remains to be shown that the Phaedo is both 
literature and moral philosophy. If it is to be both, it must be shown to be at 
least each. 




So, is the Phaedo a work of moral philosophy? In evaluating the joint aims 
of the Phaedo, Raphael cites A. J. Ayer's distinction between a moralist and 
a moral philosopher, wherein the former seeks merely to promote a 
particular ethic and the latter's activities constitute a 'systematic endeavour 
to understand moral concepts and justify moral principles.' 24 In short, the 
moral philosopher seeks to construct an account of morals and moral 
principles that not only offers a cogent explanation of the concepts it 
entails, but also furnishes reasons for accepting his or her claim that they are 
compelling, or that they possess a normative content, or that they are 
consistent with the accepted aims of moral philosophy and philosophy in 
general. The moralist, however, offers no such justification for his or her 
injunctions. Rather, the moralist in the sense intended here (and employed 
by Ayer and Raphael), as a person given to moralizing, seeks simply to 
inculcate in the recipients of his or her 'wisdom' a preferred set of 
principles that guides actions or ways of life, without the benefit of 
explanation, reason or normative justification. With this distinction in 
mind, Raphael questions whether the Phaedo's second aim is moralism 
instead of moral philosophy. Is Plato's account of Socrates' approach to 
death an exercise in moralism insofar as it seeks merely to present the 
Socratic character as worthy of unreflective emulation rather than a 
systematic philosophical reflection on the nature of Socratic virtue? Raphael 
asks whether Plato himself would accept this and, in responding on Plato's 
behalf, argues: 
He would agree that one can be a moralist without being a moral 
philosopher, but he would not agree that one can be an adequate 
moral philosopher without being a moralist.25 
Raphael offers no justification of this claim. However, it is not unreasonable 
to allow the qualification given that the prescription of certain actions, 
forms of character and ways of life is an essential feature of first order 
24 Pojman (1995), op. cit., p. 1 
25 Raphael, /oc. cit. 
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moral philosophy, and that these prescriptions require systematic reflection 
on the grounds on which they are justified. Thus for the moral philosopher, 
moralising - the communication of ethical prescriptions with the intention 
of convincing others to comply with them - is legitimate activity, but it 
constitutes only part of his or her activities. Even then the philosophical 
method requires that the prescriptions communicated be questioned, 
analysed, and refined. For the pure moralist, on the other hand, in 
Raphael's sense of the term, issuing prescriptions for conduct with the 
expectation of unreflective conformity constitutes the entirety of his or her 
moral activities. For Plato, however, there is sufficient evidence throughout 
the Socratic dialogues that no expectation of unreflective conformity is held 
by Socrates. The objective of the dialectic method he employs is not 
intended to elicit unreflective subservience to a moral ideal, as would be 
the aim of the mere moralist, but to provoke a considered response to the 
kinds of philosophical questions inherent in the situations of ethical 
significance he raises for discussion. The moralising in the Socratic 
dialogues is not the advocacy of dogmatic adherence to uncritically 
accepted principles, but a moralism tempered by reason; and is thus 
legitimately the activity of a moral philosopher. 
However, Raphael suggests that, even allowing this, given that the 
prescriptions are only implied in the depiction of Socrates' attitude towards 
death, and do not constitute an express argument, 'you may still question 
whether the moralism of the Phaedo is part of an enterprise in moral 
philosophy.'26 He asks whether the moralising implied in the depiction of 
- 
Socrates' demeanour relates directly to the more distinctly philosophical 
aspects of the work: 'the philosophical arguments of the dialogue are 
concerned with the immortality of the soul, a topic for metaphysics rather 
than moral philosophy.' 27 Insofar as the Phaedo constitutes a case in point, 
Raphael's question raises an important issue for the relation between 
literature and moral philosophy; especially given that the dialogue is 
26 Raphael, /oc. cit. 
27 ibid. 
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treated by Raphael as a paradigm of moral philosophy as literature. 
Certainly the Phaedo is a work of philosophy: Socrates' metaphysical 
arguments for immortality are clearly presented, objections enumerated, 
and replies clarified. But it also has clear moral relevance. Our acceptance 
or rejection of metaphysical arguments concerning the soul's immortality 
has a profound bearing on how to behave, especially if conduct in 'this' life 
influences the quality of the next. In one sense, then, insofar as moral 
implications flow from its metaphysical conclusions, the Phaedo is at least 
implicitly a work of moral philosophy. But does accepting this argument 
require accepting that all works of metaphysics also qualify as implied 
works of moral philosophy? Raphael himself observes, 'we all know that 
the different branches of philosophy run into one another.' 28 Moreover, for 
Raphael, the Phaedo's moralism (whether or not it is a product of an 
underlying moral philosophy) is implied in the literary fabric of the text 
rather than expressed in argument form, as are its metaphysics. 
But does the mere fact that moral implications flow from its 
metaphysical conclusions render it specifically a work of moral 
philosophy? Or does the fact that its moral reasoning is only implied 
disqualify it as a work of moral philosophy? An affirmative answer to the 
first question would require a revision of the criteria that delineate areas in 
philosophy. However, this revision is clearly unwarranted by Raphael's 
argument. Post-modern boundary-blurring aside, the activities of the 
various branches of philosophy, while they often overlap and have 
implications for each other, are largely defined by their specific subject 
matters and objectives. A metaphysical argument for the indestructibility of 
the soul may have ethical implications, and if valid, these must be 
accommodated in an adequate ethical theory; but this does not qualify the 
argument as explicitly moral in its own right. An affirmative answer to the 
latter question has serious implications for the acceptability of the claim 
that the Phaedo is a paradigm of a work that is both moral philosophy and 
28 ibid. 
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literature, as there is nothing controversial in the suggestion that a work of 
literature can also be a work of moralism. 
Two responses may be made to these questions. The first, not 
considered by Raphael, is that the Phaedo contains some expressly 
. expository moral philosophy separate from its pure metaphysical 
arguments, that distinguishes it from merely moralising. If this is true, then 
the Phaedo is a work of philosophy which also qualifies, at least in part, as a 
work of moral philosophy, just as we regard Hume's Treatise as a work of 
philosophy which, given Book III, is, at least partly, also a work of moral 
philosophy. This is my position. Raphael's position, however, is embodied 
in the second response. He argues that while the Phaedo is not explicitly a 
work of moral philosophy, it nevertheless qualifies as such because the 
moralism it contains derives from a philosophical purpose that is woven 
into its literary form. 
Taking the first response, features of an explicit moral philosophy are 
evident in 82a-b of the Phaedo, in which Socrates discusses the value of the 
virtues with Cebes, arguing that the more virtuous our conduct in 
corporeal life, the more desirable will be the lives of our souls after death: 
I suppose that the happiest people, and those who reach the best 
destination, are the ones who have cultivated the goodness of an 
ordinary citizen, so-called 'temperance' and 'justice,' which is 
acquired by habit and practice, without the help of philosophy 
and reason.29 
Socrates' account of the virtues here implies a criticism of unreflective 
moralism, for the cultivation of virtues by 'habit and practice' is not the 
product of serious reflection, and even the happiest people will not reach 
the destination reserved for those who have actively reflected on their 
ethical lives. For Socrates, the most desirable afterlife is awarded only to 
those reflective souls whose moral conduct is grounded in reason and 
learning: 'But no soul which has not practised philosophy, and is not 
29 Plato, op. cit., p. 141 
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absolutely poor when it leaves the body, may attain to the divine nature; 
that is only for the lover of learning.' 30 
A more sustained and clearly philosophical discussion of the virtues 
occurs in 68b-69d. Here Socrates takes up a theme introduced in the Meno, 
concerning the distinction between popular and Socratic morality, between 
'ordinary' virtue and the virtue of the philosopher. The section begins with 
Socrates contrasting the fear with which ordinary persons face death and 
the marmer in which a philosopher approaches the afterlife. He contends 
that ordinary persons fear corporeal death because they are lovers of the 
body and bodily pleasures, and that these will be unavailable in the 
afterlife. The philosopher, on the other hand, is the lover of wisdom and 
regards the body as an impediment to the attainment of knowledge. He 
argues that, of all persons, the prospect of death is least alarming to the 
philosopher: 
a true lover of wisdom who has firmly grasped this same 
conviction - that he will never attain wisdom worthy of the name 
elsewhere than in the next world - will he be grieved at dying? 
Will he not be glad to make that journey? We must suppose so, 
my comrade; that is, if he is a genuine "philosopher;" because then 
he will be of the firm belief that he will never find wisdom in all 
its purity in any other place. 31 
Thus the philosopher, whose ultimate aim is to achieve wisdom, and who 
believes that wisdom is only attainable after corporeal death, would be 
unreasonable to fear death. Socrates' position here can be seen as the 
conclusion of a compelling argument, one that he makes explicit: 
The philosopher will only be truly happy when he or she finds 
pure wisdom; 
Pure wisdom can only be found after bodily death; 
Therefore, rather than fear death, the philosopher will 
take delight in its prospect. 
3° ibid., pp. 141-142 
31 ibid., p. 121 
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Socrates then analyses the virtues of courage and temperance, arguing that 
they are illogical when, if understood in the ordinary sense, applied to 
persons other than philosophers. He argues that when an ordinary 
courageous person faces death, unlike the philosopher, 'he does so through 
fear of something worse.'32 This is illogical, according to Socrates, because it 
makes no sense to suppose that courage is due to fear and dread, 'that fear 
and cowardice should make a man brave.' 33 He makes a similar point 
against those who value temperance as a virtue in the ordinary sense: 'Is it 
not, in just the same way, a sort of self-indulgence that makes them 
temperate?' He argues that those who practice temperance ordinarily do so 
for reasons that are inconsistent with true nature of the virtue: 'We may say 
that this is impossible, but all the same those who practise this simple form 
of temperance ... are afraid of losing other pleasures which they desire, so 
they refrain from one kind because they cannot resist the other.' 34 This 
comports with the popular aphorism 'You have to have some vices' and, on 
this account, a person who exercises temperance by refraining from 
gluttony so as to allow themselves a higher level of alcohol consumption is 
not temperate at all, in any meaningful sense. Indeed, the suggestion that 
temperance is manifest here strikes Socrates as having 1 .. .nothing sound or 
honest about it.' 35 Although he employs these arguments as defences 
against Cebes' and Simmias' challenge that it is unnatural for him to face 
death without grief or bitterness, they support his more general ethical 
position that prescribing virtue in isolation from wisdom is merely 
moralising and, as such, prey to illusions of virtue: 'The real thing, whether 
self-control or justice or courage, is in fact a kind of purification from all 
this kind of motivation, and wisdom itself is a sort of cleansing agent.' 36 
Moreover, while these arguments occur in the general context of his 
metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul, they espouse a 
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distinct position on the nature of the afterlife and its relation to the here and 
now, and, as such, do not directly contribute to Socrates' attempts to prove 
the immortality of the soul. Rather, in asserting that the desirability of one's 
afterlife depends on how one comports oneself in the material world, 
Socrates presupposes the soul's immortality and makes a distinctly ethical 
point. This feature of Socrates' argument is analogous to the arguments 
Kierkegaard advances for the mortal agent to cultivate a relation with the 
eternal (God) in Either/Or and Stages on Life's Way. In these works, 
Kierkegaard does not intend to prove the existence of God and His 
particular nature; rather, he presupposes His existence and nature, 
proposing that one must, unlike the aesthete who operates at a visceral 
level, consciously choose to choose between good and evil and, as such, 
buy into the ethical life as a stage on the way to one's ultimate relation, that 
with the eternal.37 While his argument clearly assumes a metaphysical fact, 
it does not constitute a metaphysical argument but an ethical one insofar as 
it examines and prescribes a certain form of character or way of life. 
Moreover, like those of Judge William and William Afham in Kierkegaard's 
works, Socrates' arguments are expressed in the dialogue and are not 
merely implied in its literary fabric; and they espouse a clear and 
specifically ethical position. The moralising entailed here rests on explicit 
reasoned argument and is, thus, clearly an exercise in moral philosophy. 38 
Raphael offers a different perspective on the position that the Phaedo, 
constitutes, at least in part, a work of moral philosophy and gives different 
reasons why it should be accepted as such. He argues that the work is a 
'reformed version of tragic drama' 39 which accommodates and overcomes 
37 Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or and Stages on Life's Way, in Robert Bretall, ed., A Kierkegaard 
Anthology Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1946), passim. 
38 It must be acknowledged that as Plato is thought to express his own ethical position, to a 
certain extent, through his depiction of Socrates, so Kierkegaard chose to express much of 
his philosophical thoughts pseudonymously. However, as the precise aims of each writer's 
choice of narrative mode and point of view are unavailable except by speculation, and do 
not largely affect my own arguments, I shall leave aside questions concerning the 
provenance of ideas expressed in their works. 
39 Raphael, op. cit., p. 4 
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Plato's criticism of the poets in the Republic. Raphael writes, 'In the Republic, 
Plato talks of a long-standing quarrel or rivalry between poetry and 
philosophy; he means a rivalry for the role of moral educator: 0 Indeed, in 
books II, III and X of the Republic, Socrates' argument that poetry ought to 
be banished from his ideal society on the implied grounds that didactic 
poetry is the product of mere moralising is wholly consistent with the 
arguments in the Phaedo against the inculcation of virtue via means other 
than active reflection, 'in isolation from wisdom: 41 As Raphael notes, 'the 
central point of that criticism [in the Republic] is an attack on the tragic 
drama, especially for inducing pity and for allowing us to fear death and its 
aftermath.' 42 Raphael argues that while the Phaedo is clearly a type of 
tragedy, it differs from other tragedies in the manner in which its hero is 
depicted as dying. Raphael's critique relies on Phaedo's early account of the 
manner of Socrates' death: 
He says that Socrates died so fearlessly and with such confidence 
that "he appeared blessed ... and about to be happy, if any man 
ever was," in the next world. And therefore, adds Phaedo (twice, 
to make sure that we have taken the point), "I did not pity him" as 
one might otherwise have expected; instead there was a strange 
mixture of pleasure and pain.43 
But does the fact that Socrates' death is presented in a manner held by Plato 
to be virtuous, qualify it as specifically a work of moral philosophy? 
Raphael believes that it does, and argues that the pedagogic aspect of the 
narrative depends on a form of reasoning implied in the actions of the hero 
rather than expressed directly in explicit arguments. He argues that, in 
presenting the character of Socrates in the Phaedo, Plato 'is trying to take the 
place of tragic drama: 44 According to Raphael, Plato 'presupposes that the 
tragic drama of the previous century performed the function which he was 
now taking over. The function certainly included moral education, but I 
40 ibid. 
41 Plato, /oc. cit. 




think it can be called moral philosophy.'45 For Raphael, the Phaedo's status 
as a work of moral philosophy is at least partly due to its historical context: 
'Tragic drama was the moral philosophy of fifth-century Athens.' 46 
Undoubtedly, moral education is part of the Phaedo's aim. But this 
observation of itself fails to distinguish between moral philosophy and 
mere moralising. Throughout the ages a great deal of poetry, drama and 
literature in general, including stories, myths and fables, both religious and 
secular, has aimed at moral education. For example, Edmund Spenser's The 
Faerie Queene has moral education as its clear aim and constitutes an 
undisguised work of literary moralism. Indeed it was commissioned as 
such by Spenser's patron, Elizabeth I. But few would accept that, because it 
depicts its tragic hero in a mode that differs from more common 
representations of virtuous action, it qualifies as a work of moral 
philosophy. If, as Raphael claims, one can be a moralist without being a 
moral philosopher, but cannot be an adequate moral philosopher without 
also being a moralist, then a poem like Spenser's can count as a work of 
moralism without qualifying as a work of moral philosophy. Similarly, on 
Raphael's account, the Phaedo has a didactic function that certainly qualifies 
it as a work of moralism. But what features, for Raphael, qualify it also as 
distinctly a work of moral philosophy? First, he writes, 'the ethical 
dimension of Attic tragedy was not simply the preaching of moral doctrine; 
that would be moralizing pure and simple.' 47 But neither does he mean that 
the moral prescriptions are presented as the conclusions to a carefully 
structured and explicit moral argument. Rather, he argues, in tragic 
narratives like the Phaedo, moral doctrine is presented 'as the outcome of a 
new perspective, in a form of persuasion that can fairly be called rational . 
although not reducible to rules of inference like logic.' 48 
However, as shown, Socrates' perspective on death, whether or not 






structured argument, and the bulk of this argument is explicit in the text. 
The form of persuasion Plato employs in the Phaedo is both rational and 
reducible to chains of inference. Indeed, to excise the more explicitly 
philosophical aspects of Socrates' approach to death from the text, would 
leave merely an image of his manner of dying, one which clearly embodies 
Plato's didactic aim of presenting his death as an ideal of how to approach 
mortality, but without the rational support furnished by philosophical 
argument. Such excision may not compromise the narrative's literary 
quality, but without the rational support given by explicit argument, it 
would render the prescriptions implied in the perspective furnished by 
Socrates' attitude to death into mere moralising. Contrariwise, removing 
the dramatic features of the narrative, leaving only the arguments (both 
moral and metaphysical) in bare propositional form, would not 
compromise their status as serious philosophy. Thus, regarding the Phaedo 
as firstly a work of philosophy puts Plato's choice of form in a different 
light: the dramatic mode works both as moralising and as moral 
philosophy. 
So while the Phaedo is clearly an exercise in moralising, it is also a 
work of moral philosophy. But, as argued, it is not specifically a work of 
philosophy for the reasons outlined by Raphael. This is an important point, 
with serious implications for his second, most controversial proposition: 
that a work of literature can also be a work of moral philosophy. However, 
as noted earlier, for the first proposition that a work of moral philosophy 
can also be fully a work of literature to hold, it must be shown to be at least 
each. As argued, the Phaedo can reasonably be regarded as a work of moral 
philosophy, although not for the reasons given by Raphael, but how does 
this bear on its status as a work of literature? In 61b, Socrates himself 
distinguishes between the versifier of 'stories' and the writer of 'discourse,' 
claiming that he is no story-writer. Is this indicative of Plato's desire that 
the dialogue be regarded in a certain fashion, as philosophy rather than 
literature? To paraphrase Kipling's devil, the arguments in the Phaedo 
render it clever, but is it art? 
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Raphael's assessment of the Phaedo's literary quality turns on its dramatic 
intensity. For him, the entire narrative is characterised by its dramatic 
quality: the narrative itself is 'literally dramatic. It has the form of a Greek 
drama.'49 Raphael also observes that the dialogue follows the method of 
presentation employed by dramatists and comments that drama in ancient 
Greece 'depended almost entirely on what was said.' 50 He suggests that 
Plato derived the dialogue form as much from the practice of drama as 
from Socrates' own practice of dialectic. Raphael argues that, like Greek 
drama, the work is broken into episodes, each of which is 'interrupted by 
pauses of a less weighty character' 51 in which focus shifts from the 
dialogue's predominant subject matter and, at two critical points, by a 
commentary from a small group separate from the 'main cast.' This little 
group, says Raphael, is analogous to the chorus used in Greek drama 'to 
express the feelings of the wider "audience' of the work.' 52 Still more 
significant, argues Raphael: 
is an indication that the drama is a kind of tragedy. The hero dies, 
nobly, having excited our imagination; but early on, in the 
introductory discussion of the "chorus," the narrator Phaedo, who 
had been present at the events he is going to describe, 
distinguishes the death of Socrates from other tragedies. 53 
His earlier claim that Attic tragedy has an ethical dimension that 
transcends mere moralising, and his contention that the Phaedo can be 
regarded, to a certain degree, as analogous to Attic tragedy, at least in its 
literary form, is consistent with Atticism's distinguishing features: its 
simplicity, directness and lack of rhetorical device.34 
But the Phaedo's status as a work of literature is due to more than its 
mere resemblance to a certain form of Greek drama. While it does embody 
the dramatic elements which characterise Attic tragedy, it also employs a 
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number of devices common to literature in general and which qualify it as a 
work of literature per se. First, the Phaedo qualifies as a work of narrative art 
in the most fundamental construal of the term 'narrative.' While the Phaedo 
does contain dialogue, it is a narrative, and its dramatic tension is due to 
more than its presentation of interlocution. Insofar as the Phaedo recounts 
the story of Socrates' death, with characters, scenes, settings and actions, 
and that this story is told by a narrator, Phaedo, the work qualifies as a 
narrative by the criteria identified earlier: there is a story, and this story is 
told by a story-teller, the narrator. These features also distinguish it from a 
work of pure drama as, write Scholes and Kellogg, 'a drama is a story 
without a story-teller; characters act out directly what Aristotle called an 
"imitation" of such action as we find in life.' 55 Raphael considers the 
narrative's tragic intensity to be its defining quality as a work of literature. 
But its tragic tone is embodied in the speech, actions and attitudes of a cast 
of characters; and dramatic characterisation, as argued previously, is a 
function of literature. Language, too, plays a role here. The language used 
by the characters is simple and direct, and, even when complex 
metaphysics are discussed, is free of the technicalities that, according to 
Seth, detract from a work's literary merit. The insider's perspective that 
characterises literature also features in the narrative. Socrates' attitude to 
death, his manner of dying, and even his moral and metaphysical 
arguments are all conveyed via the viewpoint of the narrator; and we are 
given some access to Phaedo's own feelings on the matter. As he describes 
his feelings to Echecrates, 'I experienced a quite weird sensation, a sort of 
curious blend of pleasure and pain combined, as my mind took it in that in 
a little while my friend was going to die.' 56 
Moreover, the Phaedo is not entirely free of stylistic devices that 
characterise modern literature. The description of his death and the 
54 Cuddon, op. cit., p. 65 
55 ibid. 
56 Plato, op. cit., 59a, p. 110 
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ordinariness of Socrates' last words, as well as his friend Crito's calm reply, 
lend a tragic dignity to his situation: 
The coldness was spreading about as far as his waist when 
Socrates uncovered his face - for he had covered it up - and said 
(they were his last words): 'Crito, we ought to offer a cock to 
Asclepius. See to it and don't forget.' 
'No, it shall be done,' said Crito. 'Are you sure there is nothing 
else?'57 
The scene's pathos is heightened by the quiet manner of Socrates' passing: 
Socrates made no reply to this question, but after a little while he 
stirred; and when the man uncovered him, his eyes were fixed. 
When Crito saw this, he closed his eyes and mouth. 58 
This scene demonstrates three further specifically literary features which 
help to qualify the Phaedo as a work of literature: imagination, fiction and 
symbolism. The imaginative element is present in the way in which 
Socrates dies, and the very manner of his dying is symbolic of the attitude 
to death that he espouses throughout the narrative. As Socrates' soul 
departs his body, it commences the journey towards achieving everything 
he sought throughout his life - dying is merely a further step along the path 
to pure wisdom. As Tarrant describes it, 'At the end of the work we meet 
an excellent illustration of the slightness of this step as Socrates fades gently 
out of this life, the soul leaving the body from the feet upwards.' 59 Tarrant 
cites Christopher Gill in his argument for this scene's intentional fictiveness 
and symbolic significance: 
this is not an illustration of the normal effects of hemlock 
poisoning, but a piece of idealistic fiction illustrating the main 
message of the dialogue. Socrates is released, and released without 
violence because he had practically released himself already.80 
The symbolism of this scene is augmented in Phaedo's closing comments to 
his listener, in which he says, 'This, Echecrates, was the end of our 
comrade, who was, we may fairly say, of all those whom we knew in our 
57 ibid., 118a, p. 185 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid., p. 99 
80 ibid. 
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time the bravest and also the wisest and most just.' 61 The moralism is clear; 
but it is literary moralising which, when viewed together with the 
numerous stylistic features that Plato employs to sustain and reward his 
audience's contemplation, qualifies the Phaedo as a work of literature. It is 
didactic art, to be sure, but it is art nonetheless. 
Thus the Phaedo possesses a Janus-faced double aspect. It is clear that the 
narrative without the explicit arguments would qualify as a work of 
literature per se. It possesses a number of elements that warrant such a 
characterisation: an insider's perspective, character development, 
interaction and dialogue, dramatic intensity, pathos, non-technical 
language and stylistic devices such as the symbolism embodied in the 
depiction of Socrates' death. Conversely, the bare arguments it contains, 
without the characterisation, stylistic devices, and dramatic intensity of its 
literary aspect, the text would remain a work of philosophy per se, and its 
ethical arguments would qualify it as, at least in part, a work of moral 
philosophy. Thus, as a work of literature qua literature, the Phaedo has 
merit; it also has merit as a work of moral philosophy qua moral 
philosophy, although not necessarily for the reasons given by Raphael. 
Moreover, as Raphael and Tarrant argue, the dialogue has genuine merit as 
a combined work of philosophy and literature. As Tarrant observes, 'We 
are asked to listen to the arguments critically; we are also asked to respond 
to the personalities of those participating.' 62 
Raphael is right that some works of moral philosophy can not only 
possess literary merit, but can also be works of literature. But it does not 
follow that any work of moral philosophy, however literary, can also be 
considered a work of literature. The Phaedo, like other works of Plato, is a 
special case, and it qualifies because it possesses a number of features 
common to imaginative literature while retaining the features - a reflective 
generality and style of argument that aims to be rationally persuasive - that 
61 ibid., 118a, p. 185 
62 Tarrant, op. cit., p. x 
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qualify it as a work of philosophy. But Plato's dialogues number among 
very few exceptions to the rule. The overwhelming majority of works of 
moral philosophy, commencing with Aristotle's up to the present day, 
remain works of pure philosophy, even allowing that significant literary 
merit may attach to them. 
However, it is not Raphael's intention to treat the first proposition as it is 
treated here; that is, as the object of worthwhile reflection on a 
philosophically interesting point. Instead, he employs his argument that 
some works of philosophy can also be works of literature as evidence in 
support of his second proposition, that a work of literature can also be a 
work of moral philosophy. He writes: 
If others accept my view that some literature has an ethical 
dimension which strikes the eye through a novel perspective, an 
ethical dimension which goes beyond moralizing but is not 
reached by explicit argument - if they accept this, will they also 
agree that such literature can be called a form of moral 
philosophy? 63 
The acceptance or rejection of Raphael's proposition here has a crucial 
bearing on the validity of his second proposition. Because to value 
literature for the distinctive contribution that it can make to philosophical 
reflection is to acknowledge a distinction between literature and 
philosophy, and to accord importance to the distinction itself. However, as 
will be argued, to accept this second proposition is to reduce one form of 
discourse to another form of discourse, and there are good reasons to 
believe that the power of the connection between philosophy and literature 
would be severely attenuated if this were the case. 
But before proceeding to a detailed critique of this crucial second 
proposition, it is worth considering the third and fourth propositions to 
evaluate their implications for the validity of the proposition that a work of 
literature can also be a work of moral philosophy. 
63 Raphael, op. cit., p. 4 
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The Third Proposition: Moral Philosophy Feeds Literature 
When Raphael suggests that moral philosophy can 'feed' literature, he 
means that moral insights gleaned via philosophical reflection can enrich 
the moral theme and dimension of a work of literature. These insights, the 
argument runs, can be embodied in the situations depicted in the work and 
in the actions and attitudes of its characters. While the proposition that 
moral philosophy can feed literature is uncontroversial, it nevertheless 
implies a valuable relation between the two enterprises. However, 
accepting this proposition does not entail, as Raphael supposes, that its 
validity supports the separate proposition that merely because a work of 
literature embodies ethical insights or issues which are derived from 
philosophical reflection, it qualifies as a work of moral philosophy in its 
own right. 
Raphael selects the works of two writers as examples of works of 
literature whose themes or moral dimensions are clearly fed by moral 
philosophy. It is noteworthy that both authors are also philosophers in their 
own right: Iris Murdoch and Jean-Paul Sartre. Of Murdoch, he writes that 
some of her novels 'feed on her views as a moral philosopher in that they 
exemplify in imagined individuals her abstract ideas about good and 
evil.' 64 He posits a similar relation between Sartre's philosophy and his 
literary endeavour: 'Sartre likewise tries to exemplify his existentialist 
theory of ethics in a play like Les Mouches or in his novels, La Nausee and the 
unfinished Les Chemins de la liberte.' 65 Raphael claims a similarity between 
• the literary works of these writers and those produced by non-philosophers 
yet which nonetheless contain a valuable moral dimension: 
What Murdoch and Sartre are doing here has some affinity with 
the activity of a novelist who is not an explicit philosopher but 
who gives expression, in imagined characters and situations, to a 
moral insight.66 




Here Raphael acknowledges that moral insight is not always derived solely 
from the arena of moral philosophy. In allowing that such insight is not the 
exclusive domain of the moral philosopher, he agrees with Phillips when 
he writes, 'Moral philosophy can clarify moral insight but it can also twist it 
askew.'67 His comment chimes with Cunningham's claim that, taken to 
their limits, 'prominent modern ethical theories would squeeze out, ignore, 
or deform things that matter.' 68 Indeed, for Raphael, the more closely the 
moral dimension of a work of literature corresponds to the ethical ideas 
that feed it, the more likely it suffers from the same faults as the 
philosophical work which produced the ideas. He nominates •both 
Murdoch and Sartre as producing works which, while endowed with moral 
significance, fail to speak fully to the heart of what matters in ethics: 
If Iris Murdoch and Sartre had not been philosophers and had 
given their literary talents free rein without any guidance from a 
preconceived ethical theory, the moral tone of their fictional works 
might have rung more true. 69 
Precisely how Raphael believes that Murdoch's and Sartre's works might 
have rung more true is unclear, as is the significance of this criticism to the 
proposition under investigation. On the one hand, he argues that moral 
philosophy can feed literature; on the other hand, he evaluates the works of 
these writers as poorer because of it. Raphael offers no elaboration of his 
criticism here, but he seems to hold that because moral philosophy itself 
fails to ring true to moral experience, the moral dimension of literary works 
that are closely informed by theories that emerge from moral philosophy 
also carry this shortcoming. If this is correct, then it raises a question 
concerning the import of this third proposition for the connection between 
literature and philosophy. If feeding literature with the moral insights 
generated in philosophical reflection infects that literature with the same 
shortcoming that limits the significance or value of the original insight, then 
how can this relation between the two enterprises be valuable? Stylistic and 
67 ibid. 
68 Cunningham, op. cit., p.2 
Raphael, /oc. cit. 
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methodological differences aside, if connecting philosophy and literature 
via the 'feed' relation generates no more valuable insights than 
philosophical reflection itself does, then no substantive purpose is served 
by the connection. This criticism also implies that works that have been fed 
by philosophy are of lesser value to philosophical reflection than those that 
embody purely pretheoretical moral views or insights. The implications of 
this for the proposition that literature may productively feed philosophy 
are obvious. To an extent, Raphael's criticism of the two writers assumes a 
teleological view of the moral value of literature and moral philosophy. The 
end to which these enterprises is to be directed, and by reference to which 
they are to be judged, is the development and communication of moral 
insight. Therefore, if the moral end of literature is to communicate moral 
insights that ring true to human experience, and that are unavailable 
through philosophical reflection alone, then it follows that works which 
fulfil this end are the most valuable. While Hare's criterion for the relation 
between literature and its real-world counterpart is empirically verifiable, 
Raphael offers no suggestion concerning how to assess the veracity of 
literary embodiments of moral insight. How is one to judge how closely a 
work rings true to moral experience and the extent to which its proximity 
here is due to its being fed by moral theory? 
However, his criticism of Murdoch's and Sartre's works could be 
grounded in their failure to achieve this end. Raphael argues that many 
works of literary artists who are not explicit philosophers 'manage to 
achieve willy-nilly what moral philosopher are after.' 70 He offers no 
examples of writers whose works achieve this end in his account of the 
third proposition. But in his defence of the second proposition, he 
nominates Henry Fielding and Samuel Butler as non-philosophers whose 
works embody the sorts of insights that moral philosophers aim to develop. 
But if these writers achieve 'willy-nilly' what moral philosophers are after, 
that is, the communication of moral insight, and if they achieve this without 
explicitly drawing from the reflections and conclusions of moral 
214 
philosophy, then to what extent can their works be said to have been fed by 
an explicit moral philosophy? What are the implications of this for the 
validity and value of the third proposition? On Raphael's account of the 
works of Murdoch and Sartre, the proposition seems to entail a positive 
relation between philosophy and literature; but if the literature is afflicted 
with the shortcomings that burden the explicit moral theory that feeds it, 
then this connection is of only limited value to the work of literature, and of 
no value to moral philosophy. 
However, Raphael's motives here are not to articulate an objective 
argument for the proposition that philosophy can valuably feed literature 
in a way analogous to literature's feeding philosophy by contributing what 
is unavailable via the methods of either sole endeavour, but are inextricably 
linked to gaining acceptance of his second proposition. As he writes, 'The 
example of Sartre, unlike that of Iris Murdoch, shows the difficulty of 
making a firm line of distinction between proposition three and proposition 
two.' 71 
Raphael claims that Sartre's example entails a difficulty for this 
distinction because he wants to defend the proposition that a work of 
literature can also be a work of moral philosophy. If he can show that an 
explicit work of literature can generate or explore moral insights, not as a 
result of its direct discursive or argumentative content, but for the fresh 
perspective it offers on moral concepts and issues, and that this perspective 
is as rationally persuasive as direct, explicit argument, and that it shares 
key aims with moral philosophy, then it is a small step to accepting that it, 
too, qualifies as a work of moral philosophy. This is his reason for 
nominating Fielding and Butler as non-philosophers whose works embody 
ethical insight and, as such, qualify as works of moral philosophy. But the 
works of Fielding and Butler either have or have not been explicitly fed by 
antecedently developed moral philosophy. If it can be shown that their 




then this fact alone unequivocally supports the validity of the third 
proposition, irrespective of any other relation they may have to moral 
philosophy. Further, if these writer's works are more valuable as a result of 
this relation than they would be without it, then this vindicates the value of 
the connection expressed in the third proposition. On the other hand, if it is 
shown that the moral insights expressed in their works are not derived 
from antecedently developed moral philosophy, then the works of neither 
writer are relevant to the validity of proposition three and, as such, cannot 
contribute to the debate. 
In illustrating the weakness of the third proposition, and how its 
acceptance could support his second proposition, Raphael draws a 
distinction between the way in which the depictions of characters and 
situations in Murdoch's novels are fed by her moral philosophy, and how 
the relation between Sartre's literary endeavour and his philosophical 
activities exemplifies a stronger notion of 'feeding': 
Iris Murdoch draws on her philosophy as one element among 
others in the material she works into a novel. She does not, I think, 
regard her writing of novels as a way of writing moral 
philosophy. Sartre, on the other hand, did seem to treat the 
writing of plays and novels as an alternative method of conveying 
his philosophical notions to a wider public than would or could 
read his philosophical works. 72 
This point is interesting insofar in that it embodies two distinct senses of 
the notion that philosophy may feed literature. However, it is also 
problematic for Raphael's argument. In the case of Murdoch, it is easy to 
see how the working of philosophical concepts or issues into her stories 
constitutes a form of 'feeding' without actually accepting the novels in 
which they appear as works of moral philosophy. This is the 
uncontroversial aspect of Raphael's argument, and it conforms with the 




Raphael's comments on Sartre, on the other hand, imply that Sartre's 
literary endeavours, as opposed to his more explicit philosophical activities, 
additionally embodies a significant aspect of the philosophical process, 
rather than merely communicating its conclusions. However, the 
suggestion that Sartre's literary works are fed by moral philosophy in this 
stronger sense ignores the distinction between moral philosophy and 
moralism examined earlier. It was noted previously that prescription is a 
major function of moral philosophy and that, according to Raphael, one 
cannot be an adequate moral philosopher without also being a moralist. But 
moralising alone, insofar as this is construed as the mere communication of 
moral prescriptions, forms only part of the overall function of moral 
philosophy which must involve deep and systematic reflection on moral 
concepts and issues. The moralism of the Phaedo exemplifies this relation; 
but, as shown, the explicit reflections that inform its moralising also qualify 
it, at least in part, as a work of moral philosophy in its own right. 
In communicating a preference for a certain way of life or form of 
character through the actions and attitudes of its characters, a work of pure 
literature may also include aspects of moralism. That is, it may expound a 
moral theme or incorporate a clear moral dimension. Indeed, works like 
Spenser's Faerie Queene and other literary modes including fables, myths 
and moral tales can in their entirety constitute works of moralism. 
Moreover, if a literary work's moral dimension is informed by the 
reasoning and conclusions of moral philosophy, if its characters' actions 
and attitudes reflect the outcomes of philosophical argument, or exemplify 
an ethical position, or embody the prescriptions of an ethical theory, as they 
often do in Murdoch's novels, then it can be said to have been fed by moral 
philosophy. 
But, insofar as the literary work does not itself constitute the 
systematic endeavour to understand moral concepts, justify moral 
principles, and present a case for the best ways of life and forms of 
character, the mere communication of insights gleaned from such 
endeavour through the actions and attitudes of imaginary characters, while 
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it can be said to have been fed by moral philosophy, is not the same as 
explicitly doing moral philosophy. Indeed, there are obvious differences 
between the writings of each of the philosophers to whom Raphael refers. 
Sartre's Being and Nothingness, for instance, is as different a work of writing 
from his La Nays& as Murdoch's The Sovereignty of the Good is from her The 
Severed Head. But Being and Nothingness and The Sovereignty of the Good, 
while both very different in content and conclusions, share sufficient 
characteristics to qualify as clear cases of philosophical writing. Both of 
their other works, on the other hand, possess enough distinguishing 
features that qualify them as examples of narrative art. Therefore, while the 
first example of each philosopher's works is indisputably a work of 
philosophy, each of the second examples is clearly foremost a work of 
literature, irrespective of the extent to which its moral dimension has been 
fed by insights gleaned from the writer's philosophical activities. Nor can 
one argue that La Mats& qualifies as a work of philosophy because its 
moral dimension is grounded in the explicit argumentation of Being and 
Nothingness, or because through its characters it communicates some of the 
ideas expressed there. Despite having the same writer, they are separate 
texts, and each must be evaluated according to its own specific 
characteristics. The Phaedo is not a work of moral philosophy just because it 
is written by a moral philosopher, is about a moral philosopher, or its 
moralising is informed by insights developed and articulated in the explicit 
philosophy of the Meno and other texts, but because some of these insights 
are developed and articulated in the explicit argumentation that forms the 
fabric of the text. That is to say, sufficient of the text takes the form of 
explicit moral philosophy. Moreover, each mode requires a different 
reading approach, one primarily imaginative the other primarily critical, 
and their value needs to be judged against different criteria. Thus the 
distinction between moral philosophy and literature is evident not just in 
the works themselves, but also in the reading approaches required to 
appreciate the value and significance of works of each mode of discourse. 
However a work's aesthetic value is assessed, it will not be by reference to 
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validity, rigour, perspicuity, completeness and orderliness, criteria against 
which philosophical positions and arguments are typically evaluated. 
Further, in the pairs of works cited, the notion that the former may feed the 
latter is made intelligible by reference to these distinctions. From Raphael's 
perspective, proposition three, for all its logical dependence on a distinction 
between the two enterprises, risks collapsing into either proposition one or 
proposition two, and its validity rests entirely on there being a distinction 
between the two discursive modes: for the relation 'to feed' to hold, there 
must be a feeder and a fed. Raphael says nothing about the implications of 
proposition three collapsing into proposition one, but his argument for the 
validity of proposition two relies heavily on the third proposition's 
collapse. If one accepts Sartre's literary works as examples of an explicit 
mode of philosophy that differs from traditional conceptions of the 
endeavour, yet is no less philosophical for the difference, then one is 
committed to accepting the validity of the second proposition. However, 
one can support Raphael's claim,that Sartre's works blur the distinction 
between propositions two and three only if one disallows the distinction 
between philosophy and literature. But this would ignore the stylistic, 
methodological and evaluative gulf that separates the two modes of 
discourse and repudiate the value of the distinction. Raphael's view of the 
relation between philosophy and literature in Sartre's works, I have argued, 
is mistaken, but his example of Murdoch is a clear instance of a writer 
whose fictional works are fed by moral philosophy while not in themselves 
constituting explicit works of moral philosophy. 
The proposition that moral philosophy may feed literature is valid 
given a genuine distinction between philosophy and literature, and 
embodies a valuable possibility for the connection between the two. 
Indeed, numerous works of pure literature owe their moral significance to 
their having been fed by the reflections and conclusions of moral 
philosophy, and philosophy in general. For example, Angel Clare's 
revolution concerning the locus of moral value of Tess' past in Hardy's Tess 
of the D'Urbervilles is all the more striking for its relation to Kant's account 
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of the same subject. But no necessary connection obtains between the 
limitations of some moral philosophy and the extent to which a work of 
literature which embodies its themes rings true to human experience. There 
is no inevitable benefit to the feed relation: a novel fed by the outcomes of 
moral philosophy need not be an advertisement for its conclusions. The 
central theme of Dickens' Hard Times is clearly fed by the hegemonic 
utilitarian thought of his day. By 'fed' here it is meant that in his novel he 
implicitly represents utilitarianism, as a prevailing system of thought in his 
time, at least in part, to demonstrate its limitations. Moreover, insofar as his 
characters exemplify attitudes outside the scope of utilitarian thought, the 
novel cannot be said to ring less true to moral experience as a result of its 
relation to that philosophy. Perhaps if Dickens were a utilitarian himself, 
and employed his writing to canvass support for the theory, then Raphael's 
concern would be justifiable. But Dickens was not a utilitarian, at least not 
of the kind typified in the Gradgrind character, and the moralism in his 
novel both exceeds and conflicts with a pure exposition of that theory. Hard 
Times is critically appraised as a work of literature that reveals the extent to 
which utilitarianism itself fails to ring true to moral experience. 73 
While it may be reasonable to assume that the literary works of 
philosophers such as Sartre and Murdoch, insofar as they often exemplify 
their authors' own philosophical views, are to a greater or lesser degree fed 
by such views, the examples of Hardy and Dickens show that it is not only 
novels written by bona fide moral philosophers that are worthy of serious 
moral attention. Such a view ignores the large body of imaginative 
literature produced by creative writers who are not explicit philosophers, 
yet whose works clearly reflect the subject matter and conclusions of moral 
philosophy. Indeed, the material in any number of distinctly philosophical 
perspectives provides rich thematic resources for works of fiction and, as 
such, can be said to feed them. 
73 See Nussbaum's Poetic Justice, op. cit., for a detailed discussion of this view. 
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Jane Austen is considered by many as the apotheosis of literary 
treatments of moral life and the virtues. But are her literary themes 
explicitly fed by insights gleaned from moral philosophy? It is difficult to 
definitively answer this question. According to Tony Tanner, it is 
reasonable to conjecture that the writings of bona fide moral philosophers 
did provide her with some material that informs the moral dimension of 
her works. In particular, he argues that there is evidence that she had 
drawn ideas from the philosophical works of David Hume. This evidence 
first emerges in her first choice of a title for the novel ultimately published 
as Pride and Prejudice. It was originally to be called First Impressions, but this 
name was discarded following the publication of another book of the same 
title. 74 In his introduction to Pride and Prejudice, Tanner argues that the 
phrase 'first impressions' furnishes an 'important clue to a central concern 
for the [novel's] final version.' 75 He suggests that the notion of first 
impressions is invested with a significance that reveals its philosophical 
roots, and that it is probable that Hume's philosophy at least partly fed the 
novel's moral and epistemological themes: 
Without for a moment suggesting that she read as much 
contemporary philosophy as she did fiction (although with so 
intelligent a woman it is scarcely impossible), I think it is worth 
pointing out that 'impressions' is one of the key words in David 
Hume's philosophy, and the one to which he gives pre-eminence 
as the source of our knowledge. 76 
According to Hume, all of our ideas are derived from impressions, 
including those which comprise our moral knowledge. 77 Tanner develops 
his argument further, quoting from passages and scenes from the novel 
which clearly exemplify this theme. He claims that Hume's theory 
harmonises with Pride and Prejudice and that there are sufficient thematic 
similarities to infer some derivative relation between the views expressed 
in Hume's philosophical work and those explored in Austen's literature. 
74 J. Austen, Pride and Prejudice, Tony Tanner (ed), (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 9- 
10. 
75 ibid., p.9 
76 ibid., p. 11 
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He is particularly alert to the parallels between the cognitive dispositions of 
Austen's characters and Hume's 'reasoner' in the Enquiry Concerning 
Morals, in which Hume writes: 'The truth is, an unexperienced reasoner 
could be no reasoner at all, were he absolutely unexperienced.' 78 Tanner 
argues: 
For Jane Austen, as for Hume, man, and woman, needed to be 
both an experiencer and a reasoner: the former without the latter 
is error-prone, the latter without the former is useless if not 
impossible (as exemplified by Mary Bennet's sententious 
comments; she is all 'cool and disengaged' reason, and thus no 
reasoner at all). Both experience and reason depend upon 
impressions, and first impressions thus become our first steps into 
full human life. To overstress this may become a matter suitable 
for burlesque, but as a general proposition it is not inherently so. 79 
What is important here is not the degree to which philosophical material 
may have fed the thematic concerns of Austen's literature, but that they 
have done so at all; for this validates the proposition that works of 
philosophy can feed literature. Moreover, that such works are written by 
non-philosophers who nonetheless productively exploit the relation, is 
testament to the proposition's range - its application is not limited to works 
of literature that embody the views of their philosopher-writers. Raphael 
acknowledges this feature of the proposition in his observation that some 
non-philosopher literary artists achieve 'will-nilly' what moral 
philosophers are after. A further implication of the Austen example is that, 
if it is accepted that philosophical views have contributed to a literary 
work's richness, then this is evidence not only that philosophy can feed 
literature, but that it can valuably do so. 
However, accepting the validity of proposition three does not entail 
accepting Raphael's claim that certain examples of literature that have been 
fed by philosophy blur the distinction between propositions two and three. 
In whatever other ways the propositions differ, they fundamentally differ 
in terms of the conditions required to obtain in order for each to hold. 
77 David Hume, op. cit., passim 
78 Hume, cited by Tanner in Austen, op. cit., p. 13 
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While the validity of proposition three depends on a certain logical relation 
between discrete forms of activity, proposition two rejects this distinction 
and proposes that an identity relation between philosophy and literature is 
exemplified in certain works. The relation between the two propositions is 
disjunctive. Either a work of literature is fed by philosophy (proposition 
three), or it is a work of philosophy (proposition two). 80 But in no way can 
the validity of the second proposition be derived from the third. To say that 
Murdoch's literary works are fed by her views as a moral philosopher, and 
that this instantiates the third proposition is one thing. But to argue in the 
case of Sartre that the strength of the 'feed' relation between his 
philosophical views and his literary endeavour qualifies his literature as 
philosophy, and thus blurs the distinction between the two propositions, is 
wrong. It may blur the distinction between philosophy and literature, but it 
does not blur the distinction between the two propositions; they remain 
distinct irrespective of the status of the examples employed to illustrate 
them. Rather, it applies a different proposition to the work in question. To 
claim that a certain literary work qualifies as a work of philosophy because 
of the way in which it has been fed by philosophy, if this even makes sense, 
is to claim that the second proposition, not the third, applies to it, and that 
it is a case of literature as philosophy. It makes no sense to say that a work 
of philosophy can be fed by philosophy, other than in the ordinary sense in 
which philosophers whose work engages with the works of other 
philosophers can be said to have been fed by those works. But this 
construal does not describe a relation between two distinct enterprises. 
Rather, it describes a relation between activities within a particular 
enterprise. In this case, it describes philosophy's traditional modus operandi, 
in which philosophers often develop, refine, refute or otherwise engage 
with the ideas of their predecessors and contemporaries. Indeed, Raphael 
himself, in another work, acknowledges that this form of activity is basic to 
" Austen, ibid. 
8° Or, as shown, in the case of the first proposition, it can be both literature and philosophy; 
but that is a separate proposition. 
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philosophy's 'three related purposes, analysis, synthesis and improvement 
of concepts.'81 But acknowledging that certain works of literature are 
partially informed by, or engage with, material gleaned from moral 
philosophy, and that this connection enriches these works' thematic 
concerns and enhances their literary merit, entails accepting the existence of 
a distinction between philosophy and literature. And this is the distinction 
that is blurred by a certain construal of proposition three to support 
Raphael's arguments for the validity of the proposition two, that a work of 
literature can be a work of philosophy. However, as with the first 
proposition, the conclusions drawn from arguments supporting this third 
proposition, insofar as the distinction between literature and philosophy is 
a necessary condition for its validity, cannot lend weight to the second 
proposition, and Raphael's case to this effect must fail. 
The distinction between philosophy and literature also underpins 
the fourth proposition, which Raphael claims expresses the most valuable 
and enriching possibility for the connection between philosophy and 
literature, and which constitutes the central argument of this thesis. Before 
analysing the implications of Raphael's second proposition, it is worth 
reviewing the discussion concerning the relation between literature and 
philosophy described in the fourth, and clarifying how it bears on the 
validity of the proposition that a work of literature can also be a work. of 
philosophy. 
The Fourth Proposition: Literature feeds Moral Philosophy 
Raphael's fourth proposition for the connection between literature and 
moral philosophy has already been discussed in previous chapters. As we 
saw, Raphael offers two meanings for the term 'feed' in the context of his 
fourth proposition. The first meaning entails a chiefly cognitive role for 
literature in philosophy. This account fits with Robert Sharpe's suggestion 
that what literature does is 'offer us imaginary scenes, concentrated and 
81 D. D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy 2nd edn., (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 
16 
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complex settings, in which imaginary beings act.' 82 For Sharpe, this relation 
is valuable because, 'from literature I may learn about individual human 
propensities and peculiarities.' 83 In terms of the fourth proposition, 
literature is a valuable adjunct to moral philosophy because it can clarify 
how these propensities and peculiarities relate to the prescriptions of 
ethical theory. Throughout this thesis, this explanation of the role for 
literature in ethical reflection has been called 'the propositional account.' 
The second meaning considered by Raphael of the notion that literature can 
feed philosophy entails that some effect is produced in the reader's moral 
outlook: 'But to say that literature feeds moral philosophy can also mean 
that literature may stimulate a philosophical perception which otherwise 
might have been missed.' 84 This meaning is in line with Sharpe's claim that, 
for literature to bring real change in one's moral outlook, it 'must move and 
involve us,' 85 and echoes Nussbaum's claim that novel reading can 
'develop moral capacities without which citizens will not succeed in 
making reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or political 
theory, however excellent.'86 To an extent, both meanings interpenetrate 
and, where they overlap, I have endeavoured to offer some explanation of 
the role and value of their connection. 
Of the first meaning, Raphael writes: 'If someone says that literature 
feeds moral philosophy, he may mean that the characters or situations in a 
work of literature can be used as evidence for some issues in moral 
philosophy.' 87 On this account, literature can reveal or elucidate facts 
concerning the ethical life that have relevant implications for the truth 
value, plausibility or practical application of propositions contained in a 
body of moral philosophy. The propositional account embodies 
Beardsmore's claim that literary representations of moral problems, 
situations and possibilities can valuably be employed to 'illustrate and test 
82 Robert Sharpe, "Literature and philosophy" in Honderich, Op. cit., p. 525 
83 ibid. 
84 Raphael, op. cit., p. 1. 
85 Sharpe, /oc. cit. 
86 Nussbaum, op. cit. p. 12 
87 Raphael, /oc. cit. 
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our philosophical theories.' 88 Thus the significance of literature to 
philosophical reflection flows from what it can reveal about ethics and 
ethical theory and its value derives, at least in part, from its ability to 
augment moral philosophy's endeavour to present the best ways of life and 
forms of character. While all forms of literature and narrative art are 
valuable in this respect, the novel, with its emphasis on character, plot, 
complexity, and attention to detail, appears as the most valuable. 
Nussbaum maintains that novels and novel-reading provide 'insights that 
should play a role ... in the construction of an adequate moral and political 
theory.' 89 
Much of this thesis has investigated Raphael's claim that proposition 
four expresses the 'most obvious, the richest, and the most satisfying' 
relationship between moral philosophy and literature. 90 To see why, and to 
clarify its implications for the second proposition, it is useful to recapitulate 
the discussion so far. 
Concerning the cormection between literature and moral philosophy 
envisaged in the fourth proposition, it has been argued that the concrete 
detail in imaginative literature, when incorporated into ethical reflection, 
can elicit, illuminate, clarify and test the implications of a moral theory. In 
supplementing the 'cool head' of philosophical reflection with the 
imaginative faculty, literature can help philosophy by revealing 
possibilities of moral seriousness that may be unavailable via the general 
and abstract preoccupations of purely rational inquiry. As Norris argues, 
literature: 
is able to show us that in any given situation there may pertain 
important features that are unique and do not fall within the ambit 
of some clearly defined principle. 91 
As argued in chapter three, the scene from Heart of Darkness can effectively 
illustrate one of the foundational aspects of Kant's ethical theory, his notion 
88 Beardsmore, /oc. cit. 
89 Nussbaum, /oc. cit. 
98 Raphael, op. cit. 
91 Norris, op. cit, p. 19 
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of respect for human dignity. The workers are clearly suffering from the 
consequences of being used merely as means to the end of 'this or that will 
in its discretion.' 92 It was argued that whether this circumstance was 
actually the result of a certain mode of moral reasoning is not vital to the 
scene's ethical significance. That it is conceivably the product of such 
reasoning is sufficient and, as such, it can be seen to represent the 
iniquitous consequence of a certain ethical perspective. But contemplating 
the scene in the light of Kant's theory also reveals a number of issues that 
require more comprehensive examination, such as his account of the value 
of inclinations such as sympathy and benevolence. The moral importance 
of these dispositions was illustrated by Twain's Huckleberry Finn and 
Bennett's commentary on Huck's decision not to give Jim the slave up to 
his 'rightful owners.' As an illustration, then, the scene from Heart of 
Darkness not only illuminates and clarifies an important aspect of Kantian 
ethics, but it also alerts the reader to issues the resolution of which may be 
progressed by further engagement with literature. As shown, an 
examination of Marlow's natural sympathy with the workers in light of 
Huck Finn's intuitive morality reveals how at least one aspect of Kantian 
ethics fails to accommodate an important human propensity and, as such, 
fails to ring true to moral experience. 
Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, was used to test an ethical 
perspective. The non-utilitarian sees the dilemma posed by Ivan's challenge 
as a clash between general happiness and the rights of the innocent, and as 
a dilemma that cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of utility. The 
act utilitarian, on the other hand, sees no dilemma at all in Ivart's challenge. 
As Graham explains, provided that it can be shown that the balance of 
general good over individual loss has been properly described, then it 'as 
clear as anything' that we should sacrifice the innocent. 93 However, it was 
argued that, irrespective of the strength of any pragmatic case for the 
torture, for those with deep convictions that torturing the innocent is 
92 AK 4: 428 
93 Graham, 1990, /oc. cit. 
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wrong, nothing can make it morally right to do so. Examining the Greatest 
Happiness Principle in light of Ivan's challenge reinforces Midgley's view 
that theories which, when acted on, have obviously iniquitous 
consequences are bad theories and must be changed to accommodate our 
reasonable and deep-seated convictions, or else rejected. The rule 
utilitarian's variation of the theory entails a conception of justice which 
comports with our convictions concerning the plight of the workers in 
Heart of Darkness, and which, at least superficially, accommodates Ivan's 
challenge. But as shown; Ivan's challenge ultimately confronts the rule 
utilitarian with a difficulty that the theory cannot accommodate. The scene 
from Sophie's Choice was employed to show that, while the extreme 
dilemma represented Ivan's challenge is a heuristic device intended to test 
an ethical theory at the limits of imagination, horrid dilemmas are within 
the bounds of human possibility. The scene depicting Sophie's encounter 
with the Nazi doctor, and her subsequent choice of which of her two 
children must die, represents a moral situation that is not only possible, but 
is the kind of situation known to have prevailed in recent history. To 
paraphrase Graham, we do not need to believe that an actual woman 
named Sophie was made to choose between her two children; it is enough 
to know that her dilemma represents the kind of situation that actually 
occurred during the Nazi's reign. This knowledge is sufficient to demand 
that our ethical theories be sensitive to the influences of the emotions on 
making ethical choices, and in particular to the primacy people typically 
accord to intimate attachments. It also highlights the extremes to which 
ethical monsters are prepared to act, and furnishes some clues as to how 
the implementation of ethical theory in public morality may help to 
identify and contend with such persons. But if key aspects of Kantian ethics 
and utilitarianism are shown, with the aid of literary examples, to ring false 
to genuine moral experience, what philosophical approach to ethics is 
required? In examining the actions and attitudes of the bishop of Digne in 
Hugo's Les Miserables, it was argued that virtue theory, which embraces 
traits and dispositions that are highly valued, comes closer to speaking to 
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the heart of what matters. This is especially true when virtue theory 
employs the aid of literature to furnish depictions of characters that 
exemplify virtuous actions, ways of life and forms of character. 
However, the value of this connection between moral philosophy 
and literature, especially if it is to be exploited to overcome some of the 
limitations inherent in rational argument, is fully dependent on there being 
a distinction between the two enterprises. As D. H. Lawrence writes, books 
are not life, they are only 'tremulations on the ether.' 94 For Lawrence, 
however, the novel occupies a special place in the literary corpus: 'But the 
novel as a tremulation can make the whole man alive tremble. Which is 
more than poetry, philosophy, science or any other book-tremulation can 
do.'95 While this tremulation will be tempered by the cool head of 
philosophical analysis, this possibility for engagement and identification 
with literary characters and their ethical situations warrants the 
incorporation of literature into ethical reflection to expand one's 
understanding of the significance and implications of ethical theory, 
something unavailable through traditional philosophical reflection alone. If 
philosophical analysis has shortcomings that limit its ability to speak to the 
heart of what matters, and if we are to employ one form of discourse to 
supplement, to correct the shortcomings of, another form of discourse, then 
it makes no sense at all to reduce the corrective to that which requires 
correction. However, this is the implication in Raphael's second 
proposition, that a work of literature can also be a work of moral 
philosophy. 
The Second Proposition: Literature as Philosophy 
Raphael's conclusions on the implications of the first and third propositions 
fail to support the second proposition, that a work of literature can also be a 
work of philosophy. Moreover, the value of the relation entailed in the 
94 D. H. Lawrence, cited in Bernard Bergonzi, The Situation of the Novel, 2nd Ed., (London: 
Macmillan, 1979). p. 11 
95 ibid. 
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fourth proposition depends on a distinction between the two enterprises. 
For this second proposition to succeed, therefore, it must do so 
independently of how the other relations between literature and 
philosophy are construed. 
In arguing for the validity of the second proposition, Raphael places 
a caveat on his claim, 'the question of whether literature can be moral 
philosophy depends on what we are prepared to call moral philosophy.' 96 
For Raphael, then, the question is at least partly decided by reference to 
moral philosophy's proper definition. While Raphael's caveat is crucial to 
his account of the second proposition, I am here less concerned with the 
details of his argument than with its general stance on the relation between 
literature and moral philosophy. If the stance is unsound, then any position 
that flows from it will be problematic. 
Raphael claims that two features serve to qualify a work of literature 
as a work of moral philosophy. In 'presenting an argument by means of a 
... novel perspective,' he claims, a work of literature can, first, engage with 
philosophical position and, second, share its aim with moral 
philosophers.97 He argues that literature can sharpen moral insight, a clear 
aim of moral philosophy, and that 'what matters is the recognition that 
some literature does have this function and so has a degree of resemblance 
to moral philosophy.' 98 He reasons that works of literature that share this 
function and bear this resemblance can be regarded also as works of moral 
philosophy. To an extent, Raphael's case for the second proposition's 
validity is grounded in a teleological view of moral philosophy. This view 
informs his notion of moral philosophy as that activity whose definition is 
constitutive of the end towards which it is directed, the sharpening of 
moral insight. Therefore, if a work of literature shares the same end as 
96 Raphael, op. cit. p. 4 
97 ibid., p.12 
98 ibid., p. 6 
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moral philosophy, the sharpening of moral insight, and in so doing 
resembles moral philosophy, then that work qualifies as a work of moral 
philosophy. 
For example, if we were to resolve that certain moral insights can be 
sharpened by contemplating the ethically significant aspects of Tess of the 
D'Urbervilles, and if it can be shown that the novel engages with a 
philosophical position, then there is a case for accepting Hardy's novel as a 
work of moral philosophy. For Tess of the D'Urbervilles, the issue is 
straightforward and easy to resolve. Close reflection on Tess' actions and 
her relations with Clare and D'Urberville certainly helps to sharpen 
insights concerning the complexity of ethical judgement and its possible 
consequences. The novel's central theme of redemption clearly engages 
with an established philosophical position. On Raphael's teleological 
account, then, the novel qualifies as a work of moral philosophy. 
What is the role of intentionality here? Is the novel meant to be a 
work of moral philosophy or is it accidentally so, its status ascribed by 
reference to the possible fruits of its reading coincidentally overlapping 
with the aims of moral philosophy? Can we ascribe a genuine telos without 
intention or design? Are Hardy's explicit aims in writing Tess of the 
D'Urbervilles to make a case for the best way of life or form of character, to 
facilitate the sharpening of moral insight, to offer compelling reasons to act 
or live one way rather than another and so to qualify his novel as a work of 
moral philosophy? In short, is Tess of the D'Urbervilles intended as a work of 
rational persuasion? The answer to this question is no. Hardy's contention 
that the novel is an impression rather than an argument is a clear 
expression of his lack of intention in this regard." In presenting an 
impression of complex life from a unique perspective, explicit rational 
persuasion is incidental to the novel's aims. However, intentionality seems 
" Hardy, Loc. cit 
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not to be a deciding feature for Raphael's teleological explanation. Recall 
his earlier comment that some 'literary artists manage to achieve willy-nilly 
what moral philosophers are after.' 100  This implies that the authors to 
whom he refers may not always set out with the express aim of persuading 
their readers to accept certain normative conclusions, and that their works 
are not always directed towards some explicit philosophical position or 
goal. What is important for Raphael is not intention or design, but that 
these works engage with an ethical position, reveal a new ethical 
perspective and sharpen moral insight, all functions of moral philosophy 
and, according to Raphael, constitutive of its aims. How the novel arrives at 
these insights, and the extent to which its methods in doing so differ from 
moral philosophy's own traditional methods, is less important than the 
effectiveness with which these insights are communicated to the reader. 
This stance is evident in his claim concerning the products of moral 
philosophy: 
Moral philosophy which contains clever and impeccable logical 
argument but adds nothing to moral insight can be valuable as a 
piece of applied logic but is not, in my judgement, a distinguished 
piece of moral philosophy. 101 
This comment serves to amplify his teleological account of moral 
philosophy and emphasises the weight he ascribes to outcomes. Moral 
philosophy is not only defined by reference to its aims and functions, it is 
also evaluated according to the success with which they are achieved or 
fulfilled. However, insofar as it entails that moral philosophy's definition 
depends on the quality of its outcomes, however construed, this view is 
problematic. There is nothing in the definition of an activity that requires 
that the activity successfully fulfil its function. A work of moral philosophy 
can be bad in many ways, it can be irrelevant, irreverent and specious, but 
loo Raphael, op. cit., p. 2 
lin ibid. p. 5 
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this does not disqualify it as moral philosophy. A process cannot be defined 
solely by reference to the quality of its outcome. For instance, if I am a 
house painter I am one by reference to more than merely the quality or 
volume of my output. In addition to my aims, there is a process involved, 
and this process helps to define my role and function as a house painter: 
stripping old paint, washing surfaces, filling gaps and other such 
preparations, choosing and mixing new colours, selecting brushes and 
rollers, applying the coats of paint in the required order, waiting for each to 
dry before the next one is applied. House painting is defined by reference 
to some or all of these activities. I can be a poor house painter, a sloppy 
workman and have no eye for colour or shade, but provided that my 
activities are consistent with these processes, I am a house painter 
nonetheless. To be sure, part of what defines my role as a house painter is 
entailed in what I set out to achieve, in what function I try to fulfil, but my 
aims are not wholly constitutive of a definition of my activity. The same 
applies for philosophy. Regardless of how compelling my arguments, 
defining my activities as a moral philosophy is constitutive of the process in 
which I am engaged. This process was discussed in chapter one, and it 
involves evaluating and sorting moral claims, clarifying moral terms and 
concepts and generally arguing for a certain ethical position. That Raphael 
himself accepts this as the proper definition of moral philosophy emerges 
in his account of philosophy advanced in another of his works, in which he 
states quite clearly that the main tradition of western philosophy has two 
connected aims, which he describes as: '(a) the clarification of concepts, for 
the purpose of (b) the critical evaluation of beliefs. ' 102 This account reflects 
the more generally accepted view of moral philosophy as a process, and 
does not rely merely on the nature or quality of its outcomes for a 
definition. This account also clearly accommodates the distinction between 
102 Raphael (1990) op. cit. 
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literature and moral philosophy. While the concepts instantiated in a novel 
may well enhance a philosophical exploration of these concepts and 
sharpen insights concerning their real world applications, the literary 
instantiation of these concepts is not itself constitutive of an activity that 
may be defined as the critical exposition of these concepts in the same way 
as philosophy may be defined. 
The problem of definition aside, Raphael is not the sole occupant of 
the position that a work of literature can also be a work of moral 
philosophy. Nussbaum claims that certain novels that are deeply 
philosophical, or else make an important contribution to moral philosophy, 
may themselves be considered examples of literature as moral 
philosophy."3 She claims that a novel's philosophical status is attained, at 
least in part, by reference to its moral insight and its ability to communicate 
this to its readers. In her commentary on Henry James' The Golden Bowl, she 
argues: 
the views uncovered in this text derive their power from the way 
in which they emerge as the ruminations of such a high and fine 
mind concerning the tangled mysteries of these [the characters] 
imaginary lives.'" 
But do the facts that a novel was written by 'a high and fine mind,' 
expresses its author's insights, and furnishes a detailed depiction of the 
tangled mysteries of experience moral philosophy qualify it as a work of 
moral philosophy? Nussbaum believes so, and claims that, insofar as it is 
the task of moral philosophy to 'search for a specification of the good life 
for a human being,' 105 literary texts which help to enhance our ethical 
understanding in this regard ought to be included in the endeavour. Her 
conclusion is consistent with Raphael's second proposition. Nussbaum 
argues that some novelists can 'state... truths' about the ethical life that 
10 Nussbaum, 1990, op. cit., pp. 125-127 
104 ibid., p. 141 
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escape philosophical discourse and that, as a result of their ability to 
communicate these truths, '...certain novels are irreplaceably works of 
moral philosophy.' 106 She argues that James' novel is a clear example of 
such a work: 
Insofar as the goal of moral philosophy is to give us 
understanding of the human good through a scrutiny of 
alternative conceptions of the good, this text and others like it 
would then appear to be important parts of this philosophy. 107 
Nussbaum's approach here is not new. Indeed, it follows a long tradition of 
literary and philosophical discourse which finds perhaps its consummate 
expression in the writings of Rene Descartes who, in Discourse on Method, 
observes: 
...to read good books is like holding a conversation with the most 
eminent minds of past centuries and, moreover, a studied 
conversation in which these authors reveal to us only the best of 
their thoughts. 108 
But this stance is problematic. If literature can make a distinctive 
contribution to ethical reflection, then this contribution is at least partly 
dependent on its distinctiveness. However, as shown, literature's 
distinctiveness is due to the unity of its form and content. To value a work 
of literature for the message it communicates is to assume the separability 
of form and content, that is, of the 'valuable' message from the medium 
through which it is communicated. This dovetails with the doctrine that art 
is essentially (and principally valuable as) a form of communication, and 
fits with Raphael's teleological account. Budd observes of the doctrine that 
it requires: 
an artist to create a work of art with the intention of 
communicating something to a particular individual or group of 
105 Nussbaum (1990), op. cit., p. 142 
106 ibid., p. 148 
107 ibid. 
108 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p.30 
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• people or with the hope that somebody will experience the work 
and understand its message. 109 
The stance that literature's contribution to ethical reflection lies solely in its 
message implies that value attaches to literature principally as a form of 
cognitive communication and, as such, implicitly rejects the unity of form 
and content. Budd argues that there are serious negative implications for 
treating a work of literature merely as a vehicle for some message: 'For the 
distinction between vehicle and message intrinsic to the concept of 
communication means that for any message there are in principle many 
vehicles capable of communicating that message.'" 1° On this account, to 
value a work of literature merely for the message it communicates reduces 
it to a means of communicating that message and accords little value to the 
way it is communicated. Thus, a captioned photograph of the Congolese 
workers is in principle equally capable of communicating the moral 
significance of their predicament as the scene from Heart of Darkness. A 
diary entry reporting Stephen Dedalus' temptation and ultimate surrender 
is equally capable of revealing his anguish as the scene from A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man. A statistical representation of the scale of the 
Holocaust is equally capable of conveying its horror as Sophie's Choice. 
However, none of these alternative modes of communication can equally 
elicit the emotional engagement that makes the literary mode so valuable to 
ethical reflection. Nor, as argued earlier, can these modes furnish the 
extensive freedoms required to exploit the opportunities for ethical 
reflection offered by imaginative literature. 
While Raphael's acceptance of the unity of form and content is 
implicit in his argument that how the story is told is as important as the 
story itself, divorcing content from form is a natural consequence of 
treating literature as philosophy. Isolating and sorting moral propositions 
1°9 Budd, op. cit., p. 175 (n14) 
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is integral to the process of moral philosophy. Indeed, a necessary step in 
the philosophical analysis of concepts and beliefs is extracting what is being 
said from the way in which it is communicated. A similar objection obtains 
to Nussbaum's treatment of Henry James' novels as the musings of a high 
and fine mind. It may be that James' novels represent the musings of a high 
and fine mind, and that they deserve a place in moral philosophy's scrutiny 
of the good life, but to regard his novels as works of explicit moral 
philosophy is to isolate the propositions contained in his musings and 
subject his conceptions of the good to the kind of critical scrutiny that she 
herself assigns as a function of moral philosophy. This is not the function of 
literature, but of explicit moral philosophy. Her claim that 'a goal of moral 
philosophy is to give us some understanding of the human good through a 
scrutiny of alternative conceptions of the good' implies a distinction 
between the concepts and their scrutiny. A literary presentation of an 
alternative conception of the good is not the same thing as an analysis of 
that conception of the good. Nussbaum's argument that works which 
furnish an impression of these concepts are irreplaceably works of moral 
philosophy ignores this distinction. 
The point is not that novels cannot communicate ethical messages, 
that their messages cannot be subjected to critical scrutiny, or that value 
cannot be ascribed thereby. The point is rather that the way its message is 
communicated, and how the reader grasps it, is what makes the novel 
valuable to ethical reflection. Reducing a novel to the sum of its moral 
propositions and their logical relations necessarily deprives it of the unique 
and irreducible contribution to ethical reflection endowed by the unity of 
its form and content. While Budd's objection to the communication 
doctrine expressly concerns artistic value, it applies equally well to this 
argument, that the whole of the work is valuable, as a whole: 
110 ibid. p. 15 
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It is, of course, true that what a work of art communicates can be 
integral to its value as a work of art, for it may be integral to the 
experience that work offers. But it is the message as communicated 
by the work, the message as realized in the experience of the work, that 
determines the work's artistic value, not the message itself. 1" 
Budd's argument mirrors Cunningham's on the status of literature's 
message and its value to ethical reflection: 
When literature succeeds at conveying ethical insights, it does so 
not simply by telling us something that can be understood in some 
cognitive sense distinct from our emotional resources. Rather, 
literature works by helping us to see, which is just as much a 
matter of feeling our way to clearer apprehension. 112 
He does not mean that an insightful novel will simply depict its characters' 
emotions as objects for the reader's contemplation. Rather, he draws from 
Aristotle's notion that right feeling is essential to right judgement and, 
ultimately, good character and right living, and argues, 'because of the way 
it is told, the story itself will elicit emotions in the reader, and such 
emotions are a constitutive part of ethical judgement.' 113 As the generation 
of emotional responses to literary situations is a function of the unity of 
form and content, Cunningham's argument implicitly rejects the 
communication model with its required distinction between form and 
content. He writes: 
By helping us to feel along with and for the characters engaged in 
the often complex, perplexing, vexing business of living, a novel's 
style effectively blurs the conceptual line between style and 
content. 114 
Cunningham's position gels with John Dewey's idea that an artwork's 
meaning is embedded in the medium of its expression, is imaginatively 
invoked, engages the emotions and, insofar as it interacts with a self, 
precludes the kind of disembodied analysis required to isolate the message 
111 ibid. 
112 Cunningham, op. cit., pp. 85-86 
113 ibid., p. 86 
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from the vehicle. 115 Both of these positions dovetail with the stance 
developed in this thesis. The sympathetic world view furnished by 
contemplating ethical issues from the perspectives of Marlow, Stephen 
Dedalus, Tess Durbeyfield, Angel Clare, Alyosha Karamazov and Sophie, 
the stories of whom, as narrated, do more than simply enumerate a number 
of ethically significant propositions, can lead to a more acute awareness of 
possibilities of moral seriousness, and the complexity of moral judgement, 
than pure rational reflection can. 
As argued throughout this thesis, the opportunities for a more 
thorough understanding of ethics through the imaginative engagement 
with literary situations of moral seriousness are unavailable through 
reflection on Kant's, Mill's or other philosophical texts alone. However, nor 
are quite the same opportunities made available by treating Conrad's, 
Joyce's, Achebe's, Lawrence's and Hardy's literature as anything other than 
it is. So much of the novel's value in this capacity resides in the irreducible 
nature of its form. The significance of the whole of the text is in the sum of 
the literary devices it contains; it is in its language and in its symbolism, 
enmeshed in its metaphorical representations of life, its themes and its 
subject matter. In the novel, and in other forms of imaginative literature, 
form and content unite to endow the text with substantive meaning. And 
its value is even embedded in the ambiguities that are such rich sources for 
reflection, which prompted Henry James to declare some novels as 'loose 
and baggy monsters.' If an over-emphasis on perspicuity can become a 
shortcoming of philosophical reflection, then it seems that the loose and 
baggy monstrosity of the novel can provide, if applied with diligence, an 
ideal corrective. 
The power of this contribution would be undermined if we were to 
uncritically accept Raphael's proposition that a work of literature can also 
be a work of philosophy. As I have sought to establish, the value of the 
connection between literature and moral philosophy lies, at least in part, in 
115 John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Perigree, 1980), p. 273 passim. 
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the distinction between the two enterprises. If we are to employ one form of 
discourse to supplement another form of discourse, then it makes no sense 
to reduce the supplement to that which requires supplementing. Accepting 
the proposition that a work of literature can also be a work of moral 
philosophy requires treating the literary work in the same way as we 
would a work of moral philosophy. And that means reducing it to the sum 
of its unadorned propositions and their relations so as to subject it to the 
same forms of clarification and analysis appropriate to the normative 
conclusions of a philosophical argument. This cannot be done without 
treating the fundamental constitution of the text as something that it is not. 
If all that a novel can show us about the ethical can be reduced to the sum of 
what it says about the ethical, then it might possibly qualify as a work of 
moral philosophy. But then we would not be dealing with the loose and 
baggy monster that has been shown to enrich our ethical reflection by 
furnishing the opportunities for unique perspectives and experiences. 
Indeed, after paraphrasing the work so as to isolate and evaluate its ethical 
propositions, we would then find ourselves back where we started, only to 
repeat the cycle - honing the work to an abstract general inoral argument 
so that we can validate its prescriptions, only to find that it fails to engage 
our real ethical concerns. 
When I argue that a novel ought not to be treated as a work of moral 
philosophy, I do not mean to suggest that it cannot be deeply philosophical 
and valued for the moral insights it furnishes. What makes many novels 
great is that they are deeply philosophical; that they manage, whether 
through the writer's ability to convey profound moral insight, or by a 
reader's application and inference, to reveal something important about 
our particular or universal ethical concerns, is testament to their 
philosophical depth and import. 
The argument here is that the value of a work of imaginative 
literature resides in the irreducible unity of its form and content. If a work 
of literature is to be of substantive value in the narrowly circumscribed 
context of normative ethics, then it must be allowed to show us, and we 
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must be allowed to see, and to feel, the significance of the moral issues it 
represents. It cannot enrich our ethical perspectives in this way if it is 
reduced to a mere sum of abstract propositions. Conversely, treating moral 
philosophy as irredeemably flawed because it cannot represent complex 
lived reality in the same fashion as imaginative literature not just ignores 
philosophy's practical aim, it also misses the point of the marriage between 
the two. In this respect, the difference between the two enterprises and 
their relative benefits is crucial. What constitutes bringing philosophical 
reflection to novel 'reading? According to Cunningham, this is 'simply a 
case of bringing care, diligence, and orderliness to thinking about what a 
particular novel's answer would be to Socrates' "How should one live?" 116 
This is not to suggest that the novel will furnish a direct answer to ethical 
questions. As argued earlier, it would be seriously counterproductive to 
accept the propositions of literature as uncriticized foundations for a case 
for life. Indeed, the distinction between the two enterprises assumes a 
distinction between the object and process of philosophical analysis. To 
achieve the kind of systematic understanding of the good life aimed at by 
moral philosophy, we will always need cool-headed philosophical analysis 
to sort and evaluate moral propositions, no matter what their source• or 
how they are communicated. On the subject of philosophical style Murdoch 
writes: 
I am tempted to say that there is an ideal philosophical style 
which has a special unambiguous plainness and hardness about 
it.. .when the philosopher is as it were in the front line in relation 
to his problem I think he speaks with a certain cold clear 
recognizable voice. 117 
Murdoch identifies two functions in moral philosophy's endeavour. First, it 
is an 'attempt to perceive and to tease out of thought our deepest and most 
general concepts' and, second, it constitutes 'the critical analysis of 
ii6 cunningham, op. cit., p. 87 
117 Murdoch in Magee, op. cit., p. 231 
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beliefs.' 118 As she understands it, philosophy is abstract, discursive and 
direct, and valuable for these traits. 119 However, when the cold, clear 
recognisable voice of philosophical analysis rings untrue to a certain aspect 
of lived moral experience, literature may be employed to supplement 
philosophy's function. The argument is that contemplating the actions and 
attitudes of literary characters, their consequences and their relations with 
other characters, and reflecting on how these may apply to ethical 
experience, will deepen our understanding of ethics and ethical theory. 
In The Sovereignty of the Good, Murdoch writes that a meritorious moral 
philosophy is one which 'at least professes and tries to be a philosophy that 
one could live by.' 12° She argues that above all, moral philosophy should be 
inhabited. 121 The thrust of this project has been to show that while the 
philosophical method carves out a conceptual space in which ethical 
concepts may be sorted, clarified and analysed, literature helps to makes 
that space inhabitable. In so doing, literature augments, but does not 
replace, moral philosophy's proper endeavour to present a comprehensive 
and compelling case for the best ways of life and forms of character for 
creatures like us. 
118 ibid. p. 233 
119 ibid., p. 236 
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